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9Foreword
Soili Nysten-Haarala and Katri Pynnöniemi
The Seventh symposium for Russian and East European Studies (VIEPÄ) was 
organized in March 2008 at the University of Applied Studies, Kouvola. The 
idea of the symposium was to facilitate discussion on “logistics” of cooperation 
between Russia and Europe. The term logistics has its etymological roots in 
Ancient Greece and ‘Logistikas’ of Roman empire that were special war envoys 
in charge of mobility and services of the army. In the modern times the concept 
has acquired a new meaning in the context of economics. In the most general 
level it refers to controlling of time and space – to the process of speeding up and 
rationalizing the movement of goods and people through the economic system. 
The relations between Russia and the EU has its own ‘logistics’ as well. This is a 
repertoire of institutions through which Russia and the EU interact. In a more 
symbolic level, ‘logistics’ of Russia-EU relations consists of a vocabulary that 
forms a basis for a dialogue. However, as the developments in the recent years 
show, the same words used in articulating the relationship do not necessarily 
turn into common actions. The present collection of articles aspires to 
facilitate multidisciplinary discussion on prospects of EU-Russia relations and 
developments taking place in Russia. 
The editors would like to thank contributors to this volume for their work and also 
Soili Lehto-Kylmänen, Senior Lecturer at the Kymenlaakso University of Applied 
Sciences for the original idea and taking the main responsibility for organizing the 
conference back in 2008. We are also grateful for the Kymenlaakso regional fond 
of the Finnish Cultural Foundation for their financial support for the conference, 
including this volume.
Dmitri Furman’s article is based on his keynote presentation in the conference. 
Furman analyses how the Russian state changed from the Russian Empire to a 
new Soviet empire and further to a smaller Russian empire again. Furman 
claims that this empire at the same time tries to be both an empire and a 
Russian nation-state. A true nation state would lead to disintegration of the 
empire, which Russia tries to keep even if it leads to authoritarian rule and 
imitation democracy. He sees that the price, which Russian people pay for the 
empire in the form of absence of democracy and democratic rights, is too high. 
Furman suggests that the way out of this undemocratic, nationalist imperialism 
would be letting the empire disintegrate and become a democratic nation state. 
The next stage could then be “Europeanization” of Russia – becoming an ordinary 
democratic country within the European House. The article is a rare and brilliant 
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analysis of Russian nationalism, which seems to be even more incomprehensible 
for the Western World than Russian imperialism.
Vladimir Kagansky provides a brief overview on the spatial dynamics of change 
in the post-Soviet space during the Yeltsin period and in Mr. Putin’s presidency. 
He pays attention to the oscillation between regionalization and centralization, 
the latter being dominant in the recent years. The political development is 
divorced from the actual trends of spontaneous territorial transformations, argues 
Kagansky.
Katri Pynnöniemi’s article goes through the Russian discussion in the late 
1990s and early 2000 on the pan-European/international transport corridors. In 
today, discussion on the transport corridors focuses on the logistic systems and 
administrative barriers (e.g. customs) in the EU-Russia trade. The latter issue was 
evident already in the late 1990’s discussion. The main emphasis was, however, on 
creation of common institutional framework to tackle the issues. The article shows 
how, in what sense, Russian discussion is different or perhaps complementary to 
the discussion in the EU on this same topic. The chapter ends with the discussion 
of different types of games that underlie Russian politics and economics. These are 
the games of competition, games of chance and games of simulation.
In his article Yrjö Myllylä explores important question of the possible futures of 
the Murmansk region. The article ties up with the general theme of logistics as 
a practical as well as a symbolic concept, by assessing three different scenarios 
for the Murmansk region’s development. The first scenario depicts positive 
development trends that bring the region closer to the market economy found 
in the West. In the second scenario, development will be slower due to the 
strengthening of the authoritarian forces in the society and business. The third 
scenario foresees a possibility of the one of the “wild card” materializing and the 
considerable fall in the energy prices. These factors will contribute to a more 
authoritarian trend than in the second option. Myllylä concludes the article by 
policy recommendations for the policy makers.
Soili Nysten-Haarala approaches corporate social responsibility from the point 
of view of municipalities and the attempts to reform municipal democracy in 
Russia. On the one hand Russian companies continue old patriarchal methods of 
social responsibility of the Soviet period and on the other hand they try to orient 
themselves towards the requirements of the global markets. Forest certification 
is one method with which companies and the NGOs together introduce western 
forestry practices combining social (and environmental) responsibility with it. 
Companies, however, are the only tax payers and thus the engines of change in 
the countryside. Market driven certification also changes the role of the state from 
an overwhelming power structure to cooperator with other interest groups. The 
absence of welfare state and state arranged social security is, however, a burden 
for the companies, also leaving the local people on the mercy of enterprises. 
11
The state introducing municipal democracy cannot localize it without providing 
municipalities for financial means for its application. 
Maria Tysiachniouk  examines in her article the cooperation between the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Stora Enso Corporation during the 
implementation of the Pskov Model Forest (PMF) project in North West Russia. 
Pskov model forest was also supported by the Swedish SIDA in order to make it a 
model of Swedish forestry methods. Stora Enso and WWF successfully managed 
to localize global practices in a rather small area in Russia. Almost nonexistent 
dissemination to other areas was, however, disappointing to the SIDA. The whole 
project, however, ended in the withdrawal of Stora Enso from the district. The 
author assumes that the main reason for the withdrawal was the higher tariffs of 
exporting wood from Russia.
Ivan Kulyasov’s article focuses on the analysis of the role of NGOs and experts 
in building trust during the localization of the global process of FSC forest 
certification. Using concepts of personal and non-personal trust, trust in abstract 
expert systems, the author analyzes the mechanisms of constructing trust by 
different groups of NGOs and experts in global and local contexts. In the studied 
case the NGO experts managed to convince the company to widen the group of 
local beneficiaries of social responsibility attached to the FSC certification.
Svetlana Tulaeva presents in her case study from Priluzhie district in the Komi 
Republic how forest certification has been introduced and applied to Russian 
circumstances. The key players in introducing certification are big Russian holding 
companies and Russian offices of international environmental organizations. 
According to this case study the strongest actor was the state controlled forest 
management units, which with the Russian NGOs put pressure on companies to 
maintain and develop company social responsibility. Tulaeva describes the project 
as “democratization from above”, but assumes that the market based benefits 
will support social responsibility and continue its implementation even after the 
withdrawal of the NGO and finishing of the western financial support.
Soili Nysten-Haarala translated Dmitri Furman’s article from Russian and Roy 
Goldblatt has language checked all the articles of this volume.
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Part i: On the backround of Russian policies towards 
     the EU
14
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From Russian Empire to Russian Democratic State
Dmitri Furman
1. Introduction
The nation-state is a common, especially in Europe, state form of late Modern 
Times. In the 19th and 20th century it was the entelechy of such processes as the 
unification of Germany and Italy, the disintegration of the Turkish Empire and 
Austria-Hungary and independence for many nations and countries. The right of 
self-determination of peoples was one slogan of Modern Times. The force of this 
slogan was colossal, since the justification for this right was indisputable, as was its 
inseparable connection with other self-evident democratic rights.
As all great ideas and slogans, it led to bloodshed since the emergence of 
nationalism called for the disintegration of empires, the fall of some and 
creation of other states, and drawing of new borderlines. When the question 
concerns determining whether a certain ethnic group is a nation and the extent 
of its national territory, problems immediately arise that cannot be resolved in a 
scientific discussion. Nations talk of their own right of self-determination with 
enthusiasm and pathos, but forget this right when the discussion turns to other 
peoples and minorities living in the same territory. The most shocking example 
is Hitler’s Germany, which could easily turn from demanding self-determination 
for German minorities suffering discrimination in other states to the enslavement 
and extermination of other nations. A more recent example is Serbia demanding 
self-determination for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia while rejecting the 
same right for Kosovians living in Serbia; another is Russia bloodily crushing 
Chechen separatism, but also resorting to bloodshed in declaring the right of self-
determination for Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia.
The principle of nation-states in Europe was seemingly recreated by the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. There are no longer any larger 
European nations lacking statehood. On the other hand, however, the principle 
lost its earlier power chiefly because it was for the most part satisfied. A second 
reason is the war memories which followed its realization and how the German 
fascists utilized it. Thirdly, in the end democracy triumphed in Europe and 
integration processes intensively progress. Ethnic minorities have a substantial 
number of rights in a democratic state, and thus national sovereignty as well as 
national identity has weakened in the European integration process. Scotland 
or Catalonia achieving total national independence can no longer generate 
similar enthusiasm as the struggle to unify Italy or liberate Bulgaria, because 
in democratic Britain and Spain the Scots and Catalans have real autonomy 
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and an independent Scotland and Catalonia would in any case enter the EU 
and surrender decision-making power to Brussels and Strasbourg. The goal of 
development changed in Europe from the nation-state to supranational European 
unity.
Russia is a country of extremely rapid development. It had to experience in the 
21st century the processes which other nations experienced in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  Russia not only had to build what other countries had already built, but 
also what they were rebuilding. For Russia the democratic nation-state continues 
to be the goal.
The Russian Federation is neither a true democracy nor a national Russian state. 
It is a remnant of the Russian and Soviet empires connecting imitation democracy 
with authoritarian power. Russian identity has not yet broken free of the cocoon 
of imperial and Soviet identities. It is an unhealthy identity positing imperial 
chauvinism, revenge, Russophobic self-destruction and the fear of the collapse of 
the nation-state.
The aim of this article is to sketch the reasons for the difficulties and 
indecisiveness of the process of developing Russian national identity and the 
Russian nation-state and envisaging its realization.
2. The origin of the dilemma of Russian nationalism 
The Russian Empire was a state which arose on the basis of a Russian ethnic core, 
but developed into a multiethnic state1 as the result of wars with other and very 
different weaker states and peoples on its periphery. The Empire was ruled by an 
elite consisting of representatives of different peoples for whom relations based 
on estate and class were incalculably stronger than ethnic ties and whose loyalty 
was founded on their attachment to the dynasty – not on ethnic connection with 
the Russians. This is evident in the appellation “Russia - Rossiia” itself, which 
came about during the reign of Peter the Great; it meant the state declared itself 
an empire. This concept was a latinization of the ethnic name “Rus’.” “Russkiĭ 
– Russian”2 refers at the same time to the ethnic basis and origin of the state as 
well as the fact that the empire is not identical to the Russian ethnic core, but 
something substantially greater.3
The expansion of the Empire and reduction of the weight of the Russian ethnic 
core increased the fragility of the imperial state. But even more this fragility 
increased as a result of the processes of modernization.
The modernization of society in the Russian Empire of the 19th century inevitably 
led to the emergence of a national identity. Becoming literate and creating 
literature in national languages, people from peasant communities started to 
identify themselves not only as inhabitants of a certain place, members of certain 
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estate serving the Russian Emperor and practicing a certain religion, but also 
representatives of different nations. Nationalism was taking form – an ideology 
and political tendency targeting the unity of naturally formed ethnic communities 
identifying themselves as a nation and living in their own nation-states.
Russian nationalism also started to awaken. However, the problem of the nation-
state for Russians was totally different from that of other peoples of the Empire, 
since Russian nationalism in principle differed from that of the other peoples. 
The name of the empire was Russian (Rossisskoĭ, almost Russkĭi) (See translator’s 
comment in footnote 2). It originated from the ancient Russian state (Rus’), 
Orthodox Christianity was the state religion, emperors were Orthodox Christian 
and if not Russian by blood identifying themselves as Russian. Russians in this 
empire had less freedom and were poorer than other peoples.4 Having no ethnic 
society in the absolutist state, they had no possibilities to wield power or even 
influence it, but they could compensate for the absence of political rights as well 
as their proportional poverty with the glow and power of the imperial state. This 
weakened the development of the non-imperial Russian identity and gave rise to a 
special reactionary Russian nationalism.
Russian nationalists suffered for the non-Russian character of the imperial elite 
and the fact that national minorities such as Baltic Germans and Finns could 
enjoy rights which Russians did not have; they therefore chose the “Idea of Russia” 
as the idea of the Russian nation-state. However, they did not understand the 
idea as constructing such a state on ethnic Russian territory, which in the Russian 
Empire was impossible to clearly define. In any case, excluding the non-Russian 
territory, which had been taken by war, was psychologically impossible or at least 
very difficult for the nationalists, as was abstaining from ruling any territory, even 
land which objectively belonged to peoples who were a burden to them, such as 
Poland was to the Russian Empire and Chechnya is for the Russian Federation. 
The idea of Russia as a national Russian state arose as a demand for politics 
specifically protecting Russians as well as discriminating against minorities and 
the Russification of all territories “which had been taken with Russian arms” for 
the Empire.  The slogan “Russia for the Russians” did not mean “Poland for the 
Poles,” not to mention “Ukraine for the Ukrainians”, because Poland and Ukraine 
were Russia and also belonged to the Russians. Russian nationalism at the same 
time desired mutually exclusive things – the national Russian state and the 
Empire. What they wanted was an impracticable utopia and attempts to realize it 
required pogroms, exile of entire peoples as well as forced Russification.
The nationalism of other peoples which was formed in the Russian Empire could 
refer to democratic values, but not Russian nationalism, because in a continental 
empire with unclear borders between the imperial center and the periphery 
democratization of the center was impossible and separatism in the fringe-area 
was not allowed. This diverges from “overseas” colonial empires in which the 
center can be democratized and yet continue to permit authoritarian rule in the 
colonies; democratization and liberalization of continental empires immediately 
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leads to disintegration. Alexander II put this idea very clearly: “If Russia is given a 
constitution, it will break up. That is why I will not allow it, not because I refuse to 
give people these rights (Mironov 2000, 152). The Empire remained as absolutist 
state and Russian nationalism, struggling to maintain and Russify the Empire, 
adhered to absolutism, thus confirming its inherent “Russianness” and the non-
Russian and anti-Russian character of liberation movements.  Anti-Semitism 
became its inseparable characteristic.
Absolutism and the imperial elite saw a danger in Russian nationalism. It was a 
new ideology of the democratic era, exploding the unquestionable traditional 
loyalty towards authority, directing its own demands towards the power structure 
and setting a priority on ethnic relations rather than class and estate. Moreover, 
Russian nationalism generated a reaction to other kinds of nationalism and in this 
way made the disintegration of the Empire, which it struggled to avoid, possible.5 
By losing traditionalist legitimacy and the support of the masses and facing new 
revolutionary challenges, absolutism struggled to find a new justification of power 
in Russian nationalism, with the support of Russian nationalist Black Sotnians.
The anti-liberal and imperial position of Russian nationalism isolated it from all 
other national movements in the Empire and from liberal democratic movements 
in Russian society. For Russian revolutionaries fighting against the absolutistic 
empire, any nationalism, except the Russian, was a potential ally and Russian 
support of authoritarianism by the masses was the main enemy. The term “union 
of the Russian people” became the symbol of pogroms and the word “Russian” 
could not exist in the title of any revolutionary party.  They were “rossiiskie” not 
“russkie” (see translator’s comment in footnote 2), and the national composition 
of the movement was as diverse as that of the imperial elite. The only difference 
was that if there was a proportional overrepresentation of Germans in the 
imperial elite, in the revolutionary counter-elite Jews were well represented.6 
The revolutionary movement adopted an extremely international and even 
Russophobic character. If the Black Sotnians were Anti-Semites and described 
the revolutionary movement as a plot by the Jews, Lenin could say: “A Russian 
intellectual is almost always a Jew, or at least a person with some Jewish blood in 
him.”
During the civil war the Whites fought for the Empire and the Reds for world 
revolution and the international socialist state. Practically all the peoples of the 
Empire except the Russians spoke for self-determination of peoples and tried 
to establish their own democratic nation-state. In practice, no one proposed a 
democratic “Russian Russia,” which could have been compared to the striving for 
a “Ukraine for Ukrainians” or a “Georgia for Georgian.”
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3. Nationalism in the Bolshevist State
The winners of the civil war were the Bolsheviks, who fought together with 
nationalists of non-Russian peoples, filled with passionate internationalism and 
hatred for Russian chauvinism, and prepared to realize all their demands and 
national projects under conditions whose fundamental nature the nationalists 
still could not quite understand – the dominance of the Communist Party. It is 
possible to claim that the Bolsheviks managed to reawaken the dream of empire 
just because they did not strive for this goal. The losers were the more developed 
peoples in the western borderlands. For the nationalists among non-Russian 
peoples the choice between the Bolsheviks and the Whites never even emerged, 
since the Bolsheviks were unquestionably the lesser evil.
In the beginning the new state did not act as a successor to the earlier empire, 
but promoted the future international socialist cooperation of peoples. In a way 
it acted like a caretaker government, which found it necessary to defend the 
international revolution. In its name there was no mention of either a successor to 
the empire or nationalism. Not a Russian Union, but the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics – a union of any republic – since they were Soviet and socialist, and in 
the end the union should have become worldwide. The first national anthem of 
this state was the “International.”
The Bolsheviks indeed in a way put into effect the nationalist programs of 
different peoples of the Empire by founding national Soviet republics and working 
hard to build socialist nations, e.g. creating literary languages, collecting folklore, 
establishing pantheons of great figures and so forth. Among the republics, there 
was a special Russian republic – the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. 
However, the special position of the Russians in the Russian Empire created some 
significant differences for this new republic.
One difference from other republics, the Russian republic was not established to 
fulfill a national project or to be a “national home for the Russians.” It was formed 
according to a residual principle. It included territory which could not be given 
to other republics and territory on which it was difficult to establish new Soviet 
republics, either because the peoples were too small to be regarded as equal to 
other republics, or the area they resided in had been absorbed inside the massive 
Russian territory due to Russian colonialism. Therefore autonomous republics 
were founded for these peoples inside the RSFSR. It was like the remnants of 
the earlier empire, where many peoples, with very diverging cultures from the 
Russians, belonged, but where some regions with Russian majorities were not 
included, since they were given to other republics for different reasons. In the 
name itself, the succession of the Empire is evident, but not the ethnic basis of the 
republic (rossiĭskaia, not russkaia, but in any case a federation). Russians in the 
Soviet Union had the least visible national republic.
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Furthermore, the Russian republic did not have all the national-governmental 
symbols that other republics had. There were communist parties in the republics 
with their own central committees, but no Russian Communist Party. Every 
republic had an own academy of sciences, but not the Russian and so forth.
In addition, it can be noted that Russian nationalism (imperial chauvinism) was 
overseen in the 1920s and 1930s more repressively than that of other peoples and 
the enormous work to modernize societies in earlier national borderlands of the 
Empire required transferring resources from the Russian center to compensate for 
the oppression which they had experienced in “the prison of peoples” under tsarist 
rule. This also required discrimination against Russians. In this way we can view 
the exploitation of the Russians in the Soviet Union, which in the post-Soviet era 
created Russian nationalism.
This image, however, is only one side of the coin. It has to be complemented 
by the compensation which the Russians received in the Soviet state and the 
psychological resonance which was so significant that the Soviet Union still 
awakens nostalgic feelings among the majority of Russians. In a series of opinion 
polls which lasted from 1992 to 2009, the number of those expressing sorrow for 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union was not less than 60 percent (Obshchee 
mnenie 2009, 191). Stalin was not ranked first in the competition for the most 
significant Russian only through the help of state power. What from one point 
of view appears as a sign of discrimination and exploitation can from another be 
evidence of the special imperial role of the Russian people.
4. The Soviet Union becomes the successor of the Russian Empire
The state founded by the Bolsheviks was understood to be a federation of equal 
republics.  However, a federation comprised of great Russia and small Armenia 
and Georgia having equal rights is totally impossible. It never existed in reality, 
but only on paper in the Constitution and in ideological dogmas.  In reality 
the totalitarian Soviet state, which was founded on a quasi-religious dogmatic 
ideology, was actually more unitary and centralized than the Russian Empire.
In spite of the dominant ideology, a tightly centralized state on the territory of 
the Russian Empire, ruled from Moscow and where the official language could 
only be Russian, where Russians were the largest in number (in 1989 50.8 % of 
the population), and the rulers were either Russian or Russified representatives of 
minority peoples, was a new manifestation of the old empire. With the dreams for 
the worldwide revolution going down the drain and the collapse of the eschatology 
of Marxism-Leninism, the state was more often seen not as an embryo for the 
worldwide union of the nations, but as the successor of the Russian Empire, a new 
manifestation of the same state, which was founded by Russian warlords, whose 
names were adopted for the new military badges of honor. 
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While Lenin, the founder of this state, was an enemy of Russian nationalism 
and a “Russophobe”, his successor saw himself as follower of both Lenin and the 
great despots, the founders of the Empire – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. 
The revised “Internationale”  (first national anthem of the Soviet Union) states: 
“Unbreakable union of reborn republics, Great Russia has been welded forever to 
stand.” In the Soviet state the Russians were officially called the Big Brother of the 
Soviet Peoples. Even if the existence of national republics and the development of 
socialist nations is based on ideological dogmas, ignoring them or even Marxism-
Leninism completely was impossible and a policy of Russification and Russian 
language in the Soviet republics starting in the 1930s replaced national languages. 
Rapprochement and even assimilation of peoples and creating a new society of 
unified Soviet peoples was possible to achieve only based on Russian language and 
culture. This was an ideological construction of the late Soviet period. 
After the war, when the circle of vassal communist states was founded, Moscow 
controlled a larger territory than had ever before been controlled from one center. 
For the outside world this great empire was simply “the Russians.” Never in history 
had the appellation “Russian” been associated with such power.
This was significant compensation for some losses incurred by the Russians in 
the Soviet Union and for some elements of discrimination against them as well 
as the general absence of rights in a totalitarian state. While other peoples of the 
Soviet Union had their national homes and national republican patriotism, the 
Russian house was the whole Soviet Union and Russian patriotism was all-Soviet, 
not Russian. Russia did not have its party or academy, because the Soviet party 
and academy were Russian. Even if resources were granted by Russia to national 
republics and representatives of some non-Russian peoples could be privileged 
to attend universities in Moscow, this was only because the Russians were such 
a great nation, big brothers who were continuously and ritually praised by other 
peoples. In his famous toast of victory over Germany Stalin said: “I would like 
to drink a toast to our healthy Soviet peoples and above all the Russian people, 
because it is the most developed of all the nations belonging to the Soviet Union… 
because it served …. as generally recognized, as the leading force of the Soviet 
Union among all the peoples of the country.”7  In the Soviet Union Russia was a 
non-national republic and Russians a people with an undefined national identity; 
it was difficult for them to see themselves living in a national home and not in a 
magnificent multinational state, where it played the main role.
5. The role of Russian nationalism in the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union
The founding of the Soviet Union saved the Empire from disintegration by giving 
birth to a new form of an imperial state on a new ideological foundation. But the 
forces which led to the destruction of the old empire, continued to function in the 
new state.
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As the Russian Empire preserved traditional loyalty towards the monarch, which 
in modern times hindered any development of society, the Soviet Union preserved 
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which translated into a series of wasted 
thoughts and continuously wasted vitality and displaced Western democratic 
ideologies as well as nationalism.
While the Empire exploded through a natural process of increasing national 
identity and nationalism, the Soviet Union, which was gnawed by the same 
processes, accelerated the building of Soviet socialist nations without foreseeing 
the far-reaching consequences of this enormous work.  At the time the Russian 
Empire collapsed, most of the peoples did not have a clear national identity, a 
clearly defined national territory, or a modern elite which could have led the new 
state; this explained the ease with which the Bolsheviks were able to crush these 
peoples and their nationalism. However, more vital nations existed in the Soviet 
Union with national features, their own intellectual and bureaucratic elites and 
a form of nation-state which could easily be filled with a national content and 
which made it relatively easy to destroy the Soviet state without resistance and 
bloodshed. 
As in the Russian Empire, Russian nationalism also played a different role in the 
Soviet Union than the nationalism of other peoples. As the communist ideology 
cracked down (continuously accompanied with anti-Semitism), nationalist 
movements first wielded power as an element of imaginary and contradictory 
ideas and in a symbolic synthesis with the Stalinist period and gradually became 
an independent ideological force and pressure group.8 But this movement was 
unprepared for independence or unifying with the other forces which corroded 
the Soviet Union – and was as impotent as the nationalism of the tsarist period. 
Therefore it was forced to adopt a sick and unnatural ideology and political 
position. The ideology of Russian nationalism is anti-Marxist, but as the glue of 
the empire was the party, the officials and dogmatic ideology that was Marxism-
Leninism, it had to be loyal to the party and the ideology. Again it sought the 
impossible – the transformation of the multinational Soviet Union cemented by 
the communist ideology and an openly national state for the Russian people. 
There were some attempts, first of all Solzhenitsyn’s, to build some kind of a non-
Soviet-imperial form of nationalism, but none led to anything but marginalization 
and isolation.
Once again history repeated itself for good or bad depending on the approach. 
The Soviet leadership regarded Russian nationalism as a danger, as the imperial 
leadership had earlier done. As the ideology holding the state together was 
deteriorating, everybody turned to support nationalism. People with democratic 
attitudes were afraid of it. The anti-liberalism and anti-democracy of Russian 
nationalism again made Russian liberalism and democracy “anti-national.” 
Russophilic anti-democracy again created a Russophobic democracy (see Furman 
2010, 37-).
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When Gorbachev’s perestroika ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
both the anti-communist revolution and the liberation movements of all Soviet 
peoples adopted a nationalist-democratic character. Anti-communism, democracy 
and nationalism unified them. Only the Russian democratic movement and 
nationalism diverged. In the fight against the center represented by Gorbachev, 
democrats could resort to arguments of nationalists on the exploitation of 
Russians,9 and nationalists were powerless to oppose slogans for the sovereignty 
of Russia and blindly advanced with the democrats towards the disintegration 
of the empire, which they wanted to preserve. New revolutionaries were drawn 
by national instincts, which they were afraid of. The Russian anti-communist 
movement was unable to create a synthesis, an organic unity of nationalism and 
democracy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of Russia as an independent state 
was the only way for the democrats to achieve real power with the leadership of 
Yeltsin. If for other nations and their leaders independence was a conscious and 
idealistic goal, “the coming true of century-long dreams,” for Russians such a goal 
did not exist and for their leaders the liquidation of the Soviet Union was only 
the decisive step in the struggle for power. The Russian people did not fight for 
independence, nor did they want it. An overwhelming majority of Russians voted 
to preserve the Soviet Union in Gorbachev’s referendum, and Yeltsin therefore 
decided not to legitimize the Belovezh Treaty (ending the Soviet Union) through 
a new referendum.10 The attempt to make the day of Russia gaining sovereignty 
a celebration of “Russian Independence” only led to mockery and sarcasm, 
and it was simply renamed “The Day of Russia”. The people did not even truly 
understand that the Union (Imperial) state really disappeared and not only 
changed its form – but everything remained as before.
The Leadership under Yeltsin did not clearly understand what it had done. The 
idea of the big brother, the natural leadership of the Russians within the territory 
of the Empire, was so strong that the domination of Russia seemed natural and 
not dependent on any governmental form. The attitude of the Russian leadership 
towards the new states can be defined in the concept: “It will not work out.”
The RSFSR and the Soviet Union were never results of a national project such as 
were the other republics. The new state was not a result of a national project but 
of a fight for independence. No one dreamed about it and it was not welcome. It 
just happened. 
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6. Low legitimacy of the new state leads to the old path
The legitimacy of independent Russia, the reception of the state by the people 
living in it, was –as is natural to them – less than the legitimacy of other new 
states. Russians cannot understand the state as their “national home” and its 
borders as historical and natural. Outside Russia there were territories where 
the majority of the population was Russian, but which for various reasons these 
areas were given to other republics in the Soviet Union. Some of these areas, such 
as Sevastopol, represent significant historical value for Russians. A significant 
amount of Russians were left outside Russia, and those who moved to Latvia 
or Estonia after the Second World War turned out to be non-citizens. On the 
other hand, there were numerous peoples on Russian soil whose culture differed 
significantly from the Russians and formed autonomous republics in the RSFSR. 
For them the legitimacy of the new state and their own inclusion in that state 
is even more doubtful than it is for Russians. For such peoples, for example the 
Chechens, whose history is practically one of fighting back the Russians, it is 
difficult to understand that they have no right to independence only because in 
Stalin’s totalitarian Soviet Union they did not receive the status of  a union republic 
but only an autonomous republic. 
A state which does not enjoy legitimacy either from the majority population 
or national minorities, combined with weak central power and the ordinary 
transformation crisis, starts to disintegrate. Autonomies demanded independence. 
Furthermore, separatism appeared in areas of Russia unmotivated by idealistic 
nationalism, the appearance of which was directly connected with the doubtful 
legitimacy of the state. The illusions of different Far-Eastern, Uralian, Siberian and 
other similar republics might not have seemed less natural and legitimate than 
Russia itself with its strange borders.
For those groups which came into power with Yeltsin, this self-destruction of the 
state was at the same time a threat and a means to grasp power, to strengthen 
and change it into something without alternatives. For those who gained power 
in 1991, transforming it into an authoritarian and non-alternative form cannot 
be explained solely by the threat of the collapse of the “mini-empire,” but also as 
a common cultural and psychological unpreparedness for democracy. However, 
the threat of the collapse of the state played a significant role in the defense of 
authoritarian evolution. The next step after the initial disintegration indicated that 
without personified central power and an authority figure, society descends into 
chaos and the Russians can lose the state and even disappear as a unitary people. 
The unity of the Russian Empire was maintained by autocracy. The unity of the 
Soviet Union was maintained by totalitarian power. The unity of the Russian 
Federation – the remnant of the Empire, could also be maintained only by the 
power of a non-alternative president for whom it is easy to grasp the traditional 
Russian authoritarian and personified power of the tsars and Communist 
Party secretaries. As in the great Russian and Soviet empires, maintaining and 
strengthening the unity of the Russian mini-empire could not be realized through 
bureaucratic “power verticality.” 
25
During the struggle for power of the Russian democrats the slogan of the right 
of self-determination of peoples was expressed. Their leader Yeltsin said, turning 
to the non-Russian population of Russia: “Take as much sovereignty as you can 
swallow!” But when the power in Russia was already won, the right for self-
determination of peoples was forgotten. It was only remembered in connection 
with separatism in the countries neighboring Russia. 
In spite of the dogmatically strengthened internationalism, the state created 
by the Bolsheviks assumed the identity of the successor to the empire in a new 
manifestation. The new state, in spite of the declarations of its democratic 
values in connection with its foundation, achieved the same identity even more 
quickly. The Yeltsin regime followed a path which was even more dangerous and 
psychologically closer to the understanding of Russian masses − a path which was 
more comfortable for those in power in its conservation and attempts to widen 
the mini-empire. This again demanded for a rebellion against the ethnically 
ambiguous morality which had existed in the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union. The new Russia is significantly more Russian than the Soviet Union. 
Compared to the Soviet Union Russians represent a clear majority (79.8% in 2002, 
but the power of Russians is gradually weakening and that of other, indigenous, 
peoples is growing). The official role of Orthodox Christianity is growing. 
However, in connection with this development the concepts “Russkiĭ” and “Russkiĭ 
State” are carefully avoided. Instead, the non-ethnic concept “Rossiiane” is applied 
(See footnote 2). Russian identity again turns to the imperial form, which is typical 
of them – the form in which an authoritarian nature and non-national character is 
compensated by the Russians being the leading people of the empire.
Yeltsin stated a war against a people who actually decided to “swallow” what they 
wanted and become completely sovereign − the Chechens. The first Chechen 
War did not lead to “pacifying” Chechnya and annexing it to the Russian “power 
vertical”. Even if the war was very unpopular and Russian identity was humbled 
for losing Chechnya, the actual defeat of the Russian army by a militia of a people 
amounting to less than one percent of the Russian population and confirming this 
loss through the Khazaviurt peace agreement was taken as a national humiliation. 
The war was later renewed for the consolidation of society in connection with 
the transfer of power from Yeltsin to the successor he had chosen. Putin finally 
managed to crush the Chechen resistance and formally regain Chechnya for 
Russia. In reality Chechnya became an authoritarian vassal state.
Preserving the unity of Russia was Putin’s main mission. He says in an interview 
for the book Ot pervogo litsa (From the First Figure): “Caucasia would have shifted 
the weight, it is clear … then upwards along the Volga River – Bashkortostan, 
Tatarstan. You see, when I imagined the real results – I got embarrassed. I thought... 
how many refugees could Europe and America take? ... Or should we have agreed 
on disintegration of the country.”11 These opinions are not Putin’s personally, 
they are images of the contemporary Russian mass identity. But for the second 
president of Russia they are the main ideological justification for an authoritarian 
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regime masked behind a democratic façade. In strengthening his power, he 
protects the country from breaking down and even protects Europe and America 
from millions of imaginary refugees.
In the system which Yeltsin founded and Putin developed into a “classical” form 
of imitation democracy, just like that of the totalitarian Soviet Union, federalism 
can only be a façade, a fiction. The national republics, which declared their 
sovereignty, do in fact under Putin possess similar rights (or lack of power) as 
Russian regions and are annexed to large areas, where the leaders are eparches 
nominated by the president. Putin actually abolished federalism, moving to 
name governors and make the Council of the Federation (the second chamber of 
parliament) a meeting-place for these governors and representatives of regional 
parliaments. 
As in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the integration of the collapsing 
state resorts to the post-Soviet verticality of power and crushes spontaneous 
national movements. However, as in the Soviet Union, such integration through 
vertical power is to a large extent only formal. Withdrawing from federalism and 
national republics is not realistic and the possibilities of controlling these republics 
from Moscow are limited. In reality the bureaucratic “verticality of power” tends 
to become a vertical of quasi-feudalism. The republican leaders, who are loyal to 
Moscow, provide different kinds of services, for example, in the form of votes, 
but Moscow, which is striving for stability and peace, does not intervene in the 
administration of national republics. The republics have an “isomorphic” all-
Russian system of power of the non-alternative Shaimevs, Iliumzhinovs and 
Kadyrovs (regional leaders), analogical to the system of power of the Razydovyhs 
and Kunaevs of the late Soviet period and objectively lay the foundation for its 
later disintegration. The verticality of power does not abolish chaos, it only locks 
it inside. It lurks under the peaceful and monolithic surface and waits for its time 
to take arms.
7. The politics of the authoritarian mini-empire
The main non-legitimacy of the borders of the Russian Federation as understood 
by the Russians is that the old Soviet viewpoint borders remained (and were 
greatly identical with those of the Russian Empire) the natural historical borders of 
“Great Russia”. Thus, nowadays only 14% of the Russians (Rossiiane) support total 
independence of the earlier Soviet republics and 53% answer “no” to the question 
of whether they see Ukraine as a foreign country (Obshchee mnenie 2009, 149, 
152). Therefore the Russian Federation, identifying itself as the successor to tsarist 
Russia and the Soviet Union, should not strive for a special dominating role in 
the post-Soviet space. The struggle to annexing the earlier autonomies into the 
Russian “verticality of power” is orchestrated with the struggle for oppression of 
the earlier Soviet republics. These are two aspects of the same policy, originating 
from the nature of the new Russian state − the mini-empire connected with 
authoritarian “power verticality.”
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The collapse of the Soviet Union was masked by Yeltsin (and not only from 
the people but to a great extent to himself) by founding of the CIS, which was 
understood to be the new form of russo-centric entity of the imperial space. A 
great deal of the domination of this space belongs to Russia.
Russia, which has not yet survived its own separatism movements inside the 
country, started to support separatists of other republics who turned to Russia 
with a stream of psychologically necessary flattery. Russian peace-keepers entered 
the separatist regions making it impossible for the new states to crush separatism 
with force in the same way as Russia did in Chechnya. This brings back the 
feeling of Russia as big brother − the decision-maker over the fates of the younger 
siblings. Support for separatists is connected with the officially recognized 
territorial integrity of the post-Soviet state, and works as the tool for driving 
the disobedient state to the CIS and tying it to Russia. For the governments, on 
the territory where separatist entities are supported, Russia maintains a feeling 
that in case they behave well, Russia will show them mercy and return their 
territorial integrity. The Russian-Georgian War in 2008 and the recognition of the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an acceptance of the impossibility 
to continue such politics eternally and to the destruction of Georgia. 
It is typical that by actively supporting national separatists in other post-Soviet 
states Russia, with great care, turns to Russian “irredentism” (Russians living 
outside Russia) and generally in supporting the strivings of Russians in new 
states to organize themselves. Supporting Russian irredentism pulls the rug from 
under the character of the Russian state as a multinational mini-empire, and 
not a Russian nation-state, not to mention domination in the post-Soviet space. 
Choosing between this support and even a symbolic recognition by the post-
Soviet states of the leading role of Russia, she would undoubtedly choose the latter.
In keeping the new states bordering it, Russia applies all possible methods – 
economic temptation in connection with economic threats, support for pro-
Russian politicians and applies the threat posed by the Russian irridentia: “we 
make no demands for the Crimea as long as Ukraine stays outside NATO.”
As securing the mini-empire cannot be divorced from strengthening the Russian 
authoritarian imitation democratic power system, the isomorphic system in 
earlier autonomies, and seeking to reinforce and widen the circle of vassals, 
enhancing post-Soviet space as the sphere of Russian interests cannot be divorced 
from Russia’s struggle to ensure regimes similar to Russia in the new states. As 
post-Soviet space is a true extension of the Russian mini-empire, the regimes of 
Lukashenko, Nazarbaev and others are similar extensions of those isomorphic 
All-Russian personalized regimes of Iliumshinov, Shaimiev and others, which 
were formed inside the mini-empire. The authoritarian governments of the CIS 
assess their independence highly and do not strive to continue under Russian 
rule. Perspectives of integration with Western unions, however, are closed to 
them as to Russia as well, because these regimes are incompatible with Western 
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political systems, and therefore they comprehend that in a difficult moment 
(like the Flower Revolution, or some crisis connected with transferring power to 
a successor) the West will not help them, but Russia in any case would try. As 
long as such regimes remain weak and imperfect in post-Soviet space, they will be 
dominated by the largest and strongest one, big brother Russia. 
The Soviet post-war structure of empire with its different circles has continued 
to exist in a reduced size and a much weakened form. The core is Russian Russia 
itself. There are national republics belonging to the Russian Federation that 
have a level of real independence, but this has very little to do with their formal 
constitutional position. Formally they are only parts of Russia, but in reality 
power is applied with a significant amount of inner freedom and Russian “vertical 
power” cannot infiltrate them. Finally, the outer circle is formed by those post-
Soviet states which are formally completely independent, but are part of the post-
imperial space with Russia as the center; they are to some extent tied to Russia, 
which tries to control them through softer and less restrictive methods that are 
still analogical to the “Soviet camp” of the Cold War.
8. How can the third attempt for democratization be successful?
As mentioned at the beginning of the article, a democratic nation-state was the 
entelechy of development for Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, and such a 
state continues to be the same for Russia. The year 1991 was a milestone and in 
the process a similar milestone for post-Soviet Russia as for the Soviet Union. 
The imitation democratic system does not have an ideological foundation. It is in 
internal conflict, not founded on a solid basis, and will naturally collapse from the 
inside. Russia will face an inevitable crisis connected with a new attempt to move 
toward real democracy. Such crises always arise more or less unexpectedly and it 
is impossible to completely prepare for them. However, some of the features of a 
crisis can be anticipated.
The unsuccessful attempts to move toward democracy (in 1917 and 1991) 
show that when a new democratic movement (a third attempt) starts separatist 
movements among non-Russian peoples will again rise to the surface. 
Indeed, democratic elections held in those national republics of the Russian 
Federation which did not have demands for independence, were completely 
incomprehensible. Furthermore, with their separatist ideas and slogans, 
numerous simultaneous nationalist demands inevitably arise against one 
another, for example, Ingush against Ossetians and Kabardinians against 
Balkarians. The extremely difficult problems of “liberating” one people from 
another will again surface; they had been forced to join together within the 
same autonomy and define their national territories. It is possible that some 
kind of separatist movements or movements for autonomy in Russian regions 
will also develop. Naturally they will be weaker and less motivated but find 
their spark in the general instability. The chaos which appeared between the 
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1980s and 1990s, and was crushed by the authoritarian vertical power, will 
certainly try to reappear. The countries will again be beset by an immense amount 
of difficult problems, which theoretically will need years if not decades to resolve, 
but will have to be resolved immediately and simultaneously.
This will mean that we will again face a dilemma – the disintegration of the mini-
empire and a new diminished Russia or a new rejection of democracy; this in turn 
will crush separatism and build a new power verticality in order to eliminate the 
chaos. 
To ensure that society does not, however, reject democracy, that the third 
attempt succeeds and does not lead to a third round of disintegration and chaos, 
which would then lead to a new form of authoritarianism, massive changes in 
the identity of society are required.12 Above all, it is necessary to understand the 
immensity of the scale, the difficulties of the problems and the need to solve them. 
It is necessary to overcome archaic nation-state greediness, the instinctive need 
not to give away what is your own because it is not possible to solve the problems 
based on the presumption of the unity and integrity of Russia. Of course no people 
should ever be pushed away and forced to become independent. Building a new 
independent state is a very difficult task and it is self-evident that if the different 
non-Russian peoples are really guaranteed autonomy and a real possibility to 
separate from Russia, all of them are not going to use it. It is, however, necessary 
to understand that holding back Chechnya and other republics is not worth the 
strait-jacket of the power vertical, and the independence of these republics would 
not be a loss but an achievement. 
A new diminishing of Russia will, however, be painful. Seen objectively, it can be 
extremely difficult and painful for many reasons, but definitely no more painful 
than the collapse of the Soviet Union. The compensation for the pain can only 
be recognizing the fact that the disintegration of the mini-empire will lead to 
achieving a normal democratic Russian nation-state.
Russia has to think about itself as a Russian nation-state. Assuming this new 
identity could be a difficult process, not only because of instinctive imperial 
Russian nationalism and in general Russian national feeling, but also because of 
the instinctive Russophobia of the liberals and democrats, the fear of the concept 
of “Russian” itself. The saying “Russia for Russians” is nowadays a wild xenophobic 
slogan. It should, however, not be this, but a declaration of a balanced truth. Russia 
for the Russians, Poland for the Poles, Ukraine for the Ukrainians and Chechnya 
for the Chechens does not mean denying of rights of others for their own national 
home, but requiring them.
There are signs of such a new understanding and a liberation of Russian identity 
from imperial imprisonment. Such signs can be discovered in the not always clear 
ideas of Solzhenitsyn, who bravely searched for a non-imperial foundation of 
Russian national pride. Elements of this existed in the unclear and contradictory 
30
ideas of Russian nationalists, who supported Russian sovereignty13 and in the 
idealistic projects of radical democrats between in the 1980s and 1990s (the 
Constitution of Saharov), which demanded the right of autonomous regions to 
independence and transferring the rest of Russia into a Russian nation-state. In the 
unanimity of the democrats and nationalists in the struggle for the union center 
there was a great deal of deception and self-deception, but it is possible to discover 
the seeds of a future synthesis there. The relative easiness of the Russians to accept 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union to some extent describes their tiredness 
with the empire and a hope for their own state. The Chechen War was not popular 
and the option of giving Chechnya to the Chechens did not very much frighten 
the Russians, nor does it frighten them today.14 But all this, however, without any 
synthesis of Russianness and democracy, which would certainly be difficult, the 
third attempt to build democracy in Russia would prove be as unsuccessful as the 
earlier two. 
Russia for the Russians is the antithesis of Russians for Russia, a state in which 
Russians pay with their freedom, welfare and blood for the fact that other peoples 
are oppressed. Neither Russians as a people nor the Russians in it have organs 
which could express their will or establish governments of Russian nationality. 
Russia for the Russians is a democratic Russia, a state which is an instrument 
for the people. It is the goal of what was once the unimaginable entelechy of our 
development of Modern Times.
However, as previously mentioned, Russia is galloping. It reaches stages which 
others have undergone long ago. The nation-state is for European peoples 
already a past stage. A new entelechy is developing – supranational society above 
governments.
Bypassing the nation-state phase, taking the step from mini-empire to 
supranational society, seems impossible. But this nation-state cannot last long. 
Galloping Russia should change the vectors of its development. The democratic 
nation-state is a state which can and should enter the supranational community 
of Europe. Even if the idea of entering the EU is supported by the majority of the 
population,15 it now seems quite unrealistic. However, if at the end of the 1980s 
someone would have predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accession 
of some of its republics to the EU and NATO, it would have seemed as unrealistic 
fantasy. 
Entering Europe would also be immense compensation for a people who can 
never build European forms of political life for itself, but is culturally oriented 
to Europe and generally retains the European and Western model of society 
structure.16 This would mean the end of the Russian fear for isolation and 
marginalization and the suffering about its identity (European or not?) Since 
the entry of Russia into a Europe which would not include Ukraine, Byelorussia, 
and Moldavia is unimaginable, it would mean the end of the very painful process 
transferring Russian and other peoples of these republics “abroad”. 
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It would be the end of a Russian history of building, disintegrating and rebuilding 
an empire in which Russians are compensated for their lost rights (not having 
rights) in order to have Russians in power oppressing other peoples. It would 
mean a beginning of a new history of Russians living in the all-European home in 
their own national flat, as the French in a French flat, the Swedes in a Swedish and 
the Ukrainians in a Ukrainian flat.
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Endnotes
1. In 1717 Russians formed 70.7% of the population of the empire, in 1762 62.3%, 
1795 48.9%, 1857 45.9% and in 1914 44.6%.
2. The word Russian has an ethnic connotation. The name of the country – Rossiia, 
on the other hand, describes the multiethnic character of the country. Therefore 
Russians can in today’s Russian language be called either russkie, referring to ethnic 
Russians, or rossiiane, referring to all ethnic groups living in the territory of Russia. 
This difference cannot be translated into English. Rus’ is the name applied to the 
ancient Russian state (the Kiev Rus’ and the Moscow Rus’; translator’s comment).
3. E. Kankrin, the Minister of Finance under Nikolai I, later suggested abandoning 
the ethnic appellation “Rossiia” and adopting Romanovia, according to the 
imperial family, or Petrovia, according to Peter the Great.
4. The following figures show the position of Russians in the empire they founded. 
It shows child mortality before the age of 10 years. If the mortality rate before the 
age of ten is 100 for Estonians, for Latvians it is 102, Lithuanians 107.8, Moldavians 
113.8, Jews 123.8, Ukrainians 129.1, Bashkirians 133.1, Byelorussians 149, Tatars 
143.1, Chuvash 145.6, Russians 169.3 (Mironov 2000, 20). The life-expectancy 
for Russians was 28.7 years, lower than for Germans (45), Latvians (45) Finns 
(44.3), Estonians (43.1), Lithuanians (41.8), Poles (41), Jews (39), Ukrainians 
(38.1), Moldavians (40.5), Byelorussians (36.2), Bashkirians (37.3), Tatars (34.9), 
Chuvashians (31), and lower than the median mortality level for the Empire (32.4). 
Until the end of the 19th century the amount of literate Russians was 29.3%. The 
same figure for Finns was 98.3%, Estonians 94.1% Latvians 85%, Germans 78.5%, 
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Jews 50.1%, Lithuanians 48.4%, Poles 41.8%, Greeks 36.7% (http:www.apn.ru/
publications/article21603.htm). Other similar figures can also be shown.
5. When one of the fathers of Russian nationalism, Iu. Samarin, spoke in public 
against German dominance in Ostzeijsk kraĭ, Nikolai I put him in prison.
6. 43.5% of the revolutionaries repressed by the tsarist government between 1905 
and 1917 were Russians (Mironov 2000, 439).
7. http://alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/69226.
8. On Russian nationalists as a pressure group, see Mitrohin 2001.
9. In a meeting in Ufa in August 1990 B. Yeltsin said: “Russia feeds everybody. 
Russia makes sacrifices all the time. Russia all the time gives things away. We 
cannot assume that we could pay for other governments, which send aid here, yes, 
and to other republics.” Soiuz mozhno ... 2007, 165.
10. About Yeltsin’s role in ending the Soviet Union see Furman 2010. 45-.
12. More about how Russia could get rid of imitation democracy see Furman 
2010, 143.
13. The idea of Russia leaving the Soviet Union was expressed for the first time in 
May 1989 at a meeting of the Congress of People’s Deputies, not by a democratic 
admirer of the West, but by the Russian nationalist author V. Rasputin, who 
applied it as an example in a polemic discussion with Baltic representatives: “In 
this meeting the activity of the Baltic representatives is clearly seen in trying to 
present amendments to the Constitutions in order to make it possible for them to 
break away from this country. Do not give me advice in these issues. You should 
decide over your own fate according to the law and your own conscience. But it 
may be that Russia itself will leave the Union if you blame her for all your miseries 
and if her weak development stage and clumsiness hinders your progressive 
strivings. It would help us solve a lot of problems.” http://www.slavic-europe.eu/
index.php/comments/1. Let us assume that this was demagogy, but not completely 
demagogic. That such an idea came to Rasputin’s mind and was astonishing in its 
paradoxicality made it possible to apply it as a demagogic and polemic method. 
On the role of Russian nationalism in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, see 
Tatiana Solovei, Valerii Solovei 2009 and Furman 1992.
14. The question “How would you relate to the possibility of Chechnya separating 
from Russia?” in an opinion poll in 2009 had the following options: “ My opinion 
is that the separation has already happened” – 10%; “ I would only be happy for 
that kind of development” – 14%; “It would not make any difference to me” – 21%; 
“ I am against such a development, but ready to live with it”
– 19%; “It would cause a counter reaction in all possible ways including a war” – 
22%. 16% thought that the republics of North Caucasia would finally separate from 
Russia and 30% that they will be sources of unrest in future decades (obshchee 
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mnenie , 2009, 115).
15. Support and partial support for Russia entering the EU were in 2009 53% 
with 21% against or partly against. Obshchee mnenie 2009, 179. NATO, however, 
continues to be considered an enemy force. 
16. V. Putin, for whom the Russian regime represents quite “non-European” forms, 
however, says with undoubted sincerely: “We are a part of Western European 
culture. And there is our value in fact. Wherever our people live – in the Far-East 
or in the South, we are Europeans (Putin. Ot pervogo litsa 2009, 156 ).
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Russia’s territory in the 21st century
Vladimir Kagansky1
1. Introduction
At the beginning of the new century and millennium, Russia found herself in a 
very interesting and fast-changing situation. The Yeltsin era, the last decade of 
the 20th century in Russia, witnessed an extraordinarily swift and considerable 
transformation of all spatial patterns in society and the state.
In the USSR, Soviet territory was vast and uniform (Kagansky, 1991; in detail - 
Kagansky, 2001A). Its main features were as follows: coalescence between all 
structures of society and the state, and a uniform system of regions for all vital 
activities including society, economics, and ethnicity.  It was a hierarchical and 
monocentric system, and the primary line of communication was between the 
centre and the periphery.
In the last decade of the 20th century, the entire territory of the former USSR 
experienced a vigorous regional revolution.  What had previously been 
components of the uniform Soviet territory assumed superior jurisdiction (first 
stated - Kagansky, 1991). The first phase of this revolution was the disintegration 
of the USSR.  This involved a complicated and long redistribution and delegation 
of authority, the dismantling and transformation of the Soviet structures, 
establishment of region-states, redeployment of the armed forces and, finally, 
redesigning the entire system of relationships and ties between the former 
components.
When the USSR disintegrated, the authorities of the union’s republics made an 
outstanding decision, in terms of its simplicity, aptness and historical implications: 
they transformed their republics into sovereign states with inviolable borders 
and an outright renunciation of all territorial claims. Without this successful 
geographical engineering (different from geopolitics, see Kagansky, 2002) wars 
would still be raging across the entire area of the former USSR (cf. situation in 
the former Yugoslavia, which failed to secure such a consensus). This decision, 
on the part of Russia in particular, was far from self-evident, easy and simple, at 
least because the settlement of several ethnic communities – the Russians in first 
place – did not correspond to the boundaries between the republics.  This decision 
was reached in spite of the fact that there were at the time numerous authoritative 
and popular demands for integrating all the areas populated by Russians into the 
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new Russia:  this which would have implied annexation of substantial chunks 
of Estonia, Latvia and Belarus, and a complete disintegration of Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan.
The second phase of the revolution of regions – regionalisation – which was under 
way throughout the Yeltsin decade, involved the transformation of Russian regions 
into autonomous subjects of the Federation, both de jure and de facto.  There was a 
real decentralisation and federalisation of Russia.  During Yeltsin’s time, the centre 
was weak and the regions strong, independent and even self-willed; the limits of 
joint jurisdiction between the centre and regions were fixed through conflicts 
and haggling. In some cases, it came to war:  for instance, the war in Ossetia and 
Ingushetia in 1992.  The regions became semi-independent actors, with regional 
elites sharply gaining strength. Signs of a deeper regionalisation began to be seen 
in the second half of the 1990s, but the pendulum had by then already swung in 
the opposite direction, something which manifested itself in the first Chechen war. 
In the modern Russian Federation, the administrative-regional structure of the 
territory is still pronounced. The structure of the state determines the structure 
of society. The much stronger regions constitute a basis of the federative structure 
of the state; even if there is some separation of powers, it is separation of powers 
between Moscow and the subjects of the Federation. The overwhelming majority 
of regions themselves remain monocentric. This indicates that the old Soviet 
structures have, in fact, been preserved: there is a wealth of centres and even the 
poorest regions now have the status of a federated subject.  By the same token, 
the outlying areas of even the most prosperous regions are in a dire state (e.g. the 
remote areas of the Moscow and Leningrad oblasts). 
2. Spontaneous processes
The main transformations of the territory in recent years were natural and 
spontaneous, not arranged by the authorities. The former components of the 
Soviet territory are not only becoming autonomous, as in the past, they are now 
also rapidly changing their roles and functions. One can speak of an inversion 
of the Soviet model (Kagansky, 2005).  Previously closed state borders are being 
opened, and borders become an area of contact rather than an area of closure. 
People in the old Soviet borders of the Russian Federation learn of business 
and cultural developments not from the remote centre but from their foreign 
neighbours: the former USSR frontier is turning into a development axis, a linear 
international node of growth. By contrast, the new Russian Federation borders 
with former Soviet republics have become more closed and the ties are weakening 
(Tarkhov, 1997).  Neighbouring countries are acting as financial and cultural 
centres, sources of investments and innovations, models for imitation, guarantors 
of environmental stability for the ever-many Russian areas (Finland for Karelia 
and the Karelian Isthmus, Germany for the Kaliningrad oblast, Japan and in 
part Korea for the southern regions of Russian Far East, etc.).  Also increasingly 
noticeable on Russia’s fringes is the increasing presence of foreign populations. 
37
There is therefore a “centre-border inversion” with respect to the previous Soviet 
model; this corresponds to the contrast between the large, closed Soviet economy 
and the small, open Russian one (Pappe, 1998).
Even more important is the inversion between the centre and the periphery. 
Russia’s economic development is increasingly affected by outlying resource-rich 
regions, poorly developed, thinly populated areas in Siberia and in the northern 
areas of the European part of Russia.  This contrasts with the earlier Soviet model, 
where it was in the European provinces of Russia and the USSR that the main 
military-industrial enterprises were located.
The functional core of the Russian Federation is not so much the old, densely 
populated Central Russia as the young but undeveloped Northern Siberia. The 
economic centre of gravity in Russia is rapidly shifting to the northeast.  Rising 
world energy and metal prices have increased the importance of these resource-
rich outlying regions of the country. 
By the same token, while the old elite was the military-industrial complex, the 
new elite is in found the fuel and energy sectors, as well as in energy-intensive 
operations like non-ferrous metallurgy.  Previously closed cities are opening up 
and integrating into the economic and social fabric of their respective regions, 
whereas in the past they were isolated bunches of technologies. 
This all has serious implications.  First, it is not clear whether this framework can 
sustain the integrity of the state. The infrastructure axes of the fuel and energy 
complex are not cultural axes in the way that the railways of the military-industrial 
complex were.  It is also unclear whether the fuel and energy complex is capable 
of generating the scales of complexity needed for the nation and especially for its 
cultural landscape. The old Soviet military-industrial complex did generate, as a 
by-product, a great deal of complexities, including social patterns and settlement 
structures.
Although there has been an inversion from the old military-industrial complex of 
yesterday to the fuel and energy complex of today, this is by no means an inversion 
of inward-oriented to outward-oriented entities: the Soviet military-industrial 
complex was oriented towards external objectives, as is the new fuel and energy 
complex.  The old export of threats, destabilisation and fear has been replaced by 
the export of energy and metals.
There has also been an inversion between regional centres and second 
cities.  The regional centres (capitals) and the second cities, in terms of 
population, generally the biggest taxpayers in regions, are changing places, 
roles and forces. In citing examples, we shall highlight the phenomenon 
straight away: Cherepovets – Vologda, Bratsk – Irkutsk, Togliatti – Samara, 
Magnitogorsk – Chelyabinsk, Norilsk – Krasnoiarsk, Surgut – Tiumen, etc. 
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These second cities, comparable in terms of numerous parameters to the regional 
centres, do not have to bear the burden of regions.  The need not finance their 
regions and hence their economies are more efficient and more effectively 
privatised.  They show all the signs of an economic boom based on rising 
production, whereas some improvements in regional capitals are based primarily 
on the large-scale redistribution of resources. Second cities are increasingly 
experiencing a general population growth, making the ever-larger number of 
regions really polycentric.
There is also the phenomenon of small-scale trade which, alongside other 
phenomena, is encouraging the formation of new localities outside the framework 
of administrative division, and the emergence of areas which do not fit into the 
system of regions and which even conflict with it (Kagansky, 2002B). For instance, 
there has been a “dacha boom” in the post-Soviet period - “dachas” springing up 
in suburban areas around cities, built for the newly rich.  City centres have become 
“gentrified” in ways that do not correspond to administrative districts.  Individual 
small towns and sections thereof are experiencing a sound upturn against the 
background of their neighbours’ decline.  There are new rural settlements; new 
and rehabilitated streets; clusters of housing in rural settlements and old capital 
city dacha settlements.  
This process of post-regionalisation and territorial fragmentation started in 
1998 – 1999.  It coincided with the growth of new sectors of the economy. In 
economic terms, post-regionalisation means investment in an area, emergence 
of sites absorbing considerable direct and indirect financial and material 
resources.  The new processes no longer fit the previous territorial delineation 
of the state and represent the end of the old Soviet system of territorial division. 
Local differentiation has increased in terms of living standards and way of life; 
peripheral areas have moved to a subsistence economy while other areas have 
grown prosperous.
3. The new logic of political power in the state territory
President Putin’s term in office was characterised by an attempt to reassert the 
authority of the centre over the whole of the state territory.  Much of this attempt 
was expressed in symbols, for instance, the effective restoration of the old Soviet 
national anthem and the reintroduction of the red flag for the armed forces. In 
its most violent form, this attempt has been seen in the second Chechen war, in 
which the state showed its determination to put an end to secessionism.  Whereas 
the former union republics of the USSR became independent in 1991, former 
autonomous republics of the Soviet Russian Federation are forbidden to even 
think of independence.  
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The federal centre also undertook a policy of de-regionalisation, re-centralisation 
and de-federalisation of the country, the reconstruction of a vertical hierarchy 
and regional mergers.  All these measures have been implemented by amending 
legislation, which has resulted in placing greater powers in the hands of the federal 
centre. Conflicts between the laws of the Russian Federation and the regions 
were removed by solely amending regional legislation (rather than regional 
and federal laws at a time), which markedly reduced the powers of regions. 
Yeltsin’s agreements between the centre and the regions led to a division of 
responsibilities, authorising extensive decentralisation and federalisation, making 
the regionalisation process civilized and ensuring that the unity of the state was 
preserved.  Tax law amendments, however, caused a loss of revenue to the regions, 
which made them more dependent on the federal budget.  
In addition, there is also a financial recentralisation of the country though 
private business, especially the banking sector.  The powers of the Council of the 
Federation shrank markedly after it ceased to be composed of the elected heads 
of regions and the heads of regional legislatures.  There is no longer any elected 
public body at the federal level representing the subjects of the federation. The 
fact that the heads of regions are now appointed by the government is one of the 
clearest signs of this counter-federalisation.
Many of the above measures were carried out in the name of so-called 
administrative reform, whose real purpose is to streamline an extremely 
ineffective, unwieldy and highly expensive territorial administration system; 
the reform aims at tightening control of all activities in the territory, primarily 
of the regions.  It is precisely to subordinate the “unruly regions”, or rather 
regional elites not quite loyal to the centre, that a special tool, namely the creation 
of seven federal areas, was used.  Their heads are plenipotentiary presidential 
representatives.  Hence, a new non-constitutional level in the territorial 
institutional structure has appeared, even though, in creating these areas, no 
amendments were made to the constitution of the Russian Federation.  
There are other aspects to this same process of regional integration. The first 
step has already been made: the Komi-Permiatsk Autonomous Area (inhabited 
by a predominantly indigenous population) and the Perm oblast have been 
amalgamated as the Permskiĭ krai. The argument that there are too many regions 
is rather bogus (For more data see Kagansky, 2000-2004). 
All the state’s current actions are paradoxical and doomed to failure, for even the 
much more powerful Soviet state was unable to halt quite natural spontaneous 
processes.  For instance, it has failed to prevent the growth of the biggest cities, 
even though it tried.  The government keeps trying to standardise, rationalise 
and centralise the state territory while the key spatial developments are already 
beyond its control. Thus the centre is still waging war on regional elites; their role, 
however, keeps shrinking in effect as a result of post-regionalisation and economic 
upturn, which is itself blurring the regions.
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4. The paradox of Russia’s territory today
Russian public opinion pays little attention to these dramatic developments in 
the structure of their state territory.  The mass media portray the new territorial 
arrangements as the result of decisions taken by the authorities but, as has been 
argued above, the reality on the ground is quite different.  Thus we have entered a 
period of the early final breakup of Soviet territorial structures, and the transition 
of Russian territory to a post-Soviet phase.  As in the 1990s, the spontaneous 
processes are much more powerful than the decisions of the authorities.  Whereas 
under Yeltsin the authorities swam with the tide and adapted to spontaneous 
territorial transformations, today the authorities are trying to counteract the 
trends of spatial reality.  Just when the territorial arrangements are being de-
nationalised, the authorities are trying to re-nationalise them. The authorities are 
unable to arrest these trends but are capable only of complicating and hindering 
the spatial development of the country (Kagansky, 2003C). The window of 
opportunities for a purposeful transformation of Russia’s territory as a whole is 
closing for good, at a time when the key objectives of long-term geographical 
engineering remain largely unresolved and even unarticulated.
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Part ii: Logistics of cooperation between  
      Russia and Europe
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Russian transport corridors and prospects for 
dialogue with the EU
Katri Pynnöniemi
1. Introduction
In this paper I discuss the emergence and evolution of discussion concerning 
the ‘pan-European transport corridors’ in Russia and what this means for 
Russia’s relations with the EU. The pan-European transport corridor concept was 
introduced in the mid-1990s as the embodiment of and idea for an all-European 
transport policy (Pynnöniemi 2008, 107-110). This policy was formulated in the 
context of the then forthcoming EU eastern enlargement. It was acknowledged at 
the time that the enlargement required formative actions including a definition 
of the connections between the EU and third-party countries. The preferred 
connections were identified in the form of ten priority corridors that were seen 
as part of the general initiative to collaborate on “developing and implementing 
trans-European transport networks, with due consideration being given to their 
interconnection and interoperability, with economically weaker regions being 
supported when necessary” (Declaration 1994). 
Initially three of the ten ‘pan-European transport corridors’ were extended to 
Russia.1 In the process of formulating the Russian response to the EU’s policy the 
concept of ‘international transport corridor’ emerged. Conceptually the move 
from ‘Pan-European’ to ‘international’ transport corridors’ is a parallel move, 
in practical terms it is a way of distancing Russia from the discursive context 
of the ‘Pan-European corridor’ policy. This is partly due to the fact that the 
development of three ‘pan-European transport corridors’ in Russian territory is 
the very conjunction point of three major processes: the fragmentation of post-
Soviet space, the integration of Russia into the global markets and the EU, and the 
reorganization of Russian polity. These are at the same time the major challenges 
in Russia’s rebuilding. 
In the following I will first give a brief overview of the process through which 
the concept of international transport corridor became part of Russian transport 
policy. In the second part of paper I will discuss how the concept is used in the 
context of Russian politics.
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2. The emergence of the discussion on transport corridors in Russia
The notion of the ‘international transport corridor’ was articulated as part of 
Russian transport policy roughly between the years 1997 and 2000. The three 
successive texts outlining the policy include: ‘the concept of formulation and 
development of international transport corridors in Russia’, ‘the formulation and 
development of international transport corridors in the territory of Russia’ and 
lastly, ‘the formulation and development of international transport corridors in 
the territory of Russia’ (Arsenov et al 2001; Arsenov 2001). In December 2001, 
the Russian government accepted a Federal Target Programme entitled ‘The 
Modernization of the Russian Transport System’ which included a sub-programme 
called ‘international transport corridors’.2 This programme was further elaborated 
in the above-mentioned three texts. 
The text called The main directions of the creation and development of the 
international transport corridors in the territory of the Russian Federation was the 
first publicly accessible and formally authorized document on the development 
of transport corridors in Russia. It was discussed and accepted at the meeting 
of the Russian government on September 7, 2000.3 Introducing the document, 
Minister of Transport Sergei Frank stated that in the government policy document 
‘The main directions of social-economic policy in the long-term perspective’, ‘the 
development of transport infrastructure is mentioned as a government priority. 
And the main means to realize this goal is to create a system of international 
transport corridors’ (Frank 2000b). Having thus introduced the Ministry position 
on the issue, Minister Frank explained why the Russian government should 
adopt the new notion of ‘international transport corridor’ as the locus of its 
transport policy. He pointed out that, in fact, not just Russian authorities, but 
the international community at large considers the development of ‘international 
transport corridors’ in the territory of Russia as an important policy objective. 
Minister Frank explicitly referred to the Second International Euro-Asian 
Transport Conference that was to take place five days later in St. Petersburg. 
During the preparations for the conference ‘we became convinced’, said Minister 
Frank, ‘that the world is ready to recognize Russia’s leading role as a Euro-
Asian transit country’. In order to make use of this (recognition), he added, the 
government should confirm its readiness to ‘create an efficient transport bridge 
between Europe and Asia’. But, as the argument continues: ‘for the time being 
Russia uses its massive transit potential poorly’. This is because Russia lacks a 
consistent policy on how to take advantage of its favourable geographical position 
(Frank 2000b). 
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The formulation of a consistent, federal policy on ‘international transport 
corridors’ was considered timely because: 
‘… The group of countries, united in international alliances and supported by 
the EU and international organizations, have initiated several large international 
projects aimed at directing Eurasian trade flows around Russia’. (Government of 
RF 2000) 
The text highlighted the need for the government to act by making it known that 
the realization of these projects may ‘adversely affect’ not just the economy of 
the country but its national security as well (Government of RF 2000). Minister 
Frank’s speech at the Security Council earlier in the spring of 2000 added to what 
was left unsaid in the official text. The ‘large international project’ referred to the 
new Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor TRACECA, officially portrayed 
as ‘a renaissance of the Silk Road’ (Traceca 2002, 2). The ‘latitudinal transit 
corridor’ would help to redirect trade flows between Europe and the Black Sea 
and the Central Asian countries around Russia. In these circumstances, Minister 
Frank outlined three policy options for Russia. Complete withdrawal from the 
cooperation or full participation in it were not considered plausible forms of 
action. Rather, Frank proposed that Russia apply for observer status. This would 
give Russia access to information concerning the project, which, from this 
standpoint, would make it easier to attract the attention of others (Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in particular were mentioned) to Russia’s initiatives 
in this sphere (Frank 2000a).
The point subsequently made by Frank at the government meeting was that the 
coordination of the work of the transport ministries in Russia (meaning the 
Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Railways) was no longer adequate. ‘The 
development of Russian international transport corridors requires continuous 
support by means of foreign policy’, stated Frank. He listed several practical means 
to further the interests of the state including: ‘operative use of border-crossing 
formalities’, ‘optimization of through traffic rates’, and support from the power 
ministries to enhance the security of the transport process (Frank 2000a).
The development of the ‘international transport corridors’ would signal a step 
in the right direction. As Frank argued, the government should approve the 
document prepared for the meeting by his Ministry and also charge the Ministry, 
together with the Ministry of Railways, with the task of preparing an appropriate 
state programme that would outline Russia’s policy on ‘international transport 
corridors’ and modernization of the transport network in general (Frank 2000b).
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3. Formulating a Russian position on corridors
The government meeting on September 7, 2000 duly produced two definite 
results. First, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Railways received 
official approval to establish guidelines for the programme on modernizing 
the transport and infrastructure system. This process eventually culminated 
in government approval of the Federal Target Programme The Modernization 
of Russia’s Transport System 2002-2010 on December 5, 2001.4 By giving the 
document its seal of approval, the Russian government, in principle, consented 
to the allocation of 600 billion roubles between the years 2001 and 2010 for the 
development of ‘international transport corridors’ in Russia. It also provided 
guidelines on the way in which budgetary (and non-budgetary) funding for the 
corridors (and the infrastructure modernization in general) should be spent. In 
the sub-programme on ‘international transport corridors’ the existing texts on the 
corridors were further elaborated. The sub-programme also defined the criteria 
for choosing the particular corridor routes and described the list of investment 
projects within the corridors (Mintrans 2001b). 
Thus, formal acceptance of the ‘international transport corridor’ concept was an 
important precondition for its use as a frame for federal-level policies on transport 
and infrastructure development. The approval of the Federal Target Programme 
The Modernization of Russia’s Transport System 2002-2010 consolidated the use 
of the new title ‘international transport corridor’ in the government policy on 
transport development (Government of RF 2001b). Thus, ever since 2002 the 
federal budget has included a special category ‘Federal Target Programme: the 
Modernization of the Russian Transport System until 2010’. A cursory glance 
at the federal budget confirms that the new status of ‘international transport 
corridor’ was included in the budget after it was accepted by the above-mentioned 
government session. In the federal budget approved on December 27, 2000, over 
8 million roubles were allocated to the reconstruction and construction of federal 
highways ‘in the framework of the development of international and inter-regional 
transport corridors and main transport junctions’ (Government of RF 2001b; 
Government of RF 2001c; Government of RF 2002b). 
The implementation of the programme is envisaged to take place in two stages. 
In the first stage, from 2002 until 2005, the development of the transport 
system would be oriented towards improving existing facilities and eliminating 
“bottlenecks”. During the second stage, from 2006 until 2010, the accelerated 
development of the transport system should result in a significant improvement 
in the efficiency and quality of transport services. According to the plan, the total 
amount of investments during the programme period will amount to 4.6 trillion 
roubles, as estimated in 2001; over half would be derived from non-budgetary 
sources (Mintrans 2001b; Transport Rossiĭ 4.-10.10.2002). 
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4. The corridors as a new aspect of Russia’s economic policy
The decision to develop ‘international transport corridors’ in Russia was widely 
reported in the Russian media. As reported by the main Russian television 
channel, ORT, the active development of international transport corridors had 
duly become ‘a new aspect of Russian economic policy’ (Telekanal ORT Novosti 
7.9.2000 15:44 MSK). The redefinition of federal priorities in the transport sphere 
emerged in early 2000, at a time when Russia was entering a new phase of its 
macroeconomic environment after the economic crisis that hit the country in 
August 1998. The positive conjuncture of the high world energy prices was the 
main engine of economic growth in Russia, and one that would last for years to 
come.
A good starting point for further analysis is the interview with Prime Minister 
Mihkail Kasyanov which was broadcast on ORT after the government meeting on 
September 7, 2000. It conveys the way the corridors were publicly addressed at the 
time as well as how the development of the corridors was presented in answer to 
certain questions. 
PRESENTER: What other questions were raised?
CORRESPONDENT: One more question about today’s governmental 
session concerning the transport corridors on Russian territory, which make 
use of the country’s advantageous geographical position. This is what the 
head of government had to say on this issue.
MIKHAIL KASIANOV: Many countries receive a great deal of money from 
transit, and our country could receive more than the minimal amount 
she is currently receiving, as a result of the opportunities afforded by her 
geography. In addition, this [the development of the corridors] will bring 
investments and economic development to those regions where the transport 
corridors are located. Our international partners have shown interest in such 
projects. Concrete plans exist and we are examining them.
CORRESPONDENT: Apparently, the issue also concerns the inclusion 
of Russia in the European-like system of transport corridors. Of the nine 
[corridors], three pass through Russian territory. Furthermore, this is the 
second time that the government has raised the subject of preparations for 
winter. According to Mikhail Kasianov, the situation has not improved since 
it was first brought up. (Telekanal ORT Novosti 7.9.2000 12:00 MSK )
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The description of the corridors is enlightening since it shows how, after several 
years of cooperation, the exact locus of the pan-European corridors remains 
unclear.5 The claim that the development of the transport corridors is, in essence, a 
means of integrating Russia into the ‘European-like system of transport corridors’ 
seems to be a slip of the tongue rather than a serious statement. It contradicts what 
was implicitly hinted at, although not explicitly uttered earlier in the news report. 
The first premise of the argument for the development of transport corridors 
in Russia was expressed at the beginning, where the correspondent referred to 
the ‘advantageous geographical position’ of Russia. The missing premise in this 
notion of ‘advantageous geographical position’ is the acknowledgement that 
Russia is located between ‘two dynamic centres of the world economy: Europe 
and Asia’ (Government of RF 2000a). Prime Minister Kasianov rounded off 
the argument stated above by explaining why Russia’s geographical position is 
‘advantageous’. First, the state would benefit from the expected increase in transit 
volumes through Russia, either by way of increased transit fees or, indirectly, due 
to increased investment in the development of the transport infrastructure. The 
contradiction between the conclusion, presented by the correspondent, and the 
premises of the argument raises the question of how the ‘semantic currency’ of 
transport corridors is used in the context of Russian politics. What form does the 
notion of a new European order inscribed in the development of ‘pan-European 
transport corridors’ take in the Russian context? Does the development of Russian 
international transport corridors concern the creation of a competing set of transit 
routes through Russian territory where the ‘pan-European’ component is just one 
part of a larger game?
5. The three pairs of semantic games
5.1. The games of competition
In the first instance, the development of the ‘international transport corridors’ is 
a game of competition fought in the sphere of geo-economics and geopolitics. It 
is an answer to the question of whether Russia will become a ‘bridge’ between 
Europe and Asia, or the ‘dead-end’ of Eurasia. Opposing metaphors are used in 
the reasoning for immediate actions in the sphere of transport and infrastructure 
modernization. The concrete plan of action is inscribed in the concept of the 
international transport corridor. The semantic game of competition has two 
aspects: competition in the sense of konkurentsiia (here ‘competition’) and 
competition in the sense of sorevnovaniia (here ‘cooperation’). This pair of 
complementary and mutually supportive games is summarized in Table 1.
The positive vision of the ‘bridge’ and its negative counterpart, the ‘dead-end’, 
mirrors the traditional way of positioning Russia between Europe and Asia. In 
the game of competition (konkurentsiia) the ‘international transport corridors’ are 
considered as a means of ‘fighting for’ the transit flows rerouted through Russian 
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territory. Success in this game is counted as an instance of the international 
recognition of Russia as a great Eurasian (transport) power (derzhava) (Mintrans 
2001b; Government of RF 2000). In actual fact, however, a mere one percent of the 
trade flows between Asia and Europe presently runs through Russia. Moreover, a 
substantial proportion of Russian imports (originating from Asia) are carried via 
distribution centres in Europe to Russia. Set against this background, the ‘pan-
European transport corridor’ concept is understood as a synonym for the ‘dead-
end’ metaphor. Thus, instead of using a term that carries a negative connotation 
in the Russian discursive context, it is merged with the concept of ‘international 
transport corridor’. 
In the Russian discursive context, the development of the corridors is rarely 
addressed in terms of ‘integration’, although integration of the Russian 
and European transport infrastructures is considered ‘inevitable’. The 
conceptualization of the corridors as ‘international’ in the Russian discursive 
context reinforces rather than challenges the strict contours between the local, 
state and global domains of politics. It marks a step away from the diffuse ‘Pan-
European’ space and its terms of integration. This is clearly expressed in the 
context of discussing the ‘Russian transit’ to Europe through the former Soviet 
Union countries or other neighbouring countries. In practice, the bulk of Russian 
transit consists of crude oil and oil products and natural gas transported via 
pipelines or carried by sea or rail transport to Europe. With reference to Russian 
foreign trade, the concept of ‘international transport corridor’ is used in arguing 
for the preservation of Russia’s independence from other countries, rather than 
interdependency and integration. This policy objective has been actualized in the 
building of new port complexes in the Gulf of Finland (oil terminals and later 
container terminals as well).
More recently, the Russian policy on ‘international transport corridors’ has 
become more outward-oriented (vis-à-vis post-Soviet space in particular). This 
was illustrated in 2005 when the ‘international transport corridor’ sub-programme 
was renamed the ‘Export of Transport Services’ sub-programme (Mintrans 2005c).  
It outlines the actions required to ‘capitalize’ on Russia’s geographical position. 
In Russia’s relations with the EU, the shift is couched in the term “Transport 
Diplomacy”, which is a concept that runs parallel to the term “Transport Dialogue” 
used in the context of EU-Russia cooperation on transport. I will return to this 
point in the final chapter.
However, the game of competition (konkurentsiia) has a more ‘cooperative’ variant. 
In this latter sense, competition is understood as a challenge (sorevnovaniia). 
In the game of ‘cooperation’, the emphasis shifts from a primarily geopolitical 
to a more diffuse, temporal understanding of distance. In this sense, the 
development of ‘international transport corridors’ in the territory of the Russian 
Federation is identified in terms of the ‘quality’ of the transport services offered 
including, for example, the punctuality of the service, the use of the latest IT 
transport applications (at the logistical centres), and other practices that require 
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harmonization of the current Russian legislation with European and international 
norms and regulations. In this context, the ‘corridor’ is the ‘space of flows’ 
(Castells 1996): an interface between the internal and external domains of politics 
and between technology and politics. In both of these senses, the ‘international 
transport corridor’ correlates with the concept of the ‘Pan-European corridor’. 
In a trivial way, both terms convey a reference to ‘optimization’. In a general 
sense it refers to the challenge globalization poses to the sovereign territoriality/
regional integrity. In the context of ‘Pan-European corridors’, the idea of 
‘optimization’ is expressed in the proposal to carry out studies on the evolution 
of transport flows within the range of a particular ‘corridor’ or ‘transport area’. 
In the context of the discussion about Russian ‘international transport corridors’, 
on the other hand, ‘optimization’ refers to the balancing between private 
investors, international financial institutions and the Russian state agency in the 
planning and implementation of major infrastructure projects in the territory 
of Russia. The elaboration of the ‘international transport corridor’ concept is a 
practical application of the objective of acquiring foreign investments for Russian 
infrastructure projects. Even though the EBRD and the World Bank have been 
involved in financing the prioritized transport infrastructure projects, the bulk 
of the financing comes from the Russian state budget. Consequently, the majority 
of the discussions on the corridors have focused on the question of how to ‘fight’, 
not just against international competitors but against the ‘departmentalism’ 
characteristic of the Russian state administration. 
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competitors but against the ‘departmentalism’ characteristic of the Russian state 
dmin trati n.  
The final aspect  The “causal” aspect The rational inference 
B1: Competition 
(konkurentsiya) 
 
 
Competition 
understood as a zero-
sum game 
 
Reduction of Russia’s 
dependency on the 
infrastructures of the 
neighbouring countries 
 
Russia as a ‘bridge’ 
Prioritization of the 
development of the country’s 
own ports, redirection of 
foreign trade and transit 
flows to the territory of 
Russia 
 
 
F1: Cooperation 
(sorevnovaniya) 
Competition 
understood as a 
challenge 
 
Improvement of the 
quality of the Russian 
transport system 
 
Russia as an ‘interface’ 
Formulation of the concept 
of MTK*  
 
 
 
Assembly: Optimization ‘Capitalization’ on 
Russia’s geographical 
position between 
Europe and Asia 
 
Russia as a ‘great 
transport power’ 
MTK “North-South” and 
“East-West” 
 
“Export of transport 
services” 
Table 1. The Assembly of Competition/Cooperation. 
*MTK: International Transport Corridor  
 
 
5.2. The games of chance 
 
Russian policy on the ‘corridors’ was to a large extent formulated as a response to 
external challenges: globalization and the reordering of Europe. However, the notion of 
the ‘corridor’ carries with it an aspiration towards consolidating the ‘vertical 
administration’ of Russian polity. In the background of the formulation of the policy is an 
understanding of Russian politics in the 1990s as a game of chance. Reference is then 
made to the regular, unexpected shifts in policy and the mixing of formal, informal and 
unwritten rules in the instance of policy-making (Caillois 1961, 73).  
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5.2. The games of chance
Russian policy on the ‘corridors’ was to a large extent formulated as a response 
to external challenges: globalization and the reordering of Europe. However, the 
notion of the ‘corridor’ carries with it an aspiration towards consolidating the 
‘vertical administration’ of Russian polity. In the background of the formulation of 
the policy is an understanding of Russian politics in the 1990s as a game of chance. 
Reference is then made to the regular, unexpected shifts in policy and the mixing 
of formal, informal and unwritten rules in the instance of policy-making (Caillois 
1961, 73). 
In a positive sense, the ‘markets’ represent a form of play where the games of 
chance and competition are combined. In the Russian discourse the reference to 
playing in accordance with ‘civilized rules’ makes this connection. In practical 
terms, ‘civilized rules’ refer to the state agency as a combination of regulative 
institutions, for example, the mechanism of ‘public-private partnership’ in the 
financing of large road infrastructure projects.6 However, rational economic action 
in the context of Russian state policy is largely oriented towards securing the state 
interest in a particular economic sphere or under specific circumstances. The state 
interest, in turn, can be formulated in terms of economics but, as indicated on 
several occasions in this study, it is often a combination of economic and purely 
political ends. Control over ‘strategic’ state assets, in particular the territory, 
remains in the pervasive realm of the federal policy.
Competition in this latter sense translates into the ‘struggle’ over territory, 
resources, position and so forth, where there is very little room for competitors. 
This is contrary to basic market principles whereby competitors are accepted as 
part of a game that is pursued to enhance one’s competitiveness. Protectionism is 
one tactic in the game played in the markets, whereas disavowal of competition 
as such is not. From the viewpoint of the foreign investor, including a particular 
project or even a branch of the economy as part of the ‘strategic state interests’ 
indicates a rising level of risk. The risk lies in the unpredictability involved with 
the lack of transparency at the policy-design level, as well as at the level of policy 
implementation.7
Against this background, policy on ‘international transport corridors’ is pursued 
to improve control over policy-planning and implementation of infrastructure 
development projects. What is addressed here is the background of the ‘formal 
rules’, that is, the informal and unwritten rules of the game of chance and 
competition. In the Russian discursive context, the nesting of the two games 
takes the form of ‘inter-departmental transport complexes’ (“MTK”). The 
notion of ‘inter-departmental transport complexes’ refers to the problem of 
‘departmentalism’ (‘administrative reform’ in current parlance), but also to the 
domination of the game of chance (presupposing a certain resignation of the will) 
in the ‘administrative markets’ of Russian politics (see Table 2. below). 
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In the best possible scenario, coordinating the implementation of priority projects 
at the level of different ministries and state committees enhances the efficiency 
of the work of the agencies. However, these arrangements are often established 
under the ‘personal supervision’ of the president, whereby the semantic currency 
of “MTK” translates into a source of ‘razzmatazz’ in the instance of policy-making. 
The way in which the mechanism of ‘public-private partnership’, now inscribed 
in a law on automobile roads (see note 6 above), is implemented is an important 
benchmark in the trajectory of creating an ‘aggregate of institutions that make 
societies competitive’, as expressed by Dmitry Trenin (Kommersant 25.5.2006). 
Russia’s success in ‘transforming itself ’ would require that the destructive elements 
present in the games of chance and competition are not given the upper hand in 
the task of improving the ‘coherence’ of the country and the ‘diversification’ of the 
Russian economy.  
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The final aspect The “causal” aspect The rational inference 
B2: Control 
 
Securing the state interest in 
an instance of policy-making 
Idea of “Strategic planning” 
F2: Regulation 
 
Transformation of the agentive 
context of policy-planning and 
implementation  
Implementation of the PPP 
mechanism 
 
Assembly: Coordination Completion of priority 
projects  
“MTK” ** 
Table 2. The assembly of control/regulation. 
 
** “MTK” The inter-departmental transport complex 
 
 
 
5.3. The games of simulation 
 
 
In recent years, ‘transport and infrastructure development’ has acquired the status of 
‘topics to be mentioned by the president’ and other high-level state officials in their 
public appearances. The rise of transport from almost complete oblivion to the sphere of 
state ‘strategic interests’ has been rapid, and it is likely to retain that status in the years to 
come. As noted in previous chapters, the development of international transport corridors 
in Russia is considered in the context of the need to strengthen the coherence of the 
country and its international competitiveness. The notion of ‘Transport great power’ 
(derzhava), often used in this connection, and carries with it a reference to repositioning 
Russia in post-Soviet space. This general idea is expressed in the ‘strategic cooperation 
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5.3. The ga es of simulation
In recent years, ‘transport and infrastructure development’ has acquired the status 
of ‘topics to be mentioned by th  pr side t’ and other high-level state officials in 
their public appearances. The rise of transport from almost complete oblivion to 
the sphere of state ‘strategic interests’ has been rapid, and it is likely to retain that 
status in the years to come. As noted in previous chapters, the development of 
internatio al transport corridor  in Russia is co sidered in the context of the need 
to strengthen the coherence of the country and its international competitiveness. 
The notion of ‘Transport great power’ (derzhava), often used in this connection, 
and carries with it a reference to repositioning Russia in post-Soviet space. This 
general idea is expressed in the ‘strategic cooperation 1520’ concept. 1520 refers to 
the wide railway gauge in use in several countries bordering Russia.8
The reasoning for the policy (see Table 3.) is geared towards preserving the 
coherence of ‘post-Soviet space’ and/or Russian political and economic space. 
‘Diversification’ is, in essence, understood here as the aspiration to improve 
logistical services (such as logistics centres and terminals at the major ports) in 
Russia, as well as improve the road connections between the regions and major 
industrial centres. These objectives are clearly stated in the Russian transport 
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strategy. However, the main emphasis is placed on diversification of the energy 
export routes in line with Russia’s energy strategy.
The development of international transport corridors in the territory of Russia 
is part of the efforts to consolidate the power of the federal agencies over the 
regional and local administrations. At the same time, the conceptualization of the 
corridors is a currency used in the competition for scarce resources and power 
within the federal policy space. From the viewpoint of the regional agencies, it 
serves as a code word that denotes the commitment of the federal agencies to the 
completion of prioritized projects. 
The ‘Assembly’ of the two lines of thinking can be summarized in the notion of 
rebuilding. It is understood here in the sense of ‘putting in order’ (obustroistvo) 
the existing set of infrastructures. In a minor sense, it denotes the ‘reconstruction’ 
of the infrastructures providing for the increase in transit flows and the country’s 
most important foreign trade commodities. On the other hand, international 
competition in the sphere of transit transport between Europe and Asia compels 
Russia to ‘rearrange’ the existing administrative and other practices to provide for 
qualified services for international transport. I have already referred to this in the 
first pair of games. 
The development of ‘international transport corridors’ in the latter sense does 
not denote per se the opening up of Russian markets to foreign competition. In 
the Russian discourse, the development of corridors refers, on the contrary, to the 
forging of the Russian international gateway. The use of the term ‘international’ 
conveys the continued and reinforced emphasis on the sovereign territoriality and 
practices whereby it is upheld. The last pair of semantic games (‘coherence’ and 
‘diversification’) is the game of simulation (mimicry). 
The logic of playing the game is best described as a ‘simulation of strength’. This is 
the game of simulation and vertigo (ilinx), where simulation ‘consists of deliberate 
impersonation’, for example, in the form of cunning (Caillois 1961, 78). The main 
line of thinking is to consider the country ‘at the top of the mountain’. The path 
along the mountain range is, to a large extent, comprised of railways and pipelines, 
even if the ‘roads of Russia’ have a central place in the discourse about Russia’s 
competitiveness. The central position of the pipelines and railways is indicative of 
the weakness of Russia’s foreign economic trade pattern and the structure of the 
economy in general. Acknowledging this the Russian leadership has envisioned a 
change towards an “innovative economy”. It is seen as a recipe for restructuring 
the economy. 
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‘roads of Russia’ have a central place in the discourse about Russia’s competitiveness. 
The central position of the pipelines and railways is indicative of the weakness of 
Russia’s foreign economic trade pattern and the structure of the economy in general. 
Acknowledging this the Russian leadership has envisioned a change towards an 
“innovative economy”. It is seen as a recipe for restructuring the economy.  
 
The final aspect  The “causal” aspect The rational inference 
B3: Coherence 
 
 
Reconstruction of the existing 
transport and infrastructure 
system (ETC) 
Building the Chita-
Khabarovsk road  
 
 
F3: Diversification 
 
 
Increase in the share of value-
added products in Russian 
exports 
Establishment of logistics 
centres, adoption of IT 
solutions in the transport 
sector 
 
Assembly: Rebuilding 
 
 
 
Improving existing 
connections serving Russian 
foreign trade and 
diversification of the energy 
export routes 
Construction of new ports and 
improving connections to 
them as well as in the 
direction of Asia 
 
“Strategic Cooperation 1520” 
Table 3. The assembly of coherence/diversification. 
 
*** United Transport System (Edinaia Transportnaia Sistema, ETC) 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Irrespective of the economic growth Russia has enjoyed in recent years, the country has 
not seen any major improvement in the building of new railways, roads or air transport 
hubs. This slow progress is due to the lack of effective institutions required to implement 
long-term development needs. Over the years, the Ministry of Transport has been openly 
Table 3. The assembly of coherence/diversification.  
*** United Transport System (Edinaia Transportnaia Sistema, ETC)
6. Conclusion
Irrespective of the economic growth Russia has enjoyed in recent years, the 
country has not seen any major improvement in the building of new ailways, 
roads or air transport hubs. This slow progress is due to the lack of effective 
institutions required to implement long-term development needs. Over the years, 
the Ministry of Transport has been openly criticized for its lack of initiative in 
setting priorities and in failing to organize the practical work effectively. The 
solution to this problem is currently being sought in active state participation, 
which takes the form of putting state corporations in charge of large infrastructure 
projects. However, it remains to be seen whether these arrangements will help to 
tame corruption in the construction sector or, conversely, only serve to aggravate 
the problem. 
From the games identified in the previous chapter, the games of competition 
(konkurentsiia and sorevnovaniia) are candidates for a creative and relatively 
open dialogue between Russia and Europe. This is because, although they are 
competitive forms of engagement, these games entail a community of players that 
share a respect for the rules, even if they do not always play according to them. 
The reasoning for the ‘optimization’ of Russia’s interest does not per se point to 
conflict with the EU sphere of interests, especially if it is coupled with cooperative 
strategies in other fields. On the other hand, if ‘optimization’ is situated against 
a background of control and coherence, the allegedly positive-sum thinking (for 
example, Strategy 1520) takes the form of a zero-sum game. Even if the logic 
of playing the game of ‘competition’ and that of ‘cooperation’ is different, the 
common trait in these games is that they are relatively public, presupposing both a 
community of players and recourse to the formal rules of the game.  
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From the standpoint of consolidating the dialogue between Russia and the EU, 
the last pair of games (simulation and vertigo) is the most challenging. The 
playing of these games proceeds from the public sphere whereby the policy loses 
visible signposts that would help in assessing its outlines. Instead, the public 
domain of the politics acquires features of razzmatazz. This means that the 
public performatives are ambiguous and contain an element of improvisation. 
At the policy-implementation level, improvisation means pursuing the policy in 
accordance with the unwritten (non-public) rules that we may only have access 
to through traces of zigzagging. In the current parlance, the notion of strategic 
sectors and industries is subject to the kind of zigzagging discussed in this study. 
The identification of Russia’s policy in terms of state “strategic interests” subsumes 
within its sphere actions which, at the outset, would seem to fall within the sphere 
of economics. From the viewpoint of the dialogue between Russia and the EU, 
this presents a problem when it is coupled with the games of chance and vertigo, 
which, although they also presuppose agreement on the rules of conduct, are more 
prone to arbitrariness, to the whim of chance, and to the self-sufficient strategies 
of engaging in the dialogue.
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Endnotes
1. The three corridors include corridor I (Helsinki – Tallinn – Riga – Kaunas – 
Warsaw),  corridor II (Berlin – Warsaw – Minsk – Moscow), and corridor  IX 
(Helsinki - St. Petersburg – Pskov/Moscow – Kiev – Ljubasevka – Chisinau 
– Bucharest – Dimitrovgrad – Alexandroupolis). The total length of the pan-
European corridor network is about 48 000 km, of which 25 000 km are rail 
networks and 23 000 km road networks. Airports, sea and river ports and major 
terminals serve as nodes between the modes of transport, along these long-
distance interconnections between the Central and Eastern European countries 
)Status of the Pan-European Corridors and Transport Areas (SPECTA) 2002, 7).
2. The sub-programme was written in cooperation with NTsKTP (Scientific 
Centre of Complex Transport Problems at the Ministry of Transport of Russia) 
experts and experts from other transport and infrastructure planning institutes. 
Other materials that provided a basis for the work included the declarations of 
‘all-European’ and ‘international Euro-Asian’ conferences (1994, 1997, 1998, 
2000); materials from UN/ECE working groups on transport; materials from 
other sub-programmes of the FTP ‘Modernization of Russian Transport System’; 
materials from working committees of  pan-European transport corridors 1, 2, 
and 9; technical studies and business plans, as well as other studies conducted by 
NTsKTP or other participating institutes (Mintrans 2001b, 11-12).
3. Other topics discussed during the meeting included the energy supply of the 
autumn-winter period 2000-2001, the simplification of the import customs tariffs, 
changes in the status of the Ministry of Antimonopoly Politics, and the allocation 
of funding for the Saratov oblast from the federal reserve fund.
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4. The Russian government authorized Mintrans and the Ministry of Railways 
to draw up a detailed modernization programme on transport in accordance 
with the governmental directive No 232-p on 16.2.2001. The programme was 
finally approved on 5 December 2001. The programme had ‘federal status’, which 
meant it was entitled to direct budgetary funding. The available financing for the 
modernization programme is decided separately for each year (Government of RF 
2001a; Government of RF 2001b).
5. From the very outset, the Russian discussion on the corridors was inconsistent 
and different terms were used to denote the same routes.
6. The law on ‘automobile roads’ accepted by the Council of the Federation on 
26.10.2007 defines the mechanism of the public-private partnership and includes 
blueprints for the building of toll roads in Russia (Federal’niĭ Zakon 2007).
7. The acceptance of the law on ‘strategic industries’ in September 2007 should 
therefore be seen in a positive light since it provides foreign and domestic 
investors with a formal map indicating those branches of the economy in which 
the state interest and involvement is expected to be deep (Liuhto 2007; Hanson 
and Teague 2005; Gaddy 2007).
8. Today the broad gauge is used in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, the 
Caucasian and Central Asian republics and Mongolia. The main railway networks 
of Spain and Portugal use a wider gauge than the standard one. 
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The Development of Murmansk Region in the light 
of three scenarios
Yrjö Myllylä
1. Introduction and objectives
 
This article presents the development of the socio-spatial structures and the 
geoeconomic position of the Murmansk Oblast (Figure 1) through the year 
2025. The starting point for the analysis is that the appropriate planning of 
industry, logistic infrastructure and population is inadequate without a well-
grounded assessment of the region’s present and future economic conditions and 
contingencies.  Key concepts of study are Strong Prospective Trends (Toivonen 
2004; Kuusi 2008; Naisbitt 1984) and Cluster (Porter 1990; 2006; Malmberg & 
Maskell 2002). The study is based on the Delphi method, which is commonly 
used within the discipline of futures studies (on the method, see Myllylä 2008a; 
Kuusi 1999; Kuusi 2002; Turoff 1975, 2002, 2009; Sackman 1975; for more on 
futures studies, see Bell 1997a; 1997b). The main question to be answered involves 
what future socio-economic scenarios the Delphi method provides for the 
Murmansk Oblast. Figure 1 shows the target region for this study, the population 
concentrations and the administrative districts and major towns today.
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Figure 1. Population concentrations, administrative districts and major towns in the 
Murmansk Region. 
 
This study is based on material from interviews with a panel of specialists in the 
Murmansk Oblast and an analysis of on-going socio-economic development in the 
region, together with material from interviews with two additional panels, one 
consisting of specialists from Moscow and St. Petersburg and the other an 
“international” panel mainly consisting of experts from Finland (See Table 1).  
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The starting point of the article is the idea that the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
resulted in a shift of the geopolitical and geoeconomic focus in Russia to the north. As 
the main oil-producing regions of the Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, became independent, the relative importance of north-western Russia 
and Siberia increased in Russia’s oil and gas production (Tykkyläinen 2003). The high 
Figure 1. Population concentrations, administrative districts and major towns in the 
Murmansk Region.
62
This study is based on material from interviews with a panel of specialists in the 
Murmansk Oblast and an analysis of on-going socio-economic development in 
the region, together with material from interviews with two additional panels, 
one consisting of specialists from Moscow and St. Petersburg and the other an 
“international” panel mainly consisting of experts from Finland (See Table 1). 
2. The background and need for the study
The starting point of the article is the idea that the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
resulted in a shift of the geopolitical and geoeconomic focus in Russia to the north. 
As the main oil-producing regions of the Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, became independent, the relative importance of north-western 
Russia and Siberia increased in Russia’s oil and gas production (Tykkyläinen 
2003). The high prices of crude oil and natural gas products in the global market 
have led to the emergence of wealthy, rapidly developing pockets in remote 
regional economies. Oil and natural gas are Russia’s main exports, brought to 
Europe primarily by oil and gas pipelines, an infrastructure built several decades 
ago. Now, however, the situation is changing.
Economic interest in northern regions has increased as the growing world 
economy demands more energy and the resources in existing oil and gas fields 
are being depleted. The Arctic region is rich in oil and natural gas. The rising 
prices of raw materials are making the exploitation of Arctic natural resources 
more profitable than before. These regions are located northeast of Finland. 
What role will Murmansk’s northern location have in the new, rapidly developing 
transport system? What impact will the fact that the Murmansk Region is located 
relatively close to key market areas – the European Union and the increasingly 
important eastern coast of the United States – have on the development options 
for the region (Figure 2)? How will other geographical factors, such as an ocean 
port that is ice-free the year round, affect the development options available to 
the Murmansk Region? What effect will the change have on the development of 
industry and logistics in the Murmansk Region and how will it affect social trends 
there?
The business structure of the Murmansk Region consists not only of activities 
related to national defence but economic activities typical to high-resource regions 
in general: extraction and pre-processing of natural resources, particularly mining 
and the related ore processing, apatite mining and the fishing industry. The 
mining and metal-processing industry, which is very important to the region, has 
found its way to a new global market, but tough competition is forcing production 
plants to reduce their workforces as well as modernize their technologies. The 
rationalization of industry has resulted in outmigration, particularly from 
communities relying on a single industrial enterprise and lacking any other jobs. 
This study also discusses the options for developing the sector based on natural 
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resources and the possibilities of creating a more diverse structure of the regional 
economy through improved know-how and expertise.
Figure 2. The location of the Murmansk Region. Sea routes from Murmansk and the nearby 
Arctic gas and oil fields are relatively short to current key market areas, particularly Europe 
and the increasingly important eastern coast of the United States. Reproduced by permission 
of the Geographical Society of Finland and the authors (Myllylä & Tykkyläinen 2007).
In terms of regional development, the aim of this study is to outline the various 
options for the economic future of the Murmansk Region and the logistic 
structures required by these options and to test the applicability the Delphi 
method for outlining this future. From the perspective of futures studies, the 
viability of the Delphi method with regard to studying and forecasting regional 
development in general was also assessed. The target group of the study consists of 
three expert panels, the first is called the Murmansk panel, the second the Moscow 
panel and the third the international panel. A total of 77 experts participated 
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in these panels in 2004-2007 (Table 1); in addition, a number of other experts 
were interviewed. The time span covered by this study extends to the year 
2025. Because the Delphi method involves the identification of change factors, 
it is better adapted to long-term foresight than methods with models based on 
historical material, the latter being better suited for forecasts for the near future. 
The evaluation of the scenarios and choice of the most probable one are based 
on an application of the Delphi method which was developed during the data 
collection. The use of a feedback round among the specialists for evaluating the 
actual results of the Delphi method forms a new model for the application; this is 
called Feedback Delphi (see Myllylä 2008a, 2008b).
Table 1. The data of interviews based on the experts’ competence and interests. Here, 
‘competence’ means the experts’ special experience in clustering and ‘interest’ the interests 
of the specialists in the clusters. The Murmansk panel consisted of a pilot interview (10 
respondents) and the Delphi panel’s 1st (25 respondents) and 2nd round (19 respondents); 
the Moscow panel consisted of the Delphi panel’s 2nd round of interviews (6 respondents), 
and the international panel consisted of the Delphi panel’s 2nd round of interviews (17 
respondents).
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Energy 3  1 2  2    3    2  8 2 3 
Mining and metal 
processing 
3  1 1  1 1   5      10  2 
Transport and logistic 
services 
3  1 1  1   1 1  1  1  5 1 4 
Food 5         1  1    6  1 
Tourism 2  1       1  2    3  3 
ICT 3  1 2  2 2         7  3 
Environment 2            2 1  4 1  
Welfare 2      1  1 1   2   6  1 
Security             1   1   
Others             4 2  4 2  
Total 23  5 6  6 4  2 12  4 9 6  54 6 17 
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3. The development of the Murmansk Region - Three scenarios
The logic of the scenarios. When the results are compared to each other, 
highlighting the greatest differences between the interest groups can draw 
attention to all fundamental concepts behind these differences and the related 
driving forces, which often act synergistically (Geist & Lambin 2002: 146). In this 
project, there were substantial differences between and within the respondent 
groups with regard to the development of value-based trends or changes in 
values. In addition, respondents also disagreed on where economic decisions 
regarding the Murmansk Region would be made in the future – in Moscow by the 
federal government, in the international market or at the regional level. If certain 
assumptions are made about the driving forces, the other variables in the scenarios 
could be described through the results of the Delphi panel. The major projects 
in energy production, for example, and their time schedules will impact on the 
development of the Murmansk Region. For example, the schedule for the opening 
of the Shtokman gas field and the Murmansk or Indiga oil pipeline project can 
be linked to the driving forces. Scenarios 1 and 2 represent the extremes in or the 
limits of the most probable scenario for the development of the Murmansk Region 
not leading to an actual economic disaster. Scenario 3 represents an unlikely but 
still possible deep regression in the world economy and a slump in the oil price.
Scenario 1 – ‘Market forces and democracy are strengthening and values developing’
- Decision-making power lies with the market and democratic forces as well as 
civil society.
- Russia is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- The impact of value-based trends is essential, the importance of environmental 
values is increasing and values are increasingly consideration in the design 
and development of the clusters.
Scenario 1 is summed up in the comment of one of the international participants 
in the panel, which presents the following main vision and key actions: The 
Barents region will be as active as the Persian Gulf, exporting oil and gas. The 
region will become a base for offshore operations, with global importance over 
the next 200 years. There will be a large amount of spin-off activity. All this, 
however, will require changes in Russian legislation. Exclusion of foreign actors 
from investments, which is currently the greatest obstacle, must be eliminated to 
allow free movement of capital.
Scenario 2 – ‘Authoritarianism is increasing and a regulated economy prevails’
- Decision-making is concentrated in the Kremlin and oligarchs have less and 
less influence.
- Democratic forces and civil society are weak.
66
- The role of international enterprises is to supply technology for Russian 
enterprises.
- Russia is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- The influence of value-based trends is weak and environmental values are 
given very little consideration.
Here, the development will be slower than in the previous scenario. Taking 
advantage of favourable trends in the world economy, Russia will attempt to 
launch the Shtokman operations and other large energy projects on its own. The 
projects will start slowly and have less impact on the development of the region 
than in Scenario 1. 
Scenario 3 – ‘Problems are accumulating and the oil price is sinking’
- Problems are accumulating because at least one of the threats (wild cards) 
considered unlikely has been realized, with a significant effect on development.
- The price of oil has fallen well below USD 20.
In this scenario, all or some of the wild card events considered possible but 
unlikely by the participants in the panel will occur. The scenario is largely built 
on the assumption that the price of oil will fall well below USD 20 per barrel1 
(Brunstad et al 2004: 165; Pynnöniemi 2006: 57), taking into account inflation 
since the year 2005; this will be preceded by an increasingly authoritarian trend in 
society. The price of oil may plummet because of a slump in the world economy, a 
crisis or sudden peace in the Middle East or a pandemic disease. Other wild cards 
may also emerge, such as an environmental disaster or youth riots, but these will 
be limited and can even provide an exit from a crisis.
The scenarios show a vision of the future for Murmansk as a function of the main 
variables. Each scenario is described in more detail in Tables 2a and 2b. The main 
actors and phenomena are as follows:
1. The main forces of change, or driving forces (DFs), working in the  
 background.
2. Strong prospective future trends (SPTs), which are results of the driving  
 forces.
3. Clusters developed through SPTs and decision-making.
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4. The levels of decision-making.
5. Logistic development projects supporting the development of clusters.
6. The social and economic state of the population and the level of migration.
The scenarios are strongly simplified. None of the scenarios is likely to happen as 
such; nevertheless, it is possible to find the main components for the future on the 
basis of the research material. From the perspective of some of the interest groups 
Scenarios 1 and 2 could be preferable, but Scenario 3 would most probably be 
considered undesirable by all. In the long run, however, Scenario 3 could prove 
positive in some ways.
Scenario 1 could perhaps gain the greatest support among the population in 
Murmansk, because of the mega-projects related to Shtokman and the oil pipeline 
to Murmansk, which the panellists considered preferable. These projects would 
have a positive effect on the population’s income. In reality, it is also possible that 
some features of one scenario, e.g. Scenario 2, will be realized first and parts of 
Scenario 1 later. This model was suggested by some of the international experts 
taking part in the feedback interview round. 
Driving forces. The panellists’ views on which main driving forces would affect 
socioeconomic development in the region were gathered from the interviews. 
These driving forces contribute greatly to the emergence of strong prospective 
trends (SPT), which have a central role in the scenarios. Some specific driving 
forces, like a growing world economy and instability in the Middle East, mean 
higher oil prices, which will naturally impact on the Murmansk Region. The three 
scenarios were based on assumptions about the state of each of the eight important 
driving forces. On the basis of the answers from the panellists, the following 
driving forces were omitted: historical factors, material corrosion over time 
(rusting containers of nuclear material deposited on the sea bottom and ashore), 
the threat of terrorism, connections in the Murmansk Region, environmental 
overload (climate change, for example), the degree of corruption, and economic 
risks. These factors may be indirectly present, and the threat of an environmental 
disaster on economic risks or the predictability of the political environment are 
typical examples. The driving forces were grouped as external or internal driving 
forces, depending on how much the Russian state itself could influence them 
directly through political decision-making. When the material was studied, it was 
surprising to observe that Russia itself had innumerable opportunities to influence 
the basic economic dynamics of the Murmansk Region through the driving forces.
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Table 2a. Scenarios 1-3. Main variables and their states in different scenarios: 
driving forces and strong prospective trends (SPTs).
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Table 2a. Scenarios 1-3. Main variables and their states in different scenarios: driving 
forces and strong prospective trends (SPTs). 
 
Scenario 1:  
Market forces and democracy are 
strengthening and values developing 
 
Variables 
Scenario 2:  
Authoritarianism is increasing and 
a regulated economy prevails  
 
Variables 
Scenario 3: 
Problems are accumulating and the 
oil price is sinking 
 
 
Variables 
Driving forces (DFs)  
(see also DFs in Appendix 2) 
 
External: 
F: Natural resources very important 
D: Strong growth in world economy  
J: Fossil fuels are an important 
energy source, renewable energy 
forms are developing, north-western 
Russia important for EU  
K: Middle East remains unstable, but 
situation under control  
 
 
Internal: 
I: Oligarchs are free to act 
N: Common energy politics for EU 
and Russia, problem-free relations 
between great powers  
G: Foresight for educational needs 
important, research and education 
support growing clusters  
H: SMEs play a key role 
 
Driving forces (DFs)  
(see also DFs in Appendix 2) 
 
External: 
F: Natural resources important 
D: Moderate growth in world 
economy 
J: Fossil fuels and coal are important 
energy sources, north-western 
Russia less important to EU than in 
Scenario 1 
K: Middle East unstable, controlled 
instability in Russia’s interest as 
well 
Internal: 
I: Oligarchs are set aside, businesses 
controlled by Kremlin 
N: EU strives to decrease its own 
energy dependence on Russia, 
Russia’s connections with China 
important  
G: Foresight for educational needs 
unimportant, education supports 
existing clusters  
H: SMEs in weak position 
Driving forces (DFs)  
(see also DFs in Appendix 2) 
 
External: 
F: Natural resources less important 
D: No growth in world economy, 
regression 
J: Fossil fuels important, but low 
demand due to depression 
K: Civil war in Middle East, 
military action in Strait of Hormuz 
 
 
 
Internal: 
I: Disputes between oligarchs and 
Kremlin 
N: Relations between Great Powers 
becoming more strained 
G: Crisis in educational system 
because of high outmigration 
H: SME policy weak due to lack of 
resources, nevertheless considered 
important 
SPTs improving the Murmansk 
Region 
 
Technological development, logistic 
flows, globalization and value-based 
trends prevail 
SPTs improving the Murmansk 
Region 
 
Technological development, logistic 
flows and globalization prevails 
SPTs improving the Murmansk 
Region 
 
Wild card events occur: oil price 
below 20 USD, environmental 
disaster, political crisis. Exits from 
crises through technological 
development and changes in value 
bases. 
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To some extent, Russia can even influence external driving forces through its 
foreign policy. The situation in the Middle East in particular could be considered 
one such external factor. The various scenarios will be significantly affected by 
decisions taken by the central government and their attitudes towards changes in 
values as these will have direct or indirect impact on a number of driving forces. 
Some of the driving forces, however, can occur without the central government’s 
influence (oil prices, for example, can sink for reasons beyond Russia’s control). 
These scenarios provide the conditions for the region’s development. The most 
preferable and probable scenario would lie somewhere between Scenario 1 and 2, 
if the answers of the Murmansk panel are weighted. A possible, but to some extent 
less likely and less preferable development, particularly from Murmansk’s point of 
view, would lie between Scenarios 2 and 3.
Table 2b. Scenarios 1-3. Main variables and their states in different scenarios: clusters, levels 
of decision-making, development of logistics and population.
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Table 2b. Scenarios 1-3. Main variables and their states in different scenarios: clusters, 
levels of decision-making, development of logistics and population. 
Scenario 1:  
Market forces and democracy are 
strengthening and values developing 
 
Variables 
Scenario 2:  
Authoritarianism is increasing and a 
regulated economy prevails  
 
Variables 
Scenario 3: 
The problems are accumulating and the 
oil price is sinking 
 
Variables 
Clusters  
as a functional manifestation 
 
Stronger positions for energy and 
logistic clusters, mining industry 
modernized through investments. 
Military structures directed towards 
prevention of terrorism. 
- Shtokman in operation 
Clusters  
as a functional manifestation 
 
Energy, mining and metal refining as well 
as logistic clusters essential. Military 
structures strengthened. 
- Shtokman not in operation 
 
Clusters  
as a functional manifestation 
 
Weakening positions for energy and 
mining clusters. Attempts to develop 
the environmental cluster, information 
and communication technology and 
tourism. Inability to strengthen Military 
structures.  
- Shtokman not in operation 
Levels of decision-making  
in terms of power relations 
 
International, federal and regional 
levels and also local level important for 
some clusters, enterprises are central 
actors on all levels 
Levels of decision-making  
in terms of power relations 
 
Federal level most important, regional and 
local levels suffering from lack of 
resources and opportunities to influence 
decision-making  
Levels of decision-making  
in terms of power relations 
 
Federal level less important. Exits from 
crises are sought by increasing regional 
and local decision-making power  
Development of logistics 
as a condition for the development of 
Development of logistics 
as a condition for the development of the 
Development of logistics 
as a condition for the development of 
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4. The vision of the most likely future
The future is most probably either a combination of the answers from the different 
respondent groups or an unforeseen process triggered by a wild card as a catalyst. 
None of the three scenarios will necessarily be realized as such. On the basis of the 
round of feedback from the experts and in accordance with the Feedback Delphi, 
Scenario 2 (‘Authoritarianism is increasing and a regulated economy prevails’) is 
the most likely vision for the future or at least the most approximate. Initially, the 
most likely course of development will follow Scenario 1, but at some point it can 
turn towards Scenario 2, as today’s power elite grows old and loses much of its 
control, or if crucial decisions are made on WTO membership or the new EU-
Russia Framework Agreement or if the region is faced with an unforeseen crisis. 
In such cases, the realized scenario could be called Scenario 2+. 
A preferable and possible vision for Murmansk could therefore be a future based 
primarily on the exploitation and development of the region’s logistic position, 
with development of the metal and mining industries coming second, and 
development of the energy cluster taking third place. The groups of respondents 
agreed on these main lines. The information and communication technology 
cluster can also play an important role in the development of the region. The 
operational preconditions for these clusters based on natural competition will be 
strengthened through research and education. For the most important clusters, 
the course of development depends first and foremost on decisions taken by major 
enterprises and federal politics. The regional level must primarily ensure that the 
general operating conditions, such as education and infrastructure, are in place.
In the longer run, however, the importance of decision-making at the local 
level can increase, assisted by sharper changes in value-based trends, which 
was to some extent foreseen by the independent respondents in the Murmansk 
Region and the international panel (see also Kulmala and Tekoniemi 2007). 
There will be a great deal of practical decision-making on the regional level in 
connection with major energy projects decided on the federal level, which will 
bring SMEs opportunities for cross-border co-operation (feedback from experts). 
Ports and railways will be key areas of development in logistics. Pipelines and 
IT networks will also be among the most important investments; this is given 
particular emphasis by some of the respondent groups. If the logistic projects are 
considered from the perspective of the energy cluster alone, construction of power 
transmission networks extending to the Republic of Karelia and possibly to the 
Nordic countries will be important – an issue that was raised by the panels in 
Murmansk and Moscow.
For reasons of economy and military policy, it is likely that the oil pipeline will be 
built to Indiga and there will be negotiations to extend the pipeline to Murmansk 
(Figure 9). Operations in the Shtokman field will have begun in 2020-25, provided 
that international capital and technology from international enterprises, for 
example, will be available to the region (cf. Shell’s role in the Sakhalin energy 
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production project, Bradshaw 2005; see also Roberts 2003b: 31). One condition 
for this could be the EU-Russia Framework Agreement or a very long-term energy 
agreement, which would secure both investments and markets. It is possible 
that such agreements will be signed with states other than the EU – between 
Russia, France and Germany, for example – which would be enough to attract 
investments. This would give energy investments in the north similar high priority 
in Russia’s energy politics as in China or Asia. This vision should not be based on 
the Delphi panels alone: while the international panel believed that the impact 
of the international market on decision-making would increase, their view was 
not shared by the Moscow panel. With regard to Shtokman, there were mixed 
comments in the feedback from the experts. The direct and indirect impact of 
Shtokman on the development of Murmansk is nevertheless considerable. If the 
opinion of the international panel proves correct, the Shtokman scenario involving 
the launch of gas production can be realized. The most important observation 
regarding the future vision and the position of Murmansk is that the region will 
occupy a central place in the logistics of energy production, irrespective of what 
the situation of the Shtokman field is in 2025 or whether the oil pipeline will be 
built to Indiga or Murmansk. 
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Figure 3. The main Russian gas and oil pipelines in north-western Russia: existing pipelines 
and recent plans for new pipelines and ports. Reproduced by permission of the Finnish 
Geographical Society and the author (Myllylä & Tykkyläinen 2007; Tykkyläinen 2003).
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New organized and systematic transport solutions will largely be in place by that 
time, with the infrastructure and actors in Murmansk as part of these systems 
(Figure 3). The exploitation of the Prirazlomnoye oil field situated in the Pechora 
Sea supported by the Murmansk infrastructure is a good example. Oil transport 
from Prirazlomnoye through Murmansk will start around 2010 (Bambulyak & 
Frantzen 2007: 43).
Murmansk in 2007 can be compared with Stavanger in Norway in 1968, when the 
offshore oil production cycle in the North Sea started. As gas and oil production 
in the Barents region develops, Murmansk may become an offshore base, similar 
to today’s Stavanger or perhaps Aberdeen, which is the base for the offshore North 
Sea operations of Scotland’s oil and gas industry. The pace of development will 
be influenced by federal politics. The relative and absolute weight of the energy 
cluster will mostly increase in the region if the Shtokman investment and the oil 
pipeline through Murmansk are realized. These are considered preferable projects 
by the actors in the region. Investments in Shtokman, in particular, can change the 
course of the region’s population trend. 
The way ahead may at initially be the course provided by Scenario 2. Key 
political choices, such as Russia’s membership in the WTO and the evolution of 
domestic political (in)stability will impact on how the scenario is realized (see 
also Hernesniemi etc. 2005: 107). Other events, too, can have a bearing on Russian 
policy on openness and democracy, authoritarianism in Russia, development of 
Western-type democracy and the development and subsequent growth of private 
enterprise in Russia (feedback from international experts). Through its own 
common energy policy and its policy towards Russia, the European Union can 
significantly influence development in Russia and thus development in Murmansk 
as well. The direction taken by the new Framework Agreement between the EU 
and Russia or other agreements on economic or political cooperation will have an 
important effect on future trends (see also e.g. Juntunen 2002: 86-89). Russia may 
also enter into agreements with large states instead of the EU or other economic 
blocs. 
The importance of the northern parts of the world as a source of energy and, 
to some extent, as a food producer is growing. Murmansk is an increasingly 
prominent centre for the supply of energy, minerals and even food from the 
sea, even though the interests of the energy and fishing industries may at times 
conflict and require mediation. Large-capital energy production will probably 
take over docks that would otherwise be used by fishing vessels, for example, 
while the fishing industry is still suffering from a considerable lack of capital. 
The Murmansk Region will have a strategic role in Russia’s economy and 
military policy and see at least some local growth. Russia’s long-term overhaul 
of military equipment (Forsström 2002) will be reflected in the development of 
certain mining towns in the Murmansk Region as well (feedback from experts). 
Optimally, the economic growth may benefit practically all communities. Minerals 
in the Murmansk Region demanded by the energy industry and hitherto largely 
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overlooked are an emerging area in the mining industry. Sallanlatva near the 
Finnish border, for example, is rich in a mineral required for oil and gas drilling 
in muddy areas (Roberts 2003a: 26). Whether the future follows either of the most 
probable scenarios, 1 or 2, this trend offers significant business opportunities for 
foreign enterprises as well during the period examined in this study. 
It is very likely that the population will be smaller than today. Materialization 
of investments in Shtokman will change the course of the population trend, at 
least locally. In a probable scenario, communities relying on large-scale mining 
or metal-processing industries alone will not be able to maintain their population 
bases at the current level, even if the volume and value of their production is 
higher than today.
5. Findings
A need for innovative activities.  Profitable exploitation of the natural resources 
in and around the Murmansk Region will require development of infrastructure 
and the systems for producing the resources. This highlights a need for a 
consensus and partnership between local and federal actors governing the 
infrastructure with regard to sharing the benefit from investments in the region. 
Finding economically lucrative solutions plays a key role in investments that will 
bring cost savings in transport technology, for example. Finding new, lucrative 
transport and production solutions for the high-cost Arctic region stresses 
the importance of innovation activities, particularly the creation of a network 
of research institutes and enterprises in the fields of transport and logistics, 
energy production and the mining and metal-processing clusters. Thus far, local 
enterprises have sought innovative solutions for transport technology and logistics 
in a centralized manner from abroad, e.g. from Finland. 
If regional development in Murmansk is to advance, the unstable situation in 
oil production should be taken into account in the future, as should the power 
politics between the Kremlin and economic power concentrations. In addition, 
superpower relations, relevant education opportunities and SME policy should be 
considered as important, concrete factors for the development of the Murmansk 
Region.
Critical notes on applying Delphi. The expectations related to the region’s 
development up to the year 2025 were very optimistic, despite the present 
economic situation in the Murmansk Region. It was obvious that the experts 
were not inclined towards long-term pessimism or short-term optimism, which 
was a change from a majority of Delphi processes. Because Russia has acquired 
considerable wealth from energy exports, it is understandable that energy projects 
were prominent in the evaluations made by the panels. The Delphi method will 
normally yield results where the more reasonable, more necessary and more 
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economically lucrative an idea is considered, the sooner it will be expected to be 
realized. Crises that were in the distant future, such as climate change, were not 
considered.
The events in recent history play a much bigger role in evaluating the future than 
events far back in the past. This proves to be true for anticipating potential crises 
and for the importance of energy prices. In this respect, the method is tied to the 
time of its implementation. The method should be developed in such a manner 
that certain phenomena related to economic cycles could already be eliminated 
at the phase of interviewing the respondents. None of the scenarios presented 
included major disasters; it was assumed that the economy would advance and 
environmental issues would remain under control. Many respondents stressed the 
importance of security and believed that the future would be somewhat similar 
to the present situation and environment. In the future, therefore, the analysis 
of weak signals and wild cards should be given more attention. Participants in 
Delphi panels are often inclined to confuse preferable events with probable ones. 
There was strong confidence in the positive development of the economy, which 
contains a considerable risk, however.
Recommended political actions. The study indicates that Murmansk will form 
an important logistic gateway from north-western Russia to the world, enabling 
transport of natural resources and processed goods to the world market. The 
development of the logistic gateway will mostly depend on trends in the world 
economy as well as the prices of raw materials, such as oil and minerals (see 
also Brunstad et al. 2004). Murmansk’s logistic position will have a positive 
impact on the development of the region. This impact will be partly local and 
focus on logistic hubs. However, transport alone and the related construction 
and maintenance of the infrastructure will not provide employment for a large 
number of people in comparison with the existing population. Therefore, it would 
be meaningful to discuss the possibility of further industrial development. Oil 
transit, for example, could create opportunities for the plastic industry and gas 
transit opportunities for the electric power industry. 
This development will require the support of decision-makers on the federal 
and regional levels, but increasingly on the local level as well. Mono-industrial 
regions in particular may suffer from population decline, if nothing is done to 
diversify the structure of the industry or to improve the environment through 
new technology. Population decline may also disrupt existing industrial activity in 
the region. In these regions, industrial structures can be diversified through spin-
off companies emerging in connection with the rationalization or outsourcing 
of existing industrial production. Research and education as well as product 
development should increasingly be directed towards the new needs of growing 
fields, such as logistics, energy, tourism and information technology, where a 
number of new businesses will be formed, as traditional industries outsource 
their activities and concentrate on their basic activities in order to boost their 
competitiveness. The support given by the regional and federal levels to a more 
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diverse economic structure can be crucial to mono-industrial towns. New ideas 
supporting diverse industrial structures may be expressed by international actors 
who are not tied to local interests in the same way as local actors are. Creating new 
social capital will be vital to the development of local regions. 
The study shows that the structure of business life in the Murmansk Region in the 
future can be markedly different from the present situation, even if the current 
structures of industries, particularly the metal-processing and mining industries, 
retain their central role in the region’s economy. Future business will require a 
workforce and an infrastructure adapted to Arctic conditions and communities. 
Trying to develop existing communities through regional policy is therefore a 
justified task, as a substantial part of the population would rather live and work 
in their home region (Rautio 2003; Henkel 2000; see also Kari Vuorinen 2007). 
Otherwise, possible investments in the rapidly growing gas and oil industry might 
not materialize in full or be at all profitable, as attracting a workforce from other 
regions and building an infrastructure to accommodate future needs would cost 
much more. The focus of oil and gas production is shifting further to the north, 
which will require more research into acquisition of labour and changes in values 
and life styles (Spies 2006; 2009).
The Murmansk Region in the northern part of the globe is in itself an 
extraordinary opportunity. The population is fairly large compared with other 
northern industrial regions. If put to proper use, the resource formed by the 
population could turn the Murmansk Region into a central base for research and 
exploitation of natural resources in the most ecologically sustainable way for the 
needs of Russia and the world. 
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Endnotes
1. In the scenario study by Brunstad et al., one of the wild cards suggested was a 
drop in the oil price to less than 15 dollars a barrel. The Russian transport strategy 
adopted in 2005 is based on the assumption that the price of oil will remain at a 
minimum of USD 18.5 per barrel (Pynnöniemi 2006). Compared to the current 
price of oil, these estimates seem quite low.
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Muncipal self-governance and problems of Russian 
countryside 
Soili Nysten-Haarala
1. Introduction
Municipal reform in the Russian Federation based on the Federal Law of 2003 
is aimed at strengthening municipal self-governance and democracy at the local 
level. The aim is quite far-reaching taking into consideration how new municipal 
self-governance in Russia is. In the Soviet Union local administration was vertical 
state administration and also governed by the Communist Party. Municipal self-
governance was introduced by President Yeltsin; first in his Presidential Decrees 
of 1992 and then in the Constitution of 1993, with no pressure from either the 
local level or domestic politics. Municipal self-governance is one of the many legal 
transplants which were adopted in the new Russia during the reforms of the early 
1990s.1
The discussion on legal transplants, on the one hand, emphasizes that changes 
in the legal system are based on such transplants (Watson 1993), as it with 
undoubtedly is in the case of Russian transition to a market economy. On the 
other hand, borrowing from other legal systems is complex because of differing 
traditions, and social, economic and political conditions (Legrand 1993). 
Gunther Teubner even introduced the concept “legal irritant”, which better than 
“transplant” describes how the degree of success in transplanting is dependent 
on the way coupling with social processes occurs (Teubner 1998). Institutional 
economics developed by Douglass North explains the same phenomenon as an 
interaction between formal institutions such as law and informal institutions such 
as thinking modes and working habits may derive not only from different social 
and economic circumstances, but from culture and religion (North 1990: 2005).
The first federal law of the Russian Federation on municipal self-governance was 
enacted in 1995. However, the development of the local level has not been one of 
the main interests of either the Federation or the regions,2 since there have been 
struggles over the federal structure and the relationship between the Federation 
and its subjects as well as many other social and economic issues, which 
have made the introduction of municipal self-governance less important and 
complicated. To my mind, the law of 2003 and the reform now aims to strengthen 
self-governance and democracy at the local level, but is only one small factor in 
solving the complicated problems of poor municipalities in the countryside. 
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This article is based on the studies of two research projects financed by the 
Academy of Finland: Governance of Renewable Natural Resources in Northwest 
Russia 2004-2007, grant number 203964; and Trust in Finnish-Russian Forest 
Industry Relationships 2008-2011, grant number 123301. Researchers3 in the first 
project collected interviews of stakeholders, who affect or would like to affect the 
governance of forests and fisheries, while the second project focuses on how large 
globalized Finnish and Swedish forest industry companies function in Russia 
at the local level. The data is collected from the Leningrad region, Arkhangelsk 
region, Karelian Republic and Murmansk region. The article discusses local-level 
problems based on empirical data from forest localities.
2. Origins of Russian social resbonsibility of enterprises
In mill towns or villages, which during the industrialization leap of the Soviet 
Union, were often built in the middle of nowhere to utilize natural resources; state 
enterprises were responsible for local infrastructure. When the privatization of 
state enterprises began, the structure of the tasks of local communities was also 
supposed to be changed. The presidential decree of 10 January 1993 rejected the 
privatization of social and cultural capital of enterprises and the Government’s 
privatization program ordered these social and cultural objects and responsibilities 
to be transferred to municipalities within six months of confirmation of the 
privatization plan of the enterprise. Municipalities were supposed to adopt these 
responsibilities (Kortelainen & Nysten-Haarala 2009).
The change has, however, been difficult and painful. It can be said that in many 
localities companies and the municipality still live in a symbiotic relationship. 
The main problem of municipalities is the lack of tax revenues, which is partly 
due to the regulations of tax and budgetary legislation, and in the countryside is 
also due to the lack of tax payers. According to statistics from 2006 the costs of 
municipalities are twice as high as the revenues of the municipal budget. Only 
two percent of municipalities are self-sustaining.4 Municipalities are therefore 
dependent on subsidies from regional budgets. In this situation it is only natural 
that municipalities turn to local companies for help. Companies are supposed 
to have social responsibility, which has often been confirmed from the federal 
center.5 
In logging areas international companies at least donate firewood to most 
vulnerable groups of the community and sometimes even pay extra taxes 
which are included in the municipal budget (Interviews of municipal leaders 
and managers of forest companies in 2009). There are also examples of Russian 
companies which provide municipal services, for example, opening the company 
health services to all inhabitants of the municipality and building sports halls 
and cultural palaces for the use of the citizens. In our study area the Kondopoga 
pulp and paper mill is an example of a company which actually seems to run the 
municipality in a paternalistic manner (Kortelainen & Nysten-Haarala 2009).6 
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International companies do not see social responsibility in the same way and our 
interviews also indicate that most Russian companies try to eliminate extra costs 
which impair their economic competitiveness.7 This type of social responsibility is 
clearly a phenomenon of the transition period and cannot be lasting in a market 
economy.
3. Does developing municipal democracy help in arranging municipal 
services?
In this situation municipal reform should focus on how to ensure enough 
economic resources to municipalities to provide the continuance of their services. 
However, municipal self-governance being a legal irritant and as such difficult 
to introduce in Russia, the new law is more interested in organizing municipal 
administration in a democratic direction than solving economic problems. 
Municipal democracy is undoubtedly a new phenomenon and difficult to 
introduce in Russia. Municipal administration is regulated at both the federal and 
regional levels as well as in the charters of municipalities. Some regions such as 
the Republic of Tatarstan still claim the right to name the municipal leaders, citing 
local traditions (Kurnikova 2008). The Federal Constitutional Court has several 
times found the interference of regional government in local self-governance a 
violation of the Constitution.8 Municipal self-governance limits the earlier power 
of the regions, which also lost the struggle over the federal structure to the federal 
center. The decentralization of the early 1990s turned into a strong centralization 
of the “vertical” executive power during Putin’s presidency (Nysten-Haarala 2001). 
The regions are therefore reluctant to develop municipal self-governance, which 
further weakens their own already diminished power.
Municipal administration is divided into two levels. The members of the 
municipal council and the municipal leader, who are elected locally according 
to federal law, form the first level. The second level consists of the different 
organs established by the municipal charter such as committees of microraions, 
villages, streets, blocks, blocks of flats etc (Baglaiĭ 2008, 788). The village leaders 
at the second level are chosen as civil servants of the municipality by an election 
committee. The voluntary “Elders” (as they are called) of different second-level 
entities usually work without payment. Such an organization of small entities, 
which the federal law suggests on a voluntary basis, resembles the Soviet style of 
mobilizing people. This system may not last long since people who volunteer to 
take care of other people in their nearby surroundings and collect suggestions 
for the village leader or the municipal council are middle-aged and have a Soviet 
education supporting attitudes and responsibilities for volunteering. 
The two-level system may be ideal for bringing democratic decision-making 
power to villages close to the inhabitants, but unfortunately it is not economically 
sustainable. The villages at the second level operate on their own budget of 
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minimal resources to care for local roads and buildings. The suggestion of 
the federal law differs radically from Western tendencies to unify small and 
economically unsustainable municipalities. Russian federal law reflects the Soviet 
mentality and lofty ideals of local democracy. 
Russian authoritarian practice and the legacy of strong executive power also 
hinder municipal self-governance. Municipal leaders, who have misused power 
or made illegal decisions, can be dismissed by a court order if an inhabitant has 
appealed to the court. The law, however, makes it possible for the regional leader 
and, in the last instance, the president of the Federation to dismiss a municipal 
leader following a court order. This provision reflects both the authoritative 
way of thinking and the low respect given to court decisions. There have been 
incidents where a municipal leader has continued being dismissed by court order 
and the regional leader has consequently had to intervene. Self-governance as it 
is described in the Charter of the European Council demands no interference 
from the state. The state of course provides the framework legislation guiding 
self-governance, but otherwise only the courts can dismiss a municipal leader or 
nullify a decision of the municipal council. Unfortunately, authoritative executive 
power is more respected than the courts by Russian civil servants. Both strong 
executive power and the endless struggle between the Federation and the regions 
hinder the development of local self-governance. The regions would like to 
institute municipal self-governance regionally and not according to a detailed 
federal law.
State interference is, however, inevitable because municipalities are economically 
dependent on the state. This is a common feature of municipal self-governance 
in older democracies as well. In Finland and Sweden municipalities are being 
merged because they cannot cope with all the duties the state has imposed on 
them by legislative means. Social and health care responsibilities are costly 
and municipalities have previously managed through mutual cooperation and 
additional state revenues, which are granted according to a calculation rule 
introduced by legislation. Nowadays small municipalities, especially in the 
sparsely populated countryside, do not get enough tax revenue, if they do not 
manage to get enough business in their area. Therefore the state both in Sweden 
and in Finland has started to offer incentives to municipalities which decide to 
consolidate into larger municipalities. It can be said that economic responsibilities 
may lead to state interference in municipal self-administration. The municipalities 
must turn to the state in times of economic difficulty. The economic basis 
of municipal self-governance is now in great danger in the countries which 
originated legal transplants. 
In Russia the problem is highly structural, because the tax and budgetary 
legislation has not been drafted to permit local self-governance to be economically 
sustainable. Municipalities get at least 50 percent of their property tax from 
companies, ten percent from the profits on privatizing state property situated 
in the municipality, renting municipal property and all the profits of privatizing 
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municipal property9 as well as taxes on private entrepreneurs. Other forms of taxes 
gained by the municipality include a share of the capital gains tax on enterprises 
and income tax on private persons as well as a share of value added taxes. This 
share, however, has to be negotiated with the regional administration, which tends 
to take a bigger share for itself. In sum only payments and taxes on municipal 
property are an independent source of revenue for municipalities. In large cities 
such as Moscow and St Petersburg the municipality can collect considerable 
amounts of property tax revenue, but in the countryside this source is practically 
inexistent. 
The municipal budget is therefore dependent on subsidies from the regional and 
federal levels. The subsidies are negotiated when the municipality determines how 
great its budget deficit is. The region is entitled to investigate the finances of the 
municipality before providing any subsidies and also to ensure that the subsidies 
are used exactly to cover those expenses which have been agreed beforehand. The 
way of subsidizing municipal budgets is quite arbitrary and requires good social 
and negotiation skills from the municipal leader.
A special feature in Russian municipal self-governance is that municipalities 
are allowed to do business.10 The municipal reform has also encouraged 
municipalities to do business and collect special funds for municipal expenses 
(Bagliĭ 2008, 800). In the countryside municipal enterprises can be an alternative 
to arranging services such as village shops for local people, but, on the other 
hand, municipal business interferes with local business life. In Western European 
countries municipalities generally have to refrain from business and focus only on 
supporting local private business and arranging municipal services, since business 
is not an aim of municipal self-governance. 
4. The lack of property rights at the local level and its consequences 
for the Russian market economy
Another problem of the local level is the lack of property rights to natural 
resources. Although the Federal Constitution of 1993 introduced private and 
municipal ownership of property rights (Article 9; see footnote 9), the state is 
still the only owner. The Constitution also stipulates the jurisdiction of natural 
resources jointly to both the Federation and the subject (Article 76). A struggle 
has been going on between the Federation and regions over the ownership and 
sharing of the income derived from the use of natural resources. Forest legislation 
is a good example of this struggle and the development towards a high level of 
centralization. While the Foundations of Forest Legislation of 1992 stipulated 
forests in the joint ownership of the federation and the subject, the Forest 
Code of 1997 granted ownership completely to the Federation, a path which 
the contemporary Forest Code of 2006 follows. The centralization tendency 
of President Putin’s regime even took the legislative share of the incomes from 
the regions and permitted the Federation to decide on sharing the profits. The 
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budgetary code stipulates that a minimum of 30 percent of the incomes of natural 
resources should be given to the subsequent region (= subject of the federation). 
Municipalities and local people receive no payments from natural resources, 
because there are almost no natural resources in municipal ownership. Their 
share of tax revenues is inadequate, not to mention the minimal decision-making 
power on the use of natural resources, in spite of their responsibility to plan the 
use of property in their area. Private ownership of forests is not allowed by current 
legislation. The discussion about private ownership connected with the drafting 
of the forest code of 2006 indicates that the impact of privatization of companies 
hinders privatization of forests. Most people do not want to see natural resources 
in the hands of the oligarchs, the immensely rich businessmen who now run the 
Russian economy. Private ownership of forests by ordinary local people in order 
for them to survive in the countryside has not even been discussed in Russia. In 
Finland private ownership of forests has been important since it has provided 
additional resources for farmers. The only benefit which Russian inhabitants 
of the countryside may get from forest-cutting takes the form of the minimal 
taxes paid by the companies to the municipality, and potential jobs. However, 
even today jobs are threatened when companies modernize their technology. 
In particular, foreign companies have also started to use contractors that could 
import their harvesters and work force from abroad. 
It is no wonder that the consciousness of justice makes local people think that 
companies have a duty to help them, since that was the case in Soviet times. In 
a market economy, however, there should be other methods of empowering the 
local population than shifting the responsibility to companies.
5. New triends in social resbonsibility of the companies
The social responsibility of companies is also gradually turning to that in a market 
economy. In a market economy the company can choose how to demonstrate 
its social and environmental responsibility. The pressure on forest companies 
is nowadays from the markets and more environmental than social by nature. 
Many printing houses nowadays require their paper to be produced in an 
environmentally and socially sustainable manner. Therefore they require certified 
paper. As a result the FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) certification has spread 
very quickly in Russia. The reason has been the earlier scandals of logging old 
growth forest and sold abroad (see e.g. Tysiachniouk 2009). 
The FSC is based on voluntary cooperation between companies and ENGOs. 
International companies usually cooperate with international ENGOs having a 
branch in Russia. They negotiate about the principles of certification, which for 
the FSC are ten very generally expressed principles, which can be interpreted 
broadly. The company agrees to follow these principles and the ENGO monitors 
that the conditions are satisfied. In our interviews representatives of ENGOs thank 
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international companies for proper application, which is done by educating their 
entire personnel in how to follow FSC rules and conditions. They also mention 
that international companies also draw state forest authorities in the process, 
because certification and Russian forest legislation can be contradictory. It 
should be borne in mind that certification is an example of either cooperation 
with companies and civil society excluding the state or what can be so-called 
multi-level governance, in which different levels of society including the state 
consider important social and environmental issues. It is a typical example of 
modern “soft law”, which often goes further than national legislation in protecting 
the environment. Forest certification can therefore also be seen as one way of 
shaking the Russian authoritarian state model and breaking its negative path-
dependencies.
Forest certification is, however, a market-driven system paying more attention 
to environmental than social issues. However, it takes indigenous people’s rights 
into consideration. The concept indigenous people is interpreted in FSC principles 
more widely than in Russian legislation. For example, the Veps in the Leningrad 
region and Karelians in the Karelian Republic can be considered indigenous 
peoples. Russian ENGOs seem to be eager to interpret social security widely, to 
cover all the local people in difficult economic circumstances, interpreting social 
responsibility in a way which, according to them, is more suitable to Russian 
circumstances.
6. Conclusions
Municipal self-governance is a foreign institution and can also be described 
as a legal irritant in Russia, since there have been many obstacles in the way of 
introducing it and making it work properly. The contemporary reform is a sign 
of the willingness of the political elite to develop municipal self-governance. Even 
though the authoritarian approach to the state hinders this development, the idea 
of bringing democratic decision-making to the local level is clearly present in the 
new law on municipal self-governance. Democracy, however, always needs a solid 
economic basis to function. Poor Russian municipalities in the countryside do not 
have economic requisites to develop local democracy. They do not get sufficient 
tax revenues and are dependent on the state for subsidies. 
Municipalities are also dependent on companies working in the area. However, 
the social responsibility of the companies should be arranged to meet the 
requirements of a market economy. The state should take more responsibility in 
developing the social system; its absence is now clearly seen due to the current 
economic crisis. It is dangerous if the social well-being of local people is dependent 
on companies which can withdraw when the market situation no longer looks 
profitable. Many foreign international forest companies are withdrawing and the 
remainder are considering it because of the international crisis of the forest sector. 
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Furthermore, the rented lots of forest are left unguarded and illegal loggers can 
now easily enter the certified forests.
The most difficult problem from the point of view of an outside observer is that 
the property rights to natural resources, e.g. forests, are not given to local people. 
Encouraging the municipality to do business seems to interest the political elite 
more as a solution to the problems of the municipal economy than empowering 
local people as private actors. The federal state has the ownership of forests, but in 
the Forest Code of 2006 grants all responsibilities in caring for the forests to those 
who rent forest. As the example above shows this may not be a sustainable way to 
take care of forests. 
The problems of the Russian countryside and poor municipalities cannot be 
solved with only one law but require a broad approach taking such issues as 
property rights, social security and taxation into consideration. The concept 
“legal irritant” clearly describes how introducing a foreign institution affects other 
formal and informal institutions.
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Endnotes
1. Some of Russian text books on municipal self-governance historically connect 
Russian municipal self-governance to the zemstvo and other earlier local 
governance institutions before the October Revolution of 1917(e.g. Ovchinnikov 
1999). In the Soviet Union, however, development was towards state-led local 
governance (Kokotov-Salomatkin 2007, 74), which broke the tradition and 
development of local self-governance. More recent textbooks often date the 
history of Russian municipal self-governance from the Constitution of 1993 (e.g. 
Bondar’ 2009; Kutafin-Fadeev 2008).
2. Region is the concept used to cover all the different parts of the Russian 
Federation, which in Russia are called subjects of the Federation. The different 
subjects are republics, territories, oblasts (also called regions), autonomous 
regions, autonomous territories and two cities of federal importance (Moscow and 
St. Petersburg).
3. Researchers Maria Tysiachniouk, Antonina Kulyasova and Ivan Kulyasov from 
the Center of Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg have collected most of 
the interviews in both projects. This article is, however, mostly based on my own 
interviews.
4. Eremin 2008, 43. The information is from the Financial Chamber of the Russian 
Federation (Shchёtnaia Palata) from 28 April 2006
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5. Ministers of the Federal Government often refer to the social responsibility of 
enterprises and President Medvedev in his speeches concerning the economic 
crisis has suggested that since so many were enriched during privatization of 
enterprises, it is now their turn to take care of those who suffer because of the 
crisis.
6. The Kondopoga pulp and paper mill and the community have interested many 
scholars in Finland, e.g.  Melin, H. 2005; Itkonen & Stranius 2002.
7. The managers of the Solombala (Arkhangelsk) and Segezha (Karelian Republic) 
mills presented this opinion clearly, and even managers at the Kondopoga mill, 
where the company has strongly supported and run municipal services, explained 
that it is only because in present circumstances there are no other alternatives in 
Russia.
8. The Udmurtian case of 24 January 1997 and the case of the Komi Republic of 15 
January 1998 (Baglaiĭ 781).
9. The Russian Constitution and legislation treat state and municipal property 
as special forms of property, differing from private property. All three forms of 
property are regulated differently.
10. Russian legislation recognizes a special form of company, a municipal 
company.
94
NGO strategic partnership in promoting sustainable 
forest management in Russia
Maria Tysiachniouk1
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Interaction between NGOs and business may be based on different principles. 
The interaction varies from confrontation in the form of market campaigns and 
consumer boycotts to “soft inducement” through mechanisms of standardization 
and certification, or even in a more advanced way through creative NGO-business 
partnership. Cooperation aimed at building the models of sustainability on the 
ground that will be analyzed here provides an example of an innovative type of 
partnership which creates a policy generating network bringing institutional 
change to a locality in Russia.    
Transnational corporations which established their branches in developing 
countries with a cheap labor force and, as a rule, with lower environmental and 
social standards try to benefit from such conditions, and eventually are exposed to 
pressure from NGO international networks. This especially concerns companies 
with brands known throughout the world (Conroy 2001, pp. 2-3; O’Rourke 2005, 
pp. 117-119).  Standardization and certification function through revealing 
and encouraging corporations which demonstrate social and environmental 
responsibility and ensure “safety” for the brand. The level of corporate social 
responsibility varies. Some only enhance workers’ safety, comply with generally 
accepted nature protection norms, and/or use resource-saving technologies. 
Others do more: they support the infrastructure of local communities, launch 
small grant programs, and thereby develop local democracy by supporting 
community initiatives. The extent of their involvement in the development of 
social responsibility depends on a combination of local, national and transnational 
contexts in a certain locality, as well as the activity of different stakeholders, 
including NGOs. 
Joint development of sustainable business models involving economic, 
environmental and social components has become an example of partnership 
between NGOs and corporations. The development of such models helps 
transnational corporations to adapt to the specificity of the social, economic 
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and political contexts of the countries in which they work. In different countries 
they have to immediately adapt their business to numerous challenges. On 
the one hand, they should take into account the legislation and established 
rules of the country in which they are located. On the other, it is necessary to 
conform to international ethical and regulatory norms of business activity. In 
addition, they usually adhere to their own corporate policy, which they should 
follow irrespective of the location of their subsidiaries.  Building models that 
can be later on transferred to all localities of their business operation is way of 
developing optimum practices to adjust to both national and global contexts.  If 
lessons learned in the process of model-building can subsequently be applied 
to other localities in a particular country or region, the business operations can 
be standardized. In the case of successfully introducing developed innovations 
and practices to all subsidiaries, the transaction costs of business decrease to a 
considerable extent.2  At the same time the sustainability practices involve more 
localities, which is beneficial to them.   NGOs within such a network contribute to 
the development of such models by helping enterprises contact stakeholders and 
thus become a sort of “transmitter” of ideas from business to society and vice versa 
(Tysiachniouk 2006).
In this paper, based on empirical findings, I focus on strategic partner relations 
between a transnational corporation, Stora Enso, and an international 
nongovernmental organization, WWF, which have developed in the course of 
constructing a model of sustainable forest management and certifying forest 
management operations using the FSC scheme.  Outside donor funding from 
SIDA was used to enable the NGO to reach out to the local community and 
stakeholders. The paper will dwell upon advantages which strategic partnership 
with NGOs provide to business, i.e. the role of partnership in transmitting 
global discourses on sustainability to concrete practices in a specific locality. 
Furthermore, I assess the possibility of reproducing these practices in other 
localities.
1. 2. Theoretical approaches
The neo-institutional approach (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Scott 1995, pp. 29-31) is used in this paper. Institutions represent the 
roles of the game that organize interaction between actors.  If institutions are 
effective, they reduce the uncertainty of the environment and allow actors 
to reduce transaction costs related to the exchange (North 1990; Scott 1995). 
Organizations operate within institutional fields (DiMaggio 1991, pp. 268-290; 
Bartley 2003).  Institutional fields in certain contexts can either promote or 
hinder institutional change.  In order to reduce uncertainty institutional fields 
have a tendency to be isomorphic (DiMaggio and Powell 1985).  Isomorphism 
allows sociology to understand the processes that homogenize institutional 
fields and inter-organizational roles.  This allows groups of actors to react more 
smoothly to external changes.  Organizational isomorphism is based on three 
types of institutional influences to adopt an organizational innovation: coercive, 
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mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  The concept of mimetic 
isomorphism is particularly important in this paper.  
New roles brought by global actors, such as international foundations, 
conventions, NGOs and TNCs affect local institutional fields and create new 
arenas for stakeholder interaction; I therefore call these transnational actors 
agents of institutional change.  I will evaluate the effectiveness of TNC business 
strategy as an agent of institutional change (Peng 2002, pp. 252; Tempel and 
Walgenbach 2007).  In my case study, the turbulent organizational environment 
in Russia brought additional complexity to the process of institutional change and 
translating globally developed rules into local practices.  
1. 3. Data and methodology
The paper is based on qualitative field research during two trips to the study 
area in 2002 (17 interviews) and 2006 (22 interviews) and follow-up interviews 
in 2007-2008. In total 39 interviews  were conducted.  The case study approach 
was used and the situation interpreted through the lens of the informants of 
different groups of stakeholders.  A snowballing technique was used to identify 
four major groups of informants.  The first group was formed by representatives 
of civil society institutions from the WWF offices in Moscow, St. Petersburg 
and Strugi Krasnie (in 2002) and on the local level, representatives of teachers, 
clubs and libraries.  The second group was represented by power structures on 
different levels in Russia and SIDA in Sweden. The third included community 
representatives and the fourth of representatives of the Stora Enso business 
network:  STF-Strug St. Petersburg office, Stockholm office (Sweden), and Imatra 
office (Finland).  Guidelines for the interviews were developed separately for each 
of the group taking into account their specifics. Participant observation was used 
at meetings.  During the field trips notes were made and used for the analysis.
2. Transnational actors of institutional change 
The model forest of 18 400 hectares was developed in the territory of the 
Strugokrasnensk forest management unit in the Pskov region on forest land 
leased by a Stora Enso subsidiary, STF-Strug. The case examines the cooperation 
between the major agents of institutional change, namely the WWF and Stora 
Enso, in translating ideas designed globally for concrete practices in the space of 
place during the implementation of the Pskov Model Forest project. This project 
was financed by three transnational actors: SIDA, the major granting agency, Stora 
Enso, and the German section of WWF.
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Stakeholders within the project involved both transnational and local actors. The 
staff implementing the project was hired especially for this project and served as 
a major channel of translation of global standards and the desires of transnational 
actors to local practices. Project experts originally from the Research Institute of 
Forestry were developing innovative methods of felling, promoting relations with 
stakeholders and coordinating implementation.  The Stora Enso subsidiary STF-
Strug was obliged to strictly follow novel practices and fell timber in accordance 
with innovative approaches developed in the framework of the project. 
For WWF, the promotion of model forest projects is a way of involving business 
in sustainable forest management and encouraging its environmental and 
social responsibility.  In accordance with its mission in this project WWF was 
sequentially advancing its corporate strategy and its logo while introducing 
innovative environmental approaches to forest management. Co-financing 
allowed WWF to position itself as a project holder as well as implementer of all 
project achievements. 
Stora Enso in Russia had to solve the problems it encountered in the post-
socialist transition period: continual reformation of state governing bodies and 
forest legislation, institutional turbulence, and other existing realities. It was 
important for the company to find models for commercial forestry in Russia: “It 
was a development project; our business was developing together with Russian 
social development, its legislative system and law enforcement…. We needed a 
holistic forest management model with information on forest resources, inventory, 
planning, participatory methods and effective implementation.” (Interview with a 
Stora Enso manager). On certification, Stockholm, March 2008. 
In this situation partnership with such a powerful organization as the WWF 
helped the company to adapt their business to Russian conditions. The Pskov 
Model Forest could also become a suitable place to demonstrate the advantages 
of Scandinavian harvesting methods with the view to their further dissemination 
in Russia. WWF, as Stora Enso’s strategic partner, assisted in resolving problems 
originating from state structures, and the local stakeholders and population. It also 
contributed to “legitimizing” Stora Enso in the eyes of international stakeholders, 
including buyers of final products.  
The financing of projects promoting sustainability as well as advancing Swedish 
business in Russia was one of priority of the SIDA financial activity; at the 
time when the project was launched, Sweden and Russia had developed timber 
trade relations. Moreover, the Swedish Parliament declared a large number of 
initiatives (e.g., rendering help to countries with a transition economy, promoting 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, supporting a socially stable transition 
to market economy, advancing ideas of sustainable development, etc.) which 
urged SIDA to finance the project.  It was part of a SIDA initiative to reduce 
poverty in developing countries and the basic idea was that if the profitability of 
Russian timber industry increased through intensification of forest management, 
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this would contribute to the well-being of local communities in rural Russia. 
(Interview with the Manager of the Russian-Swedish Cooperation Program, 
Swedish Forest Agency, Stockholm, March 2008) Another goal was to promote 
forest sector cooperation with Russia at all levels, making forestry in Russia 
transparent and legal.  Despite the fact that SIDA did not participate directly in the 
implementation of the Pskov Model Forest, the agency contributed to involving 
Swedish specialists in the project: scientists and experts visited the model forest 
for consultations and research. This promoted Scandinavian technologies used 
in the Pskov Model Forest and fostered the intensification of forest management. 
The Swedish Forest Agency also pressed for a democratic way of decision-making, 
emphasizing the need to involve the ordinary citizen (Interview with a Swedish 
Forest Agency representative, Stockholm, March 2008). 
3. Transfer of global standardas into local place
In the Pskov Model Forest project the introduction of global practices to a 
particular locality proceeded in several crossed and complementary streams (see 
Diagram 1). On the one hand, it was implemented through FSC forest certification 
promoted by WWF all over Russia, and through the application of corporate 
practices of Stora Enso in its subsidiary “STF-Strug” on the other. Several agents 
were important in channeling global designs to the locality.   The most important 
were forest experts within the Pskov Model Forest implementation team that were 
adapting the Scandinavian model of intensive forest management to conditions in 
Russia. In the process of certification, the Pskov Model Forest team was engaged 
in its “content” preparation, including nature conservation planning, involving 
the population in forest governance, developing and introducing innovations in 
forest exploitation in order to develop a living laboratory of sustainable forestry in 
Russia. PMF involved many experts, both international and local, in economics, 
natural sciences and sociology.  The expert community served as an additional 
stream for adapting global discourses to the local context.  The FSC auditor 
Smartwood (later its subsidiary Nepcon) also contributed to the interpretation of 
how sustainability standards should be implemented in a Russian locality.
The position of the STF-Strug enterprise towards required standards for the FSC 
was basically in line with that of Stora Enso. Stora Enso adheres to a common 
corporate policy implemented worldwide, which includes environmental, 
economic and social components. This corporate policy includes labor standards 
as well as the issue of employee health and safety. Thus, the realization of FSC 
standards at STF-Strug in training workers, supplying them with uniforms, 
fulfilling requirements for accident monitoring and prevention and complying 
with workers’ rights have been ensured by Stora Enso.  STF-Strug was required to 
follow the routine standards of corporate policy of Stora Enso. 
From its start, the PMF mediated different issues and tried to solve conflicts 
between STF-Strug and the other stakeholders; e.g. leskhoz3 and its workers, 
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government officials from federal regional and local levels, the forest management 
unit, regional administration, and the local people. These networks were 
coordinated and negotiated using certain methods to interest each stakeholder in 
the model forest project. The goal was to bring them all into the decision-making 
process for managing the region’s forests. The sustainability of this approach to 
forestry was based on the sustainability of relationships between stakeholders. The 
intension was to build policy networks to last beyond the timeframe of the PMF. 
4. Interaction with the government  
The first step in gaining permission to create the model forest outside the 
normative base was to convince various levels of the forest sector that sustainable 
forestry is necessary and beneficial in many ways. WWF used its own channels for 
cooperation with state structures. Representatives of the WWF Forest Program 
are members of the Public Council at Rosleskhoz, where they gradually advance 
the ideas of sustainable forest exploitation. In 1999, prior launching the project, 
WWF and Rosleskhoz signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of forest 
governance and preservation of biodiversity. According to the agreement, WWF 
assumed the responsibility to conceptualize model forests. This document was 
an opportunity for WWF to involve Roslekhoz in the activity. Interaction with 
Rosleskhoz has somewhat contributed to obtaining special status for the model 
forest. This status favored experimentation in felling and the development of 
new standards for forest exploitation. To avoid problems with local authorities, 
relevant agreements with regional structures related to forest management were 
signed as well. These agreements envisaged the involvement of state structures 
in the project’s advisory board and working groups. According to these 
agreements, WWF was allowed to experiment with the development of regulatory 
approaches to forestry. PMF implementers used various methods of educating 
and befriending the government in order to gain their support. Their efforts were 
aimed at those members of the leskhoz who directly supervise logging operations, 
regional government officials who enforce norms and legislation, and officials on 
the federal level who set forest management policy for all of Russia. WWF tried to 
establish a network that would link all these levels to the Model Forest project and 
draw them into its implementation. They held seminars and workshops, including 
trips to Sweden to study sustainable logging sites, to which government officials of 
different levels were invited. (Interview with the Vice-Chair of the Department of 
Forest Use, Pskov region 2002). 
Cooperation with federal structures was expected to ensure relative freedom in 
performing experiments within the project.  After considerable efforts, the Forest 
Agency at the Department for Natural Resources of the Pskov region and the 
administration of the region became project partners at the regional and local 
levels, and constructive relations with the local forestry management unit were 
also established.  By negotiating with different levels of the government, the PMF 
received permission to log in such a way that the local forest management unit 
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would not penalize them for any innovations that violated existing legislation. 
An example of conflicting practices between STF-Strugy and Russian norms was 
leaving branches to decompose after logging. Russian forestry norms require 
their removal. The standard Russian tractor used to haul logs out of the forest 
creates deep ruts in the forest floor; it is therefore necessary that branches are 
gathered and laid in the tractor’s path in bunches. (Interview with a head of forest 
laboratory, Strugi Krasnie, October 2002). These ruts damage the forest landscape. 
STF-Strug, however, used modern Scandinavian machines, and it was unnecessary 
to lay branches in this way. Beyond this, the reasons why the PMF did not agree 
with the old practice were both economic and ecological. The STF-Strug was 
not interested in paying for the extra work of removal, and, in addition, leaving 
branches where they fall was good for the soil and biodiversity, as it provided 
animals with hiding and shelter (Interview with the head of the Pskov WWF 
2002). 
Another practice of the model forest contradicting Russian norms, and one that 
PMF gained permission for was leaving aspen trees on the plot. Aspen trees 
(Populus spp.), a traditional problem for Russian foresters, decay very early in 
their lives and are not very valuable commercially, yet they absorb nutrients that 
foresters would rather give to more valuable timber species.  In Sweden aspen is 
valued and preserved for biodiversity.  While Russian foresters consider aspens a 
nuisance, “a Swedish specialist who came and saw how many aspens we have in 
the forest was just crying.” (Interview with Pskov WWF office manager, October 
2002). As one of our informants ironically stated: “In Sweden, managers preserve 
aspens because they think that it is something beautiful. They run around aspens 
and build fences and put a ribbon on each tree” (Ibid). PMF used an ecological 
argument in the issue of the aspens. Because they rot on the inside, they can 
provide decent homes for animals, especially in winter. Girdling the trees and 
leaving them on the plot does not reduce the important ecological role they play. 
Companies in Russia were required to remove aspens from the plots. STF-Strugy 
did not wish to pay for this extra work when the tree could instead be destroyed 
without removal. Before the project started, they were accordingly fined by the 
local forestry unit. This penalty was less than the actual cost of removing the trees, 
so STF-Strugy left them in the forest and paid (Ibid). Later, the PMF coordinated 
this activity with the state forestry unit and the Ministry of Natural Resources, so 
that permission to leave the aspens was granted. STF-Strug workers simply had 
to “girdle” the trees by cutting a ring around them, all the way through the bark. 
This killed the tree with a minimum of work and left it standing until it naturally 
felt over.
The research director of the project took an active part in promoting the 
developed PMF standards at the federal level. However, there were no tangible 
results concerning introducing these standards at the federal level. Thereby both 
WWF and Stora Enso in many respects have achieved a constructive favorable 
relationship with state authorities. The problem of introducing new standards 
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developed within the PMF project to forest legislation had not been solved by the 
end of the project, in 2008. 
At different stages of the project, relations with the Strugokrasnensk leskhoz were 
developing differently. At the very beginning, it refused to recognize the project as 
a partner, and treated it as something alien that was trying to destroy the existing 
order with their innovations and practices. As one forest management staff 
person noted, “At first it was a little hard to understand the goals of the project.” 
(Interview with director of Strugi-Krasnie leskhoz, June 2006). 
The Strugokrasnensk leskhoz actively opposed attempts to introduce some 
elements of sustainable forest management practices which contravened the 
Russian legislation in neighboring areas (also leased by STF-Strug but without 
special status). Its employees treated such innovations as the low qualifications 
of STF-Strug workers rather than as attempts to disseminate practices of 
biodiversity maintenance: “their managers are not specialists, they all have come 
from Soviet collective farms, and their vision of forestry is therefore, absolutely 
different”(Interview with a forester in Strugi Krasnie, June 2006). 
However, during the research field-trip in 2006 the author observed appreciable 
changes in attitudes towards the STF-Strug practices. Some informants remarked 
that STF-Strug was the oldest and one of the most responsible leaseholders: “They 
keep forest roads in order; they are engaged in silviculture, they leave seed trees 
and undergrowth on forest plots”(Interview with a forester in the Uzlinsk region, 
June 2006). Another informant remarked that this company is even engaged in 
economically unfavorable but necessary sustainable forestry activities such as 
thinning in young forests.  He did not consider the foreign origin of the company 
as evidence of its being “alien” to Russian realities, but on the contrary treats the 
practices of the company as an indicator of its responsibility: “They are influenced 
by the West and are more concerned with forestry issues, and even reforestation 
and non-commercial thinning  are of equal interest for them” (Interview with the 
representative of Strugokrasnensk forest management unit, June 2006). However, 
a paradoxical situation still developed around the project. The company cannot 
introduce innovative practices in the areas which were scheduled to be included 
(i.e. areas rented by STF-Strug but not included into the model forest) (Interview 
with the research manager of the project, March 2008). Efficient cooperation with 
both regional and local administration has been a necessary condition for the 
PMF in successfully embedding itself in an existing context in the space of place. 
Being guided by this idea, the project implementation team was searching for 
ways to establish a partnership with regional and local authorities. Relationships 
with the Pskov regional administration were developing gradually, since following 
each election or restructuring of regional structures it was necessary to establish 
new relations and present the project again and again. At the last stage of the 
project, close cooperation with the Department of Education was established; 
this concerned the creation of a textbook on sustainable forest management 
developed and published within the project for high school students. Networking 
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with members of local administration was one of the easiest steps in the PMF’s 
efforts. The administration of the Strugokrasnensk region supported STF-Strug 
long before the Project was launched, as at that time this enterprise was the main 
taxpayer in the region. 
5. Building relationships with local people 
In the early stages people looked suspiciously at the project as they did not 
understand its purposes. It was necessary for the project to overcome the 
prejudices of the local population towards any foreign company which the 
people believed, “came to cut down forests, get profit and abandon the place, 
leaving a desert behind (Informal conversation with a woman at the market in 
Strugi Krasnie, October 2002). PMF was actively engaged in informing the 
population about the project and its purposes through the media.  They published 
informational press releases about the project in regional and federal publications, 
created a website, and aired television and radio shows (Report on Public Relations 
of the Pskov Model Forest project from June 200-December 2001). As project 
implementers were interested in naturally embedding PMF ideas in the local 
community, they actively participated in various actions related to local cultural 
traditions. Within the project PMF supported construction of an orthodox 
chapel, organized a Pancake festival and a school graduation party.(Interview 
with the director of the Pskov Model Forest Project, June 2002). Environmental 
actions, such as forest festivals, and ecological and sports events, have become 
another strategy for attracting the population (Interview with the Pskov WWF 
office manager, June 2002). WWF’s small grant program was a tool used to link 
the local population to PMF. One of the strategies in the grant program was to 
take activities that already existed and enhance their quality while steering them 
towards supporting the model forest. During the project’s lifetime, 32 small grants 
were made. With these small grants teachers created such programs as recycling, 
forest education, nature calendars and computer education.
Inclusion of the public in decision-making on forest management was a necessary 
measure, on the one hand, because this was one of the requirements of FSC 
certification; on the other, all experts and visitors coming to the model forest 
from abroad were primarily interested in the questions of public participation in 
forestry-related decision-making: “In the West it is a popular subject. They come 
and immediately inquire whether our public is involved in the decision-making 
process”(Interview with a participant of the Project, June 2002). The project 
implementers were themselves suspicious of the issue of public participation: 
“Maybe it is important to involve the public in Western countries, but here we 
have a different mentality”. (Interview with a PMF staff member, June 2002) They 
therefore created the institutional infrastructure for stakeholder meetings. In order 
to involve the public in the discussions of forest issues the PMF organized a forest 
club, an idea borrowed from Priluzie Model Forest, another project of WWF. 
The task of the forest club was to inform the population and the stakeholders 
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about the implementation of the project and other relevant questions.  One PMF 
implementer stated: “When visitors ask the question, ‘how is the public involved’, 
we know the drill; we have the Forest Club, and when such people come we refer 
them to the Club; they are happy because we have all possible stakeholders there 
(Interview with a PMF implementer, June 2002). Club sessions were attended by 
invited representatives of administration, the leskhoz, the school, libraries, and 
also grantees and eco-activists. The meetings were often heated discussions. As 
the population was hostile to cuttings, they had many questions and advanced 
their own claims, many of which were addressed not so much to the project as to 
the village administration. Those present wanted answers to their questions: who 
cuts forests, why they are cut, where wood is hauled, and how forest exploitation 
is organized in the region. The questions also concerned firewood, sawn-wood, 
removal of waste, etc.: “At the beginning, there was much talk because everything 
was unclear and it gave rise to a lot of questions concerning forest management in 
our region” (Interview with an activist of the Forest Club, June 2007). The Forest 
Club, however, never became a forum of negotiation where decisions about the 
project would have been made.  It was a space for information exchange between 
the PMF implementers and the stakeholders.  
Public hearings were held only once to discuss the forest management plan 
during the state forest inventory process in 2002. The PMF applied a scenario 
method developed in a pilot project of the World Bank in the Karelian Isthmus 
(Romanchiuk 2001). Using this method, experts developed several scenarios of 
how forest management can develop, each giving different weight to ecological, 
economic, and social factors of the forests. The discussion during the hearings 
resulted in a plan which represented a compromise between the economic 
component, on the one hand, and the environmental and social ones, on the other. 
A more environmentally oriented scenario involving the two most reasonable 
ones was accepted and provided for preservation of wood grouse mating areas. 
This model of hearings is hardly applicable to other regions since the existing 
rigid federal regulation in forest management has limited the range of possible 
scenarios (Interview with the research director of the project, St. Petersburg, 
March 2008). 
6. Outcomes of the WWW-Stora Enso strategic partnership
The PMF was directed both inwardly to the space of place (locality) and outwardly 
to transnational spaces (sensitive Western markets). When implementing 
the PMF project, the WWF contributed to the legitimization of the company 
within the community of international stakeholders. The results of the project 
concerning this matter were most tangible in foreign markets as the stakeholders 
in transnational spaces were completely satisfied.   
As mentioned above, transnational corporations functioning in different countries 
propagate their global strategies and approaches in localities. In our case Stora 
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Enso was a “transmitter” of Scandinavian forestry technologies, and the PMF 
was a key actor in adapting these transnational practices to locality as well as 
developing innovations that can suit the local context. The role of WWF was to 
establish a relationship with the stakeholders at different levels to introduce these 
transnational practices.
Among the positive results of the PMF project, were the intensive forestry 
technologies for the total cycle (100 years) developed within the project.  This 
would make logging most effective by combining economic benefits with 
environmental expediency (Interview with the research director of the project, St. 
Petersburg, March 2008). The PMF developed a concept on how to promote FSC 
certification in Russia with all the necessary documentation and developed an 
extensive package of documents that would advance the extensive model of forest 
management and be a “learning opportunity” for the partners (Interview with a 
certification manager at Stora Enso, March 2008). During the project an expert 
community was formed and the NGO Greenforest was founded.  Greenforest 
became a registered consultant at the FSC office in Russia and started to reproduce 
the benefits of the PMF in other forest management operations for companies 
that were preparing for FSC certification. In particular, they were preparing and 
implementing nature conservation planning including the designation of high 
conservation value forests in preparation for FSC certification in areas including 
those leased by Stora Enso. Greenforest specialists make detailed plans and teach 
companies how to use them properly. (Participant observation during the training 
seminar for Stora Enso personnel in charge of certification, November 2007). 
The research has shown that the PMF was Stora Enso’s strategy of adapting 
Russian realities to its own business, rather than vice versa. WWF, for its part, 
was also interested in the transformation of Russian forestry institutions aiming 
to achieve greater conformity of the latter with the idea of sustainable forest 
management. There were attempts to adapt Scandinavian forest management 
practices to the Russian context: to adapt them to Russian conditions and create 
new standards. The idea was to further introduce these standards at the legislative 
level. This would have been favorable for both foreign and domestic companies 
working in international markets. However, eventually these practices could only 
be institutionalized in the territory of the model forest. 
Since 2006, Stora Enso has reproduced the methodology of nature conservation 
planning for its subsidiaries. Although this methodology was not approved 
at the federal level, it was still possible to find alternative legal ways for its 
implementation through allocation of special protection zones. In each region 
where Stora Enso operates, its subsidiaries had to solve the problems encountered 
in different ways, mostly through ordering special forest management plans for 
the forest inventory agency.  For example, when allotting logging plots together 
with forestry unit staff, the company had to name the key biotopes of the 
“noncommercial forest zones,” which they were allowed to leave on the cutting 
plot.  In this way biodiversity could be preserved.
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The application of experience gained with the population in the PMF project to 
other territories was also complicated, although for other reasons. As mentioned 
above, the scenario approach used in public hearings during the project is hardly 
applicable in ordinary conditions.  Many resources are needed to reproduce 
the Forest Club and build an interested stakeholder community. Generally, the 
major funder of the project, SIDA, was very satisfied with the development of 
innovations in intensive forest management and documenting tools for sustainable 
forestry.  However, they were not completely satisfied with the dissemination of 
the project outcomes as only a small community of Russian experts and a small 
number of companies were taught to use the above-mentioned tools (Interview 
with the representative of the Swedish Forest Agency, Stockholm, March 2008). 
7. Discussion and conclusion
The case of forest management has shown how institutional fields (which at 
national level are formed by the interaction between federal, regional and local 
actors) are influenced by global rules and norms in the course of the certification 
process. This process is sporadic in the beginning; it spreads to particular 
geographical areas involved in certification, and gradually intensifies as these 
areas expand. The Pskov Model Forest is a special case where the impact of global 
practices on the national institutional field was simultaneously realized through 
two channels - through certification, on the one hand, and through building the 
model forest, on the other.  Two major agents, namely Stora Enso and WWF, 
translated global designs into local practices. As the research has shown, the 
process of introducing global norms into institutional fields is far from smooth in 
Russia, as the state norms (Forest Code 2007, regulations in the sphere of forest 
management, etc.) “resist” the changes introduced by transnational NGOs and 
corporations. This “resistance” is neither a consequence nor intentional; it is more 
likely connected with the institutional turbulence of transition processes in the 
Russian economy in recent years. 
A paradoxical situation exists when the state “switches on green and red traffic 
lights” simultaneously. This, for example, happened with the Convention on 
Biodiversity; Russia ratified it in 1995, but did not develop relevant standards 
for the preservation of biodiversity during commercial forest exploitation. 
As a result, enterprises that are seeking certification are compelled to find 
somewhat questionable methods to conform to the requirements concerning 
biodiversity conservation. Otherwise, if they acted honestly, it would infringe 
on existing Russian legislation and entail fines. Stora Enso is an object of dual 
coercive isomorphism. It is exposed to a double pressure: on the one hand, from 
the state norms of the institutional field, and from global standards of forest 
certification, on the other. Both pressure groups have surveillance bodies to 
supervise compliance with national and global rules, which often contradict each 
other. To satisfy each party, Stora Enso, as well as other corporations that seek 
FSC certification, had to search for different individual methods of approaching 
106
their representatives. The solution found in particular cases gradually becomes an 
informal code of rules. In our case, the lack of formal regulations in the society 
resulted in their replacement by informal rules (Roth and Kostova 2003, p. 314).
For partners, the principle of mimetic isomorphism is realized differently. This 
research has shown that through the model forest project Stora Enso attempted 
to create an optimum algorithm for successful business operation in a particular 
country. This algorithm was intended for application in all subsidiaries operating 
there. Thus, the principle of mimic isomorphism would be exploited. However, 
organizational instability and turbulence in the regions created obstacles to 
carrying out this plan in its original form.  Only such measures as workers safety 
and nature conservation planning were possible to standardize and reproduce.  
For its part WWF also tried to create a model of sustainable forest management 
which could be further disseminated throughout the country. In this case, the 
aforementioned solution of Rosleskhoz to create a model forests network has 
opened the prospects of implementing the principle of mimetic isomorphism. 
However,  changes in jurisdiction in the government prevented this 
implementation.  
As mentioned above, eventual reduction of the transactional costs of the 
corporation could be one of possible results in creating a model of sustainable 
forest management and its further transfer to other enterprises. However, as the 
application of mimetic isomorphism was complicated by conditions of unstable 
institutional fields in the country, transaction costs remained high and the 
expected effect was not achieved. The situation was also aggravated by the fact that 
Russia, as a country with a transition economy, often encounters problems which 
often can be neither predicted nor tested and which can sharply raise transaction 
costs. This concerns, for example, the imposition of high customs tariffs on the 
export of roundwood, which is one of the main fields of business activity of STF-
Strug in the Pskov region. These tariffs made the company unprofitable and it was 
subsequently shut down in October 2008 along with other Stora Enso subsidiaries, 
STF-Gdov and Kingisepp.
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by Stiftelsen Marcus och Amalia Wallenbergs Minnesfond. The library work at 
Helsinki School of Economics was sponsored by a Finnish Academy invitation 
project (No. 122449).  The writing of this paper in 2009 was financed by the 
Finnish Academy Project “Trust in Finnish-Russian Forest Industry Relations” 
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2. Transaction costs are those costs not directly connected to production: e.g., 
expenses incurred by permits, endorsements by different actors, and establishing 
relationships of trust with local authorities, the community and stakeholders.
3. Leskhoz is a state forest management unit.
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Building trust in the process of localization of global 
forest certification.
Ivan Kulyasov1
1. Introduction
1.1. Main ideas
The present paper focuses on the analysis of the role of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and experts in building trust in the process of localization 
of global FSC forest certification in Russia. The international FSC certification 
scheme is a global nongovernmental process (Cashore 2002: 503-529; Cashore, 
Auld and Newson 2004), coordinated by the NGO Forest Stewardship Council, 
which has succeeded well in building trust in this system and promoted socially 
responsible, environmentally friendly and economically effective forest utilization. 
FSC forest certification is based upon a model of governance in which such 
nongovernmental stakeholders as NGOs and experts have the leading role 
(Arts 2005). FSC certification promotes international norms of corporate socio-
environmental responsibility in business forest utilization (Kulyasova 2008: 126-
152). The aim of the present paper is to analyze the processes of construction of 
public trust in a certified forest company and its logging enterprises. 
Social life cannot be considered in isolation from the environment, especially 
when it involves social life in forest settlements; hence, corporate social 
responsibility includes a strong eco-component. We can therefore state that 
the global concept of “corporate social responsibility” embraces among other 
things the responsibility for restoration and conservation of forests as an 
eco-social system. Such a broadened conception of responsibility is used by 
certified companies, NGOs and experts to build trust. It has to be noted that the 
meaning of corporate responsibility to a forest company is influenced not only 
by international FSC standards but, in cases of old enterprises, by traditional 
cooperation with the local communities which existed in the Soviet era. 
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1.2. Theoretical background
In the present research I refer to analyses of the conception of trust. Trust is 
conceptualized in social science research as a broadened multi-space social 
reality which resists the complexity and abruptness of social interaction. 
Correspondingly, trust is an essential strategy for overcoming this complexity 
and abruptness and achieving the desired results (Luhmann 1979; Barber 1983). 
Trust is a collective phenomenon which emerges when interacting and orienting 
with some common aims and values (Lewis and Weigert 1985). It emerges 
in social systems when the participants of those systems act in accordance 
with the expectations and ideas they have about each other or their symbolic 
representations of another one (Barber 1980). 
Developing this conception, Giddens noted that in contemporary global society 
relationships of trust appear not only in the form of trust based on personal 
circumstances, apparent as interaction and cooperation between social agents, 
but also as impersonal trust, which appears as a credence to abstract systems, 
i.e. symbolical signs and expert systems. Impersonal trust becomes crucial in 
conditions of widening the spatial and time distances of globalization (Giddens 
1990). 
When international FSC certification is localized, it becomes a concrete system 
for local communities and indigenous people, whose life and activities depend 
on forest. Certification gives them a mechanism of forest conservation in the 
form of controlling the forest utilization of a specific company. The FSC scheme, 
however, remains a symbolic system for buyers, who deal with the company 
brand and FSC logo, and confirm the eco-social responsibility of the producer. 
The consumer, be it a large company or a simple buyer in a shop, who is willing 
to buy environmentally friendly and socially “clean” production, trusts the FSC 
logo. Purchasing FSC-certified products, they act in accordance with their values. 
Thus, by their choice, they influence the corporate responsibility promoted by the 
FSC system. Researchers consider this practice of materializing consumers’ value 
orientations and requirements to be based on market demands (Vogel 2005), since 
eco- and socially sensitive European markets increasingly more often prefer the 
certified production of responsible corporations. Trust in the FSC was constructed 
by NGOs and responsible forest companies. Due to its efforts in promoting 
FSC forest certification, the organization became well-known and influential in 
international markets (Tysiachniuk, Kulyasova and Pchёlkina 2005: 305-326). As 
a result a large segment of certified production appeared in the markets of forest 
products. NGO and expert networks, which promote the performance of FSC 
certification norms and rules, play the role of expert systems. Their logos also 
become popular and they serve as a guarantee of trust for buyers. 
112
While NGO networks and experts promote certification, their guarantees of trust 
are at the same time links to global and local spaces.
 They play an important role in the change of local practices of certified companies 
and present them as eco- and socially responsible in international markets. As 
stakeholders, NGOs and experts help the certified companies to transform 
their practices into more sustainable ones, and construct trust, interaction, and 
partnership with local communities in the forest management area. It should be 
noted that in contrast to trust in FSC-certified companies as abstract systems 
built on the global level, localities express another type of trust. This personal 
trust is constructed on the local level during the concrete interplay between forest 
companies and local communities. 
1.3. Methodology and case study selection
The PLO Onegales holding (Joint-stock company “Industrial-timber association 
“Onegales”) and its six logging companies were selected for a case study. The 
bulk of the data for the present paper was collected in 2006-2008 during visits 
to the city of Arkhangelsk and the Arkhangelsk region: the cities of Onega and 
Kargopol, the villages of Onega, Primorie, Kargopol and Plesetsk, districts located 
near forests leased by PLO Onegales. Additional data were used from field-trips 
to the settlement of Maloshuika in the Onega district (2003-2005), Arkhangelsk 
and villages of the Onega district in the Arkhangelsk region (2005). In the studies 
the author applied qualitative methods of sociology such as case study, semi-
structured and biography interview, participatory observation and analyses of data 
from periodicals. 
50 interviews were conducted. The different groups of interviewed respondents 
included managers and workers of PLO Onegales and its logging units. 
Furthermore, several pensioners who worked in Onegales for many years after the 
Soviet period provided biographical interviews. Representatives of local, district 
and regional units of state forest agencies and local administration were also 
interviewed. A great number of interviews were carried out in forest and fishery 
villages located not far from the territories leased by PLO Onegales logging units. 
Furthermore, local citizens who actively used the wood and non-wood resources 
in the forests were interviewed applying biographical and semi-structured 
interviewing methods.
The paper will initially focus on socio-economic and socio-environmental 
contexts of the case and the process of certification at PLO Onegales. Secondly, 
a brief description of PLO Onegales history will be presented to show the 
transformation of its organizational structure. The case will demonstrate how 
trust is constructed on various levels when the company, in deciding to enter the 
process of certification under pressure from international wood buyers, tries to 
implement it with minimum resources, hence, minimum eco-social change. The 
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analyses will focus on mechanisms of construction of trust by NGO and expert 
networks between both the local population and PLO Onegales in the local 
context and international buyers and the certified company in the international 
context.
2. Social, economic and environmental contexts 
Social, economic and environmental contexts influence the process of adaptation 
to FSC certification in the locality and often determine the ways of constructing 
trust in the company on the local and global levels. In our case, the construction 
of trust between PLO Onegales and the local community is based on both old and 
new forms of socio-ecological responsibility, on building personal trust through 
regular interaction or its absence. 
The Arkhangelsk region has developed an intensive forest industry since the 
mid-20th century, when many forest settlements were built in order to provide 
manpower for the many new state logging enterprises (“lespromkhozes”). The 
social life of those settlements was completely oriented to providing logging 
enterprises with a labor force, and correspondingly the logging enterprise 
was responsible for financing the infrastructure of the settlements. Thus, they 
were called “forest settlements” (Pchёlkina, Kulyasova and Kulyasov 2004: 27-
29). Nowadays many old logging enterprises continue their work after various 
structural transformations and numerous changes of owners. Today (2009) 
almost all are integrated into large regional, Russian or international holdings 
functioning in the Arkhangelsk region (Interview with a representative of the 
Department of Forest Industry of the Administration of the Arkhangelsk Region 
2004). PLO Onegales was incorporated into an international holding of Russian 
origin called Investlesprom. The wood production of this region is mostly exported 
to environmentally and socially sensitive markets in Europe. For this particular 
reason the Arkhangelsk region became the leader in mass FSC forest certification 
in Russia.
By the end of 2008 forest management of the majority of forest territories leased 
by Arkhangelsk forest holdings had an FSC certificate or was in the process of 
certification (FSC web site www.fsc.ru). In the case of PLO Onegales, all their 
leased forests were certified (Public reports on certification by Maloshuilakales, 
Nimengales,  PLO Onegales,  http//www.gfa-group.de/beitrag/home_
beitrag_903550.html). 
The features of the local context in the case under review indicates that there are 
three types of settlements near the forests leased by PLO Onegales, and three types 
of interaction between the local population and the company are evident.  
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The three logging companies Maloshuikales, Nimengales and Iarnemale of PLO 
Onegales are located in the above-mentioned forest settlements created in the 
Soviet era in the mid-20th century. Traditional relationships between logging 
enterprises and the local population formed in this period still determine some 
settled forms of corporate social responsibility of the forest companies. Inhabitants 
of the settlements continue their work at the new forest companies that replaced 
the former Soviet enterprises, and expect the same social responsibility and 
help from the new companies. The companies partly continued the tradition of 
supporting local infrastructure, i.e. we see here a paternalistic interaction between 
a settlement-forming enterprise and the local population (Kulyasova, Kulyasov, 
and Kotilainen 2006: 81-112).
Another settlement form is the traditional villages housing old residents or 
people seasonally coming from cities. Their inhabitants used to work on Soviet 
farms (“sovkhozes”), which were closed down in the post-Soviet period. Very few 
people from such villages work at logging companies. These villages either had no 
settled relationship with forest companies or expectations of social responsibility, 
hence, no trust in PLO Onegales had even been constructed. The companies 
do not exhibit paternalistic attitudes towards these villages (Interview with a 
representative of the Administration of Oshevensk village 2006). However, FSC 
certification requirements generated the need for interaction with the population 
of such villages and building their trust and the administration of PLO Onegales 
realized this fact. 
The third type of settlements located nearby forests leased by PLO Onegales are 
the traditional villages of coast-dwellers who identify themselves as indigenous 
people named Pomors. They traditionally work at fishing collective farms 
(kolkhozes) which still exist (2009). These people had no trust in PLO Onegales. 
On the contrary, there was a conflict of interests in the forest management area 
which gave rise to personal mistrust in Onegales and mistrust on the abstract level 
in any forest operator. The life of the Pomors depends very much on fishing and 
hunting. They do not work in the logging companies and are mostly oriented to 
traditional forest utilization. PLO Onegales had not considered the Pomors as 
stakeholders and for a long time did not realize any collision of their interests. The 
reason for this situation was that the status of the Pomors as indigenous people 
was not recognized officially by the Russian state, and PLO Onegales did not 
take the traditional rights of this ethnical group into account. However, as FSC 
certification recognizes any indigenous people or self-identified ethnic groups 
and requires observance of their rights, PLO Onegales was forced to consider this 
feature and accordingly to form its policy during certification and after having 
received the FSC certificate. 
It should be noted that the Pomors are indeed an independent subethnos 
(Bershtam 1978) historically living on a vast territory called Pomorie (Bulatov 
1999), Arkhangelsk region being the center of it. They identify themselves as 
ethnic community and their NGOs struggle to have their status as an indigenous 
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people recognized by the state (Interview with a representative of the National 
Cultural Center “Pomors (coast-dwellers) Revival” 2005, 2007).  Later, through 
the efforts of NGOs and experts their rights as indigenous people were assigned in 
the Russian National Standard of the FSC. At the time of the case study, this was a 
contested issue for the company and auditors who regarded Pomor communities 
as ordinary local communities. Later, we will analyze how the intervention of 
NGOs and experts helped to change this situation and forced the company to 
fulfill its responsibilities according to the FSC certification requirements.
Thus, all three categories of settlements are stakeholders interested in forest 
utilization according to FSC certification and should thus be included in the list 
of interested groups, and be able to enjoy the corporate social responsibility of the 
PLO Onegales. 
The key feature of the environmental context of the case is the presence of old-
growth forest in the territories leased by PLO Onegales. These forests are located 
on the Onega peninsula, between the Dvina and Pinega rivers, near the border 
with the republic of Karelia, and in other places (Map of the old-growth forests, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/russia/ru/press/releases/366571, www.intactforests.
org). European consumers refuse to buy wood derived from old-growth forests, 
and the NGO networks struggle for their conservation. Hence, this feature of the 
local environmental context has an important effect on the construction of trust 
on the international level. The old-growth forests were traditionally considered 
by Soviet forestry as overripe forests that should be cut (Conversation with 
a director of PLO Onegales in 2006). Experts and eco-NGOs assessed them as 
high conservation value forests, important to the conservation of biodiversity and 
rare species, and for a sustained ecosystem of our planet. As eco-NGOs created 
an international discourse of old-growth forests as an environmental value, the 
refusal to cut in such forests is now an obligatory component of trust in a forest 
company. Eco-NGOs try to conserve these forests either through lobbying for the 
creation of special protected areas by the state or persuading forest companies to 
voluntarily conserve these territories. Forest companies signed a moratorium on 
cutting wood in the old-growth forests. A part of the forest territories leased by 
PLO Onegales in 2005 on the Onega peninsula were planned as a national park in 
the 1990s and were the focus of especially rapt interest of eco-NGOs. 
3. The process of certification 
PLO Onegales is a regional holding managing six logging companies: the Joint-
Stock Companies Maloshuikales, Nimengales, Onezhskoe Wood floating 
enterprise, Kargopolles, Iarnemales, Onegales (www.ongegales.ru); most of 
them were established on the basis of old Soviet lespromkhozes. This holding, 
as well as its managing company, was established in 2003 by the Open Joint-
Stock Company Onezhskiĭ LDK (wood processing plant), which managed these 
logging companies before 2003 and was the main consumer of their production. 
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Onezhskiĭ LDK with its suppliers was integrated into the international holding 
Group Orimi, from which Investlesprom bought them in 2007. Thus, Onezhskiĭ 
LDK and all enterprises of PLO Onegales became part of one of the largest and 
actively developing forest holdings in Russia (www.investlesprom.ru).
The process of forest management certification and the chain of custody at the 
logging companies of PLO Onegales took several years. Maloshuikales was the 
first company entering the process of certification, in 2003. It was chosen for pilot 
certification to approve the process and estimate the resources needed and benefits 
provided by the FSC certificate (interview with a director of Maloshuikales 2003, 
2004). The decision concerning certification was based on economic reasons. On 
the one hand, it was the requirement of foreign purchasers of carving wood; on 
the other hand, Onezhskiy LDK hoped to raise the prices of certified production 
(interview with a representative of the administration of Onezhkiy LDK 2003). 
The international NGO WWF played an important role in publicizing the 
necessity and benefits of certification. The Arkhangelsk Certification Center, 
which is closely associated with WWF, was invited for consultations. Its experts 
helped to prepare documents and organize events required by certification. They 
also prepared a program of corporate social responsibility for the company, which 
was designed as a “Plan of social and economic development for the 49-year 
leasing period” and included some concrete measures for developing the social 
infrastructure of the settlements. The company signed a moratorium on cutting 
on plots of the old-growth forests with Greenpeace (interview with a person 
responsible for certification of Maloshuikales 2004). 
The administration of PLO Onegales was somewhat disappointed in the results 
obtained as certification of Maloshuikales required substantial expense and did 
not yield any palpable economic result. The wood-processing plant Onezhskiĭ 
LDK could not certify its chain of custody because the amount of the wood 
coming from Maloshuikales was too small. Certification of other wood suppliers 
was also necessary. This process was also precipitated by the protest actions 
organized by Greenpeace in Germany in 2004, which concerned not only 
Onezhskiĭ LDK but all forest companies of the Arkhangelsk region. Greenpeace - 
Germany blockaded ships of Solomalskiy LDK carrying wood cut in old-growth 
forests of the Arkhangelsk region. These actions forced regional forest companies 
to make extra efforts to prove their environmental responsibility (Interview with 
the chairman of the board of the Association “Industrialists of Pomorie” 2004). 
In 2004 Onezhskiĭ LDK received an FSC certificate for Nimengales. In 2005 
management issues were transferred to PLO Onegales, which certified the 
following group of companies: Onegales, Onezhskoe Wood Floating Enterprise, 
Iarnemales and Kargopolles. Nimengales was later able to join this group 
certificate (Certification public reports, www.fsc.ru). 
Various interested parties, such as experts, NGOs, representatives of state 
agencies and business play an important role in FSC certification. FSC is a 
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voluntary certification system, promoted in the forest sector all over the world 
by an alliance of international NGOs and associations of socially and ecologically 
responsible companies. FSC makes logging companies more transparent and 
open to cooperation with different interested groups. FSC is based on ten general 
principles, 56 criteria and many indicators which adapt international principles 
and criteria to conditions of specific regions. Auditing companies accredited 
by FSC check the implementation of FSC requirements in forest companies 
annually. Real implementation of the FSC is, however, possible only if logging 
companies create a constructive dialogue with NGOs, local citizens, and other 
interested parties desiring to coordinate their needs in forest use with the 
company’s operations and can control the social and ecological responsibility of 
the companies. 
In the following we will analyze the role of experts and NGOs in the construction 
of trust towards PLO Onegales, focusing on the change in practices of corporate 
social and environmental responsibility, which is crucial for building trust. 
4. The role of NGOs and experts in construction of trust
The participation of NGOs and experts in FSC forest management certification in 
PLO Onegales considerably influenced the process of building trust between the 
company and the local and regional communities. NGOs became the guarantors 
of the quality of certification and often determine how global practices of the FSC 
forest certification are localized in changing the corporate environmental and 
social responsibility of companies.
 4.1. The role of international NGOs
In our case the most prominent international NGOs, WWF and Greenpeace, 
contributed to increasing of the eco-social responsibility of the company, although 
using different approaches and constructing not only trust (WWF) but also 
mistrust (Greenpeace).
4.1.1. The role of WWF
WWF, in the frames of its forest program, promotes sustainable forest utilization 
which supposes the equilibrium of its economic, environmental and social aspects 
(www.wwf.ru). One of the goals of this program is building trust in the abstract 
system of FSC-certified forest companies in general. Affiliation with the WWF 
forest program legitimizes the forest utilization of the company. WWF takes part 
in promoting FSC-certified production to environmentally and socially sensitive 
markets by constructing an image of responsibility of certified companies both 
on the international and national levels. Since 2008, WWF has joined the process 
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of constructing a ‘green’ market in Russia and creating a new national system of 
buyers’ trust in the FSC-certified production of Russian forest companies. WWF 
builds trust in an FSC-certified company in the public space and at the same time 
increases trust in its own brand and the expert services it provides by creating 
partnerships with forest business and trade corporations, organizing informational 
activities, educational programs and various events such as conferences, seminars 
etc. 
Trust in an abstract system – any FSC-certified company – is localized through the 
stimulation of the corporate social and environmental responsibility of a concrete 
company, which creates or increases existing personal trust in the company on 
the regional and local levels. Before PLO Onegales took over the company, the 
eco-social responsibility of the logging companies managed by Onezhskiĭ LDK 
was stimulated by interaction with WWF. Due to this cooperation, the company 
enjoyed the confidence of international and regional eco-NGOs and had an image 
of an eco-socially responsible company. Onezhskiĭ LDK successfully participated 
in ratings organized by WWF (for the eco-ratings of the forest industry sector of 
the RF, see http//www.wwf.ru/about_we_do/forests/aeol/ratings/doc457/page1.), 
which were largely published in the mass media. Furthermore, Onezhskiĭ LDK 
satisfied the ISO 14000 requirements for certification of ecological management. 
WWF involved Onezhskiĭ LDK managers in its educational programs. Onezhskiĭ 
LDK managers participated in the Russian National FSC expertise initiative 
(see list of participants of FSC Russian National Initiative, www.fsc.ru). Later, 
by this time PLO Onegales became a “candidate member” of the Association of 
Environmentally Responsible Forest Companies organized by WWF (for a list 
of participants of environmentally responsible industrialists, see www.wwf.ru). 
Interaction with the WWW Arkhangelsk office was based on the same principles 
and helped the company to build trust in its activity and policy on the regional 
level. The administration of the Onezhskiĭ LDK participated in regional events 
organized by the WWF: conferences dedicated to FSC certification, seminars, 
meetings of the working group developing FSC regional standards. 
4.1.2. The role of Greenpeace
Relationships with Greenpeace were constructed on another basis. Initially, 
Greenpeace molded public mistrust in the company and its logging enterprises 
and motivated it to certain actions. These actions were then legitimized by the 
eco-NGO and became part of the construction of trust. Long relationships with 
this radical eco-NGO even resulted in personal trust, as we will later see.
Interaction by the company with Greenpeace on the old-growth forests issue 
took place in parallel with its interplay with the WWF concerning certification. 
In the first stage, relationships between the eco-NGO and the company were 
mistrustful and cautious. To conserve large plots of old-growth forests the eco-
NGOs put forward the idea of creating a national reserve, Onezhskoe Pomorie, on 
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the Onega peninsula. The idea was supported by regional and federal authorities. 
Until 2001 the administration of Onezhskiĭ LDK actively objected to this decision. 
In their public presentations they explained that “creation of this park would 
result in cutting down 2/3 of their production area and reducing wood processing 
by 80.000 cubic meters per year” (Will “Onezhskoe Pomorie” … 2001). Nor did 
this correspond to the interests of the economy of the region. The efforts of 
Greenpeace helped leaders of Onezhskiĭ LDK to change their position, and locate 
a compromise: to create a smaller reserve. One of representatives of Onezhskiĭ 
LDK commented on their relationships with Greenpeace and its leader as follows: 
“We personally know Iaroshenko, because we had long discussions about the 
Onezhskoe Pomorie National Reserve ... And we have good contacts with him” 
(Interview with the representative of the administration of Onezhskiĭ LDK 2003). 
Finally, the creation of a national park on leased territories of the holding was 
agreed. Logging enterprises signed a moratorium on cutting old-growth forests 
on leased territories. Interaction with international eco-NGOs provided the 
logging enterprises of the holding with the image of an environmentally and 
socially responsible company and constructed consumers’ trust, which improved 
their position in the international and internal markets. This case shows how the 
practice of building trust by international NGOs not only forces a company to 
undertake various actions to be more environmentally responsible locally, but also 
helps to build personal trust between representatives of NGOs and the company. 
4.2. Role of regional and local NGOs
Interaction between the holding company and regional and local NGOs started 
later, as they were not identified as FSC-certification stakeholders, and were 
not informed by the company of the fact that certification provides them with 
new rights influencing the eco-social responsibility of certified companies. 
Such NGOs as Aetas, Pomorskoe Vozrozhdenie, Pomor Public Policy Center 
and Pomor People’s Community had their own interests conflicting with the 
forest activity of PLO Onegales. Aetas cooperated with experts and Greenpeace 
about creating the Onezhskoe Pomorie National Park and was interested in the 
conservation of forests on the Onega peninsula (Interview with a representative of 
the NGO Etas 2007). the Pomor Public Policy Center, in partnership with WWF-
Arkhangelsk, developed and introduced regional methodology for identifying 
high conservation value forests (HCVF) and organized public hearings (Interview 
with a representative of Pomor Public Policy Center and WWF-Arkhangelsk 
2007). Pomorskoe Vozrozhdenie struggled for the conservation of traditional 
Pomor culture on the Onega peninsula. Pomor People’s Community strove for the 
preservation of their traditional life and traditional natural resources utilization 
(Interview with a representative of National and Cultural Center Pomorskoye 
Vozrozhdenie 2006). 
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Before starting a dialogue and interaction in the framework of FSC certification, 
regional NGOs mistrusted the holding and its logging companies. After 2007 
this situation changed radically. In 2007, local Pomor and eco-NGOs requested 
the inclusion of PLO Onegales in the list of stakeholders. They did not succeed 
immediately, and were only officially recognized as stakeholders half a year later, 
after several publications in the mass media (Raikher, I. 2007)) and through 
internet list servers. In these publications the NGOs asked the company to 
demonstrate eco-social responsibility. A bad image in this respect could have 
destroyed public trust and thus prompted PLO Onegales and auditors to start 
interacting with local NGOs.
Finally this interaction contributed to forming public trust in the company on 
the regional and local levels and encouraged the enlargement of the sphere and 
forms of environmental and social responsibility by PLO Onegales. Local NGOs 
were invited to a meeting with the company and auditors during the next control 
audit of the companies managed by PLO Onegales. Preparing for the meeting 
NGOs studied the FSC standards, the company’s public reports and consulted 
with experts. They united their efforts and composed a common proposal to 
PLO Onegales concerning the improvement of their corporate system of eco-
social responsibility, to make it conform to the FSC requirements (Journals of 
participatory observation 2007). 
The main demand of the local NGOs was to recognize Principle 3 of the FSC 
standards concerning “rights of indigenous people”, and apply it to the Pomors. 
The protocol2 signed in the presence of auditors at the meeting stipulated: 
“participation of the local population in identifying plots of high social value 
forests, providing the local population with logging plots for firewood and carving 
wood, and assistance in creating a national park.” The company recognized all 
these proposals but the last. Thus at this stage NGOs contributed to a more 
complete fulfillment of the responsibilities of the holding and acted as guarantor 
of trust in forest companies at the local level. Regional and local NGOs later 
reduced their interaction with the company, and accordingly weakened their role 
in the construction of trust. There were several reasons for the passivity of local 
NGOs, the main reason being the lack of needed resources, because interaction in 
the frame of certification requires special knowledge, additional efforts and time. 
Only the added efforts of experts enabled the company to keep its promises.
4.3. The role of experts
During the certification process PLO Onegales had to contact several groups 
of experts, which greatly influenced the localization of global practices and the 
construction of trust between the company, local people and regional NGOs. 
Experts with the necessary competence, resources and special interest in the 
quality of the FSC certification finally became the main guarantors of the 
implementation of the FSC system, both in the locality and globally. 
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PLO Onegales worked with experts from the Arkhangelsk Certification Center 
and the auditor company GFA (http://www.gfa-group.de), who were certifying the 
forest management of PLO Onegales, as well as with social experts of the Center of 
Independent Social Research (CISR) from St. Petersburg.
4.3.1. Arkhangelsk Certification Center
Arkhangelsk Certification Center was first created on the basis of the Northern 
Forestry Research Institute as a center of information on forest certification 
and sustainable forest management. It was supported by WWF. Furthermore, 
when the need for preparation of companies for certification arose, the non-
profit partnership Northern Center of Forest Certification was registered by the 
initiative of a group of experts (interview with the head of the Northern Center of 
Forest Certification 2004). The group of experts of the Arkhangelsk Certification 
Center contributed greatly to the localization of the FSC certification system 
and took part in constructing trust in the company in the local community. 
Especially strong was their influence at the initial stage, during the certification 
of Maloshuikales. As mentioned above, they developed a program of social 
responsibility for Maloshuikales for the period of 49 years. The weakness of this 
program was that it was unknown and unpublicized in the local community. 
When PLO Onegales took over the management of Maloshuikales, the program 
was not supported by the new administration, and only some of the initial 
points of this plan were implemented. However, even this small implemented 
part of the program concerning social development and support for the local 
population had a positive effect on instilling trust in the local population in 
considering Maloshuikales socially responsible. Maloshuikales also gained 
the trust of the eco-NGOs, as the company respected recommendations of the 
Arkhangelsk Certification Center and conducted biological research on its leased 
territories as well as conserving plots of high conservation value forests. The 
company also developed their environmental policy (Interview of a director of 
Maloshuikales). All these actions were intended to raise the image of the company 
as environmentally responsible.
4.3.2. Expert auditors of the GFA
Experts-auditors often play a key role in forming abstract trust in the certification 
system, as they are responsible for the quality of certification of concrete 
companies. However, in the opinion of the local community they are usually not 
considered an important agent. In our case, the auditors were, however, stirring 
mistrust of the certification of the PLO Onegales in the locality, since they paid 
too little attention to the interaction between the company and local communities. 
Experts-auditors can lead the activity of the company in the desired direction, 
addressing corrective action requests (CAR). The company should eliminate 
122
discovered incompliance with the FSC standards (Maletz and Tysiachniouk, 
forthcoming). In the analyzed case, GFA auditors, understanding that certification 
is a long process and all non-compliance can not be corrected at once, focused 
firstly on FSC principles and criteria concerning logging and accident prevention 
issues, as well as on the environmental issues important to foreign consumers. 
The problems of social principles and criteria defining interaction with the local 
population and indigenous peoples were approached more formally. As the 
auditors did not pay enough attention to this aspect, the company did not put 
enough effort into informing the population about their new rights provided by 
certification. Principle 3 was not applied to the Pomors, since neither the auditors 
nor the company regarded them as an indigenous people.
4.3.3. The role of social experts 
A third group of experts – social experts from CISR3 – played the most important 
part in constructing trust between the local community, regional NGOs and PLO 
Onegales, as their activity focused on solving the problems of interaction with 
local and indigenous people. This group from CISR had participated in developing 
the social section of the Russian national standard of the FSC. These experts and 
consultants acted as federal stakeholders of certification, at the same time doing 
research on the implementation of the certification process in Russia. 
They firstly interacted with PLO Onegales during their research projects, and 
faced mistrust from the part of the company and a lack of readiness to provide 
any sort of information. The experts were interested in promoting FSC social 
standards in Russia and were assisting regional and local stakeholders to 
understand their new rights by stimulating the company to fulfill their social 
responsibilities. Social experts consulted regional and local NGOs and encouraged 
them to become stakeholders and formulate their interests to PLO Onegales. They 
organized a constructive dialogue between the company, NGOs and auditors and 
helped build a fruitful interplay and trust between them. 
Another direction of their work concerned local and Pomor people. They co-
operated with PLO Onegales and helped them organize a number of consultations 
with Pomors concerning identifying and removing socially valuable forest areas 
from logging. By this time the company became part of the Investlesprom holding, 
with which the social experts had already been successfully co-operating, a fact 
that positively affected their work. The consultations organized by the CISR 
experts together with the NGO Aetas and representatives of PLO Onegales in 
Pomor villages on the Onega peninsula in March 2008 maintained a constructive 
dialogue in spite of the strong original mistrust of local people.
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4.4. Construction of trust between local population and PLO Onegales. 
We indicated above that the level of initial trust between the company and local 
communities varied and depended on the social and economic context. In its 
first stage certification did not greatly influence the present situation. The poor 
participation of local communities in the certification process was caused by a 
lack of information concerning certification and the new opportunities, which 
should have been provided to the local population and indigenous people. 
In forest settlements a certain level of trust in the forest company had existed 
since the Soviet period, but the information and consultation requested by the 
FSC standard only started in two of the six companies of the holding, namely at 
Onezhskoe Wood Floating Enterprise and Nimengales, where places for gathering 
mushrooms and berries were excluded from cutting. The company conducted 
public hearings in a few settlements, but this was done according to the Law on 
Environmental Expertise and was not connected with certification, which initially 
did not influence much the company’s social responsibility. 
The situation was different in the Pomor villages of the coast of the Onega 
peninsula. The local population mistrusted the company, as it was cutting wood 
near their rural forests. The Pomors were worried about cutting in their hunting 
territories and near the rivers where they traditionally fished (interview with a 
hunter of a fishing collective farm 2005) and took their drinking water. They were 
afraid of a dropping water-level that could spoil the quality of the water (interview 
with the chairman of a fishing collective farm 2007). The local population took 
wood from nearby forests for building and repairing their houses and other 
constructions (interview with the chairman of a fishing collective farm 2007). 
Their mistrust increased after an unsuccessful attempt by the fishing collective 
farms to contact PLO Onegales. They tried to get permission from the company to 
take firewood from territories the company rented from the state and prevent the 
building of a road which would have run too close to the village (interview with 
the chairman of a fishing collective farm 2007). However, they did not manage 
to start a constructive dialogue with the company. PLO Onegales mistakenly 
believed the Pomor villages were not stakeholders in the FSC certification or 
entitled to benefit from the company’s social responsibility, as these settlements 
were not located inside their leased forest territories (interview with the person 
responsible for certification of the PLO Onegales 2006). After the control audit 
of 2007, due to the intervention of local NGOs and the experts from CISR, the 
company included the Pomor villages in the list of stakeholders and started the 
process of constructing trust. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion
As the analysis showed the process of constructing trust is implemented both 
globally and locally. On the global level NGO and expert networks build the 
trust of consumers in an abstract FSC logo, and locally they build the trust of 
local people in a specific company. Thus, forming trust in an abstract system is 
localized through stimulation of the corporate socio-environmental responsibility 
of a specific company that forms the personal trust in this company on the 
regional level and to their enterprises on the local level. On the whole, when 
building the trust of local NGOs and local communities in the company the most 
important things are regular interaction between all the parties, the range of old or 
new forms of corporate social responsibility and forming personal trust. It is the 
socio-environmental context which in many respects determines settled relations 
of trust and the range of the types of corporate social responsibility.
Three different types of local communities, namely forest settlements, traditional 
villages and Pomor villages, determine three types of interaction between the 
certified company and the local population. Forest settlements are treated by 
the company in a paternalistically supportive way. The company attends to 
traditional village people but tries to solve problems with a minimum of expense. 
Relationships between the company and the Pomors are cautious: the company is 
opposed to excluding large forest plots from cutting and the reservation of these 
forests for traditional utilization. Experts, international, regional and local NGOs 
strive to overcome conflicts through constructing trust, mutual compromises and 
partnerships. 
NGOs and experts play the most important role in building trust in the company 
both on the part of consumers and regional and local communities. They govern 
the local practices of the corporate social and environmental responsibilities of 
certified companies and present them as responsible on the international level. At 
the same time, being stakeholders they help the company to change their practices 
to build trust on the local level. The role of various NGOs varies depending on the 
focus of their activity. 
Promoting FSC certification throughout the world, WWF played an important 
role in localizing the global certification process at PLO Onegales logging 
companies and predetermined the relationships with Russian NGOs. The 
representatives of WWF acted as experts enjoying common trust, because this 
international NGO is the main agent promoting sustainable forest utilization 
throughout the world. Being a FSC forest certification stakeholder, the WWF 
controls and guarantees the quality of certification. 
Interaction with another international NGO – Greenpeace – concerning 
conservation of old-growth forests demonstrated how the practice building trust 
by international eco-NGOs can force companies to undertake concrete actions to 
prove their environmental responsibility in a locality and at the same time creates 
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personal trust between representatives of an NGO and a company. As a result, the 
administration of PLO Onegales was ready to set a moratorium on cutting wood 
in large woodlands of the forests of high environmental value. 
The interplay between the holding and regional and local NGOs also contributed 
to forming trust in the company on the regional and local levels, and stimulated a 
variety of forms and enlargement of the sphere of corporate responsibility. Though 
the role of these NGOs was rather occasional and limited, they reduced their 
contacts with the company due to a lack of resources. 
The important role of experts in the construction of trust arises from their high 
competence, interest in the quality of certification and available resources. They 
proved to be the guarantor of the high quality of the FSC certification both on 
the local and global levels. The experts of the Arkhangelsk Certification Center 
in many respects determined the first forms of localization of the FSC system in 
the company and took part in the construction of trust in certified enterprises 
in regional and local communities. However, their role was limited only to the 
preparing logging company for certification. 
The role of expert-auditors was crucial in forming abstract trust in the certified 
company, as they were responsible for FSC certification quality in a specific 
enterprise to buyers, NGOs and other stakeholders. In our case, on the local level 
the auditors provoked mistrust in the FSC certification of PLO Onegales, as they 
paid little attention to the interaction with local communities. On local level, trust 
is built on personal contacts between the forest company and local communities. 
Social experts from the CISR played a very important role in constructing trust 
between the company and regional and local NGOs as well as local communities. 
Their activity focused on solving problems of interplay between the company and 
local and indigenous people. The social experts especially helped PLO Onegales 
to gain the trust of Pomor NGOs and the Pomors themselves. Due to the experts’ 
activity and intervention, the Pomors were largely informed of the new rights 
brought by FSC certification, a constructive dialogue started between interested 
parties, and information was gathered about forests of high social value, which 
should be excluded from cutting. 
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Transformation of Corporate Social Responsibility 
in the forest sector in the context of global 
processes: the case of forest certification
Svetlana Tulaeva1
1. Introduction
At present, the theme of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been actively 
discussed in the world business community at different international and 
intergovernmental meetings. It is connected with the more intensive exploitation 
of natural and human resources in developing countries in the age of globalization, 
and further development of world trade and market society (Giddens 2002). 
Consequently, one of the tasks of international organizations in the 21st century 
is the development of global rules in the sphere of labor relations, human rights 
and environmental protection (O’Rourke 2005; Arts 2004). There are numerous 
definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR), but they all imply diligent 
business practices oriented towards the economic, social and environmental 
interests of society (Vogel 2005). 
Among the new mechanisms of non-governmental influence on environmental 
and social policy of companies is forest certification, which is promoted by NGOs 
(Bartley 2003; Cashore 2002, Cashore et al 2004). Forest certification represents 
the social, economic and environmental standards that regulate the activities 
of logging companies. I assume that certification requirements for observing 
international environmental standards, creating safe working conditions for 
employees and protecting for the interests of the local population, as well as other 
requirements in this sphere, may be a framework for developing social policy 
pursued by Russian enterprises in new market conditions. If the Soviet structure 
of social responsibility implied the implementation of paternalistic relations by the 
state and the enterprise embracing all spheres of their employees’ lives, the model 
suggested by certification is based on a balance of interests between different 
groups of land users, viz. the state, business, and local population. 
Introduction of certification standards in Russian conditions, however, will be 
somewhat different from similar Western practices, as the emerging Russian 
market has not completely been formed (Kotilainen et al 2008; Tysiachniouk 
2009). The collision of two different contexts, Soviet and market, has given rise 
to a number of peculiarities not inherent in developed industrial countries. First, 
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the transition to a market society in Russia is characterized by the retention of 
significant elements of the virtual economy including barter transactions and 
informal arrangements (Gaddy& Ickes 1998). Second, the infinite and thus far 
ineffective reform of forest legislation and the absence of efficient forest resource 
control which is to be implemented by the state have complicated the further 
development of the timber processing complex. Finally, civil society, which could 
cooperate with business, is just starting to develop in Russia.
The aim of this paper is to analyze CSR transformation in the Russian forestry 
sector, which is affected by 1) state structures in the market context and 2) civil 
society structures and their strategies for implementing forest certification.
This paper is based on the framework of the new institutional approach in 
sociology (Scott 1995; DiMaggio and Powell 1983), which states that institutions 
consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior (Scott 1995: 33). If institutions 
are effective, they reduce the uncertainty of the environment and allow actors to 
reduce transaction costs related to the exchange (North 1990; Scott 1995). 
Organizations operate within institutional fields. Institutional fields in certain 
contexts can act in favor or as a barrier to institutional change. In order to decrease 
uncertainty institutional fields tend to be isomorphic (DiMaggio, Powell 1985). 
In isomorphism sociology understands the processes that make institutional 
fields and inter-organizational roles homogenous. This allows groups of actors 
to react more smoothly to external changes. Another important factor affecting 
institutions within institutional fields is the experience of the actors, operating in 
the field.  It affects institutional stability as the old rules of the game are embedded 
in the cognitive schemes of the agents involved in interaction.  This creates 
barriers to incorporating new rules that would promote overall institutional 
change (Fligstein 2001). 
My research is based on qualitative methods (Flick 2002). I used 15 semi-
structured interviews with different stakeholders (small and large forestry 
businesses, state actors, local population) which were collected in 2007 during a 
field trip. My case study involves the Priluzskii leshoz in the Komi Republic.2 This 
case demonstrates the process of implementation of forest certification in which 
the main proponent of extending the model of sustainable forest management is 
now global actors: the transnational NGO World Wildlife Fund, its Silver Taiga 
regional office, which later became an independent organization, and the Swiss 
Development Agency, which allocated funds to build innovative models of forest 
management in the territory. Subsequently, the spread of certification in the 
region was supported by a transnational corporation, Mondi Business Paper. 
In the first part of the paper I shall consider the influence of elements remaining 
from the Soviet system concerning the social policy of the enterprise. Soviet 
representations of the all-inclusive role of the enterprise in the life of the 
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population still form a basis for the informal requirements for business set by 
local authorities in rendering social help to the region. The second part of the 
paper is devoted to a new model depicting the relationship between business and 
the local community which has been propounded by forest certification. The 
availability of developed democracy in the local community is necessary for the 
successful functioning of such a multi-actor model. It is important to determine 
how efficient the suggested pattern of forestry relations is in conditions of civil 
society which have been artificially constructed by the NGOs in my case study. 
2. Description of the local business community
Small logging companies, in particular, operate in the territory of Priluzie. 
However, the timber processing enterprises which buy wood from them strongly 
influence their activity. Therefore, when exploring the business community, it is 
important to analyze the work not only of small companies functioning in this 
forest management unit, but also of large timber processing companies which 
affect the process of introducing new forms of social responsibility.
These companies are the Syktyvkar timber mill in the Komi Republic and the 
Kotlas pulp and paper mill in the Arkhangelsk region. In the Soviet era both 
enterprises were included among the seven giant pulp and paper mills of the 
USSR, their processing capacities reaching one million cubic meters per year. 
After its transformation during perestroika the Kotlas pulp and paper mill 
remained in the hands of Russian shareholders and became a branch of the 
largest Russian pulp and paper mill, Ilim Pulp Enterprise. Presently, this company 
produces approximately 19 % of all Russian cellulose, 22 % of cardboard and 9 
% of paper (www.ilimpulp.ru, last entry in December 2006). The Syktyvkar 
timber mill was bought by the transnational corporation Mondi Business Paper. 
It supplies over 40 % of the Russian market with office and offset paper; it also 
manufactures newsprint and corrugated cardboard (www.mondibp.com, last entry 
in December 2006). 
Both enterprises have a vertically integrated business structure. The head offices 
of the corporations (including enterprises) develop corporate strategy and policy, 
directions of development in regions, supply raw material, and provide up-
to-day methods of reforestation and timber harvesting. In addition, Ilim Pulp 
Enterprise has singled out Ilim Sever Les as the logistics department it will engage 
in supplying the Kotlas pulp and paper mill with raw material; this has assisted in 
distributing of functions at the mill. Thus, Kotlas is engaged in paper production 
and Ilim Sever Les is concerned with timber procurement. In the time of this 
research, in 2008, Ilim Sever Les Co Ltd. comprised 15 logging enterprises and the 
Syktyvkar timber mill incorporated 14 subsidiary timber enterprises.  
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All in all, when the research was in progress in 2007, there were 15 tenant logging 
enterprises in the Priluzie forest management unit. Four worked at the regional 
level, six enterprises leased logging sites within the Priluzie region and the 
remaining five operated at the local level in the vicinity of a particular settlement. 
The largest company working in Priluzie was Luzales. Eight of fifteen enterprises 
have supply chain certificates and another was preparing for certification auditing. 
Practically all logging enterprises had their own sawmills for the preprocessing of 
timber. 
In addition to the logging enterprises, there were a number of small trading 
companies that purchased and resold unprocessed wood. In some cases they 
were also engaged in harvesting operations in forest areas acquired through 
auction. Logging companies delivered pulpwood (the top of the tree from which 
cellulose is produced) to the Syktyvkar timber mill. This enterprise is a unique 
complex utilizing pulpwood in Komi, where there is a surplus of such wood. 
Hence, the enterprise has been able to require a high quality of wood from 
the logging companies. It has developed an eligibility system for suppliers that 
includes such criteria as logging technologies, forest certification, enterprise size 
(a large enterprise guarantees uninterrupted deliveries), and previous experience 
of cooperation with the timber mill. Those businessmen who did not have the 
opportunity to supply pulpwood to Mondi Business Paper were compelled to 
either deal with intermediaries or to reduce it to firewood. They could also ship it 
to the neighboring Arkhangelsk region, to the Kotlas pulp and paper mill, but that 
was not economically viable. 
This situation has led to an unusual context. On the one hand, sawn wood was 
sold by businessmen using market channels. On the other, logging companies were 
sometimes compelled to resort to informal ties in dispatching their pulpwood, by 
exerting pressure via the local administration. Consequently, the problems which 
arose were often settled by businessmen through informal connections rather than 
in the course of market competition. 
Such a variety of forestry companies provides an opportunity to consider different 
options concerning the impact of certification they encountered. It also made it 
possible to study the opportunities of civil society to affect the formation of a new 
type of corporate social responsibility through the process of their certification. 
3. Influence of the state on CSR transformation
In the Soviet era most timber enterprises formed company towns. They 
were responsible for maintaining roads, boilers and so forth; they supported 
schools, kindergartens, houses of culture and sanatoria. Such a structure of 
social responsibility was possible under the conditions of a planned economy 
and government subsidies. With the fall of the Soviet system the economic 
situation of the enterprises deteriorated and they could no longer maintain the 
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infrastructure level of the settlements. In some cases the enterprises managed 
to “amicably” hand over their social responsibility to the local administration or 
other institutions; otherwise, the social sector could become a factor inhibiting 
the company. Formally, after privatization, the state had to recover expenditures 
which the companies had spent maintaining the social sphere. However, this 
compensation was actually much less than the real expenses. It stands to reason 
that in the 1990s small timber companies were going bankrupt. Timber industry 
companies used the process of bankruptcy as a means of being released from the 
social responsibility payments they had been assigned since the Soviet period. 
This procedure worked in the following way: concurrent with the old enterprise, 
a new one was established and all modern equipment and facilities were shifted to 
the latter. The old enterprise then declared bankruptcy and was closed down. The 
new company began to work with the same director and same workers in the same 
place, but with new constituent documents and without any debt to the township. 
At the same time, forest settlements could no longer survive alone, even with 
a certain level of minimal support from the local administration (interview 
with a director of a logging enterprise). Nostalgic reminiscences of the well-
organized life of Soviet times constantly arose in current discourses: “In the past, 
Priluzles contained the entire infrastructure of this local forest management unit: 
settlements, boilers, etc. This was a budget item of the enterprise. There was 
housing repair: every summer four to five houses were dismantled and rebuilt, 
three brigades being engaged in this work. The logging depot paid for all this. 
Employees did not deal with such things as repairing a porch or pavements - that 
was the business of these brigades. The houses were built and tenanted” (interview 
with a local inhabitant, an employee of a logging enterprise).
The Soviet social structure, which the transformation to market relations 
destroyed, continued working as private arrangements between the companies 
and the local administration. The existing social policy of most enterprises was 
not voluntary; often it was a sort of a fee levied by local authorities as a sign of 
their tolerant attitude towards them. Large holdings and small logging companies, 
in addition to tax deductions in the budget, have contracts with the local 
administration for social support. Social aid included some financial assessments, 
providing transport, material assistance to schools and houses of culture, purchase 
of equipment for chopping wood etc. 
In addition to the agreements on social support, companies sometimes face 
additional costs for the settlement. One of the respondents, a representative of the 
Syktyvkar timber mill, told us about the double taxation introduced in practice. 
“We pay transport taxes … but in spring any forest management unit which 
transports wood down the federal road, will pay additional charge equal to 5 or 
15 thousand. That is, there are both target and seasonal taxes” (interview with one 
of the head managers of the Syktyvkar pulp and paper mill). He goes on to say 
that in order to work successfully in the region the company should have a good 
reputation: “If the municipality is in no way interested in us, they may not allow 
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us to extract minerals from the pit which are necessary for us to construct roads” 
(Interview with one of the head managers of the Syktyvkar pulp and paper mill).
Informal mechanisms of interaction were also feasible in relation to local 
forest management units. In an interview a manager of the Syktyvkar timber 
mill explains: “Forest management units try to get additional money from the 
companies.” For example, the company may violate the rules of cutting.  Formally, 
the local forest management unit should take a triple penalty for reforestation and 
transfer it to the federal budget. However, this offers a mutually advantageous 
means of solving the problem: no penalty is assessed on the enterprise, but it must 
pay the cost of reforestation that would be made by this forest management unit. 
It is expedient to both, and as one manager remarked: “According to the law, local 
forest management units have to provide companies with pieces of land gratis; 
however, they have invented such a mechanism as a payment for information (the 
description of the piece of land to be exploited) to enlarge their budget. Forest 
units spend the money received for this information on forest management” 
(interview with one of the head managers of the Syktyvkar timber mill).
One should also note that the pressure from regional administration on big 
business, including personal arrangements, double taxation and other elements of 
informal economy, was perceived by business as natural business strategies. One 
manager noted that “the more parties that are interested, the more leverage the 
situation involves. If we are bad for everybody, let them say: press them all until 
they surrender” (interview with one of the head managers of the Syktyvkar pulp 
and paper mill). 
At the same time, the local administration also depends on the businesses 
operating there, and the companies have the opportunity to use administrative 
mechanisms to influence the current situation in accordance with their economic 
importance to the region. The Syktyvkar timber mill as a key player in this region 
had an opportunity to exert pressure on the regional government. For example, 
further expansion of the Syktyvkar timber mill can promote the monopolization 
of the forest product market in the republic. In the development of its industrial 
strategy, the government of the Komi Republic is oriented towards large investors. 
According to a forestry specialist, “we are civil servants and cannot just go 
ahead and construct something … We try to take actions in order to increase 
investments. It is only a question of their desire to participate. It’s up to them” 
(interview with a specialist from the Forestry Department of the Komi Republic). 
Small companies, in exchange for financial assistance, have access to 
administrative resources. According to one of our respondents, prior to the 
competitive bidding on leasing a certain plot, they signed an “agreement on 
social partnership” with the administration: “I make extra payments to the 
administration towards the development of district … 450 thousand rubles per 
year… how they use it is not my concern” (interview with a director of a logging 
enterprise). It is no wonder that the representatives of administration who were 
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members of the committee on leasing lands usually gave preferential treatment 
to companies which not only paid taxes but also participated in community life. 
The administration even supported unprofitable but useful enterprises which 
were establishing company towns, since the liquidation of those towns could 
lead to the destruction of the infrastructure of the whole settlement. In 2006, the 
Verhnaya Lopija enterprise and the settlement of the same name were involved in 
such an arrangement. According to a representative of regional administration, 
they will do their utmost to help the company pay off all its debts: “If it leaves, 
the population will encounter serious problems. In all likelihood the settlement 
will eventually die. So long as the enterprise operates, the settlement will survive” 
(interview with a representative of local administration). Informal arrangements 
between administration and business were also used in this situation to help the 
enterprise survive. As noted by a member of local administration, “for instance, 
on Friday there was a shut-down of the electric power system because of debt. 
Everything was disconnected, including power-saw equipment; they have tried to 
stop communications in the office and garages. We, however, stopped it all with 
one phone call. On Friday all equipment was energized and everything worked… 
Everything was paid, but not by us. Now they have no debts and the electricity has 
been turned on” (interview with a representative of local administration).
The administration helped enterprises which are undeveloped but useful to the 
settlements by selling pulpwood; this was the basic problem for all companies 
in this region. It was a way of exerting pressure on the Syktyvkar timber mill. 
According to one of the representatives of this company, they sometimes had to 
violate their principles of selecting suppliers to meet demands by the regional 
administration to support undeveloped enterprises. The prevalence of informal 
mechanisms of interaction hinders the development of a market economy and 
contributes to maintenance of former Soviet practices. 
Thus we see that CSR in this case has continued to exist in the “voluntary-
compulsory” form since the Soviet era. On the one hand, such practices were an 
echo of the Soviet vertical control system; they showed instances of misfeasance 
and, in some cases, the domination of personal contacts over market relations. 
On the other hand, such practices somehow helped to support the destroyed 
infrastructure of the region. 
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4. CSR transformation process in the context of market, society and 
certification
4.1. industrial modernization
In order to develop market relations in the forest sector, timber enterprises were 
compelled to change their economic tactics. Earlier they aimed at fulfilling the 
plan laid down by the leaders of the Communist Party, while other questions were 
resolved by the state. The new position of the company entirely depends on the 
operating efficiency of timber-harvesting teams, the availability of a processing 
facility, and the successful trade of timber. This promoted modernization of 
production.
To increase the volumes of felled wood, middle range and large companies, such 
as Priluzles, Luzales, and Wiledles, began to use Finnish technology and organize 
temporary logging settlements. In such settlements workers live and work in shifts 
(lasting 15-20 days). The Finnish complexes work day-and-night and allow the 
cutting of great amounts of timber. In terms of the socially responsible position of 
the company, these camps have a dual effect. On the one hand, the construction 
of a well-appointed settlement, including separate small houses for workers, a 
dining room and a bathhouse, make life in the woods more comfortable. Finnish 
technical equipment is more effective and more convenient. The shift-work 
arrangement is more effective for raising the level of corporate culture: “It is much 
easier to institute it using this technique… When they introduced work in shifts 
- when people come and live there for 20 days in normal working conditions, 
they have no opportunity to drink… If an employee did something incorrectly, 
the manager could definitely say that it was e.g. Ivan Ivanov who operated this 
block yesterday, at such and such an hour. This worker had to correct his error 
after hours with a petrol saw bought with money deducted from his pay: you 
rushed through your work and left something undone. Well, come on, saw it 
up and stack it. Sure enough, an absolutely different attitude arises with such a 
system” (interview with an employee of the Priluzie forest management unit). But 
at the same time, high-technology equipment needs fewer mechanical operatives, 
and the formation of shift teams allows businessmen to avoid the necessity of 
recruiting workers from local villages. Unemployment already represents a serious 
problem for the local population of the forest settlements, and the occurrence of 
technically well-equipped shifts has substantially worsened the situation.  
4.2. Certification of holding companies
Presently, both the Syktyvkar timber mill and Kotlas pulp and paper mill have 
FSC certificates. The reasons which induced them to undertake certification 
were different. The Syktyvkar timber mill chose certification according to the 
general policy of the entire Mondi Business Paper Corporation. Though the 
company itself is engaged in trade chiefly within the territory of Russia, the 
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holding company certifies all its production, regardless of its marketing feasibility. 
The corporation’s ecological policy developed by its head office adheres to the 
observance of national laws on environmental protection, the implementation of 
sustainable forestry practices (i.e., application of the most advanced technology 
in the sphere of forest governance), and the introduction of forest certification 
systems acknowledged all over the world (www.mondibp.com). Moreover, 
the Syktyvkar timber mill has subsequently become another factor promoting 
certification in the Komi Republic. Since it is a unique pulpwood-processing 
enterprise in the region, it has had the opportunity to dictate terms to other 
companies. Certification of chains of custody has become one of the main criteria 
which the enterprise has set for its suppliers. In 2007 the Syktyvkar timber mill 
declared that beginning in 2009 it would cease to accept non-certified production 
and that to some extent fostered certification of its suppliers.
For the Kotlas pulp and paper mill, the necessity of certification was stimulated 
by the requirements of environmentally sensitive European markets. European 
customers frightened by consumer boycotts in the 1990s demand transparency of 
the supply chain and proof of the legality of the wood. As one director remarked: 
“Serious clients from Denmark who regularly buy our products said that they 
were afraid of any actions – ‘suppose someone chains himself to a ship and does 
not allow us to dispatch it’ – because they are very serious about this question” 
(interview with one of the directors of Ilim SeverLes). As 80 % of the Kotlas mill’s 
production is intended for export, the FSC certification would guarantee the 
stability and safety of business operations in the European markets.
4.3. Certification of small business 
Priluzie represents an atypical case of a forest certification process. The main 
role in certification belonged not to local enterprises trying to enter sensitive 
markets, but to the following global actors: the Swiss agency for development, 
which assigned means for introducing the most progressive and successful forest 
management practices in the Komi republic, and the transnational NGO WWF, 
and its NGO Silver Taiga branch, which became independent of WWF.
Most of the companies working in the territory of the Priluzie forest management 
unit are not big in size, and can hardly survive in new market conditions. They 
have considered forest management certification an additional burden which 
requires them to make changes in the organization of production and add to 
their financial expenses. A more positive attitude to certification was shown in 
larger companies, such as the Noshulsk timber enterprise, Wiledles, and Luzales. 
They had larger volumes of production and expected some interest from Western 
trading partners in certified wood. These companies considered certification 
expenses “payment for an improved image”. The Noshulsk timber enterprise and 
Wiledles, as subsidiaries of the Syktyvkar timber mill and the Kotlas pulp and 
paper mill, should conform to the internal corporate policy of the holdings. Many 
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companies working in Priluzie were compelled to certify their chains of custody 
in order to gain a more stable market for pulpwood with the Syktyvkar timber 
mill. One should note that the Priluzie forest management unit has received an 
FSC forest management certificate (mostly complicated by organizational and 
financial issues) with the assistance of the Silver Taiga foundation. The companies 
were engaged in certification of the chain of custody independently, which was 
less difficult. As a result, there was a paradoxical situation in which even weak, 
loss-incurring enterprises were able to obtain a certificate for the supply chain. 
For example, Verkhnaia Lopia was successfully audited for certification, though it 
had a debt of approximately one million rubles; another enterprise, Priluzles, has 
recently suffered the third stage of bankruptcy.
4.4. Economic, environmental and social consequences of certification
The certification process provides the companies with more opportunities to 
enter the world markets. Though it is not a “golden key” to world trade, it can 
serve, according to one top manager, “as an additional means in the competitive 
struggle”, and also guarantee a steadier position in the world markets. However, 
this economic aspect was significant for large companies such as the Syktyvkar 
timber mill, the Kotlas pulp and paper mill or Luzales. A forest certificate had no 
effect on the economic efficiency of small and middle-sized timber companies, 
which are numerous in Priluzie. None of them have profited from the sale of 
certified production in the market. This can be illustrated by the following 
opinions: “You are listed on a website as a certified chain of custody, but I don’t 
care at all, as they give me nothing. I neither see nor hear it; I only pay for it”; 
“Certification just adds too much work”; “in the economic sense, it does not play 
an important role for us” (interviews with directors of logging enterprises).
In spite of the minor economic effect of certification on small business, it became 
the basis for CSR development in timber industry enterprises. All businessmen 
and employees of local forest management units mentioned the positive influence 
of certification on the timber-cutting process in terms of environmental standards. 
An example of this is: “What we had earlier – suppose two tons of oil was lost, 
because of a hole in a tank… We insist that there are bins in the forest where 
we can collect any bottles, pieces of cables... It’s just so easy – to put in a bin, 
collect, remove. If oil is spilled, then fill the bin with sawdust and the oil will be 
absorbed and you can take the waste away” (interview with an employee of a local 
forest management unit). Higher international environmental standards demand 
protecting virgin forests and key biotopes which are not secured by the Russian 
legislation.3 
Certification also includes social standards. The certificate imposes more 
stringent compliance with sanitary standards, the requirements for overalls or the 
timely payment of wages than the laws of Russia. According to the head of one 
of enterprises, “certification has ensured more social opportunities, which have 
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become noticeable. Let us take, for example, living conditions: normal heated 
dwellings made of canted timber, first-aid kits, and special working clothes. We 
use imported equipment for sawing. Accordingly, we try to provide workers with 
imported overalls, helmets and suits” (interview with the director of a logging 
company).
After certification, the amount of social assistance to the local population has not 
really changed. The businessmen themselves note that enterprises have always 
participated in the life of local settlements, and therefore “since certification 
nothing new has been invented” (interview with a director of a logging company).
An important consequence of the implementation of forest certification in 
Priluzie was the opportunity to attract people to participate in forest management. 
Certification assumes consultations between the company and the local 
community, providing them with the prospect of being involved in the decision-
making process. Experts of the Silver Taiga foundation engaged in the certification 
of the Priluzie forest management unit have introduced public meetings as a 
way of involving the population in forest issues. This was stimulated by Russian 
legislation and applied in the ecological assessment concerning industrial building 
construction. However, it was the first time that this action was undertaken in 
regard to leasing forests. The importance of public meetings is that the local 
population discusses forest issues with a potential leaseholder, expresses their 
wishes and makes relevant recommendations. It can be made obligatory in 
a leasing contract by the decision of the regional commission. Owing to the 
interaction between the experts of Silver Taiga and the government of the Komi 
Republic, a procedure such as this has been spread throughout the area. The 
foundation has also conducted significant work on informing the local population 
of their opportunities to influence forest relations through the mechanism of 
hearings. Having been encouraged by Silver Taiga, the population began to 
participate in these actions. The main requirements of local residents addressed to 
companies were as follows: delivery of firewood, maintenance of jobs, assistance 
to schools, libraries and houses of culture, which, for example, may be to repair 
libraries or to provide transportation for schools. As noted by one of informants, 
“our population is not used to a higher level of social welfare and does not demand 
it… many things which are taken for granted in the West are almost a major 
achievement for us”  (interview with one of the head managers of the enterprise).
At the same time, there were cases when the population actively demanded 
material maintenance of the settlement and put forward requirements for 
conformity with environmental standards, for example, in respect to preservation 
of virgin forests. Such a situation occurred at a public meeting concerning land 
leased by the Syktyvkar timber mill in the Kaygorod forest management unit, 
which included tracts of virgin forests. As a result, a decision was taken to 
relinquish a major part of these territories. We should note that this happened 
not only because of certification requirements, but because of the policy of the 
corporation’s head office as well. In Russia, for the first time, Mondi Business 
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Paper was faced with the problem of protecting virgin forests, which according 
to Russian law were to be cut. Greenpeace demanded that the question of virgin 
forest preservation be included as an objective of the global environmental 
policy of the corporation. Thus in this case, the peculiarities of the local context 
(vulnerability of legally unprotected virgin forests) have entailed changes in the 
environmental policy of the transnational corporation and led to protection being 
declared one of their priorities. The regional government of the Komi Republic 
has supported the initiatives of Silver Taiga and the Syktyvkar timber mill on 
removing these forests from the list of areas to be cut. 
However, this activity of the local society was implemented with the active 
participation of Silver Taiga. We should note that in localities where no 
preliminary work was being conducted among the population, public meetings 
were often very formal in nature. The people themselves did not always believe 
in the opportunities provided by participating in decision-making. Here is an 
opinion of one of participants: “They were predesigned – all these meetings at 
the local administration. Everything was predetermined and nothing depended 
on the people. The population did not matter anymore. Everything had already 
been scheduled - to give a sector to such person” (interview with an employee of 
the Loem forest management unit). There are no relevant statistics showing that 
a percentage of the population’s demands were registered in contracts of tenancy. 
In general, the extent of involving local people in forest management still depends 
on the intensity of the work of the NGOs. As a result of terminating the vigorous 
activity of Silver Taiga in the project, the local community gradually withdrew 
from participation.
5. Conclusion
The case study has demonstrated the opportunities provided by imbedding 
international business standards into the Russian context through the activity 
of NGOs and large enterprises connected with the European markets. The 
transformation of socially responsible forest business can now impact not only on 
state institutions but also on the demands of civil society and the main instrument 
for this has been forest certification. 
As a result of the implementation of new rules the organizational field has 
to some extent changed. Some companies holding FSC certificates achieved 
stability in both the international and national markets. In implementing the new 
rules the NGO Silver Taiga employed normative isomorphism, while the forest 
management unit used coercive isomorphism, especially when implementing 
measures concerning workers’ safety. At a later stage the Syktyvkar timber mill 
used mimetic isomorphism in making its decision to certify territories of other 
forest management units in the same way as in Priluzie. 
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During the work of the project we observed that in regard to questions of social 
responsibility the companies actually feel most pressured by the state. The essence 
of this pressure and the ways it is realized differ little from those prevailing in 
the Soviet period. The main demands made by state structures to the forestry 
business include: tax assessments made to the regional budget, conformity 
with environmental standards of the Russian Federation, job creation in forest 
settlements and maintenance of their infrastructure. In these conditions both the 
authorities and enterprises often have to resort to informal and barter agreements 
using such principles as the state leasing areas to companies and then requiring 
additional payments to the budget.
Forest certification has become a new mechanism involving the social policy 
of logging companies. It has offered business a new direction in developing 
social responsibility based on a dialogue with civil society. Higher international 
standards of labor protection and occupational safety promote the enterprise 
improving the quality of its environmental and social policy. However, the scheme 
of social responsibility offered by forest certification does not eliminate and 
replace existing informal methods of interaction between the administration and 
companies. Two types of relationships - informal, based on private agreements 
and barter transactions, and market-oriented - currently co-exist. 
Such collision between two different contexts has resulted in some peculiarities of 
the certification process. A specific point involved in introducing certification in 
the region under study is that along with large companies connected to sensitive 
Western markets, state structures - one of the NGO’s main partners in this matter 
- actively participate in promoting certification. Silver Taiga offered a way of 
introducing certification through state-operated forest management units and 
implemented it in its work. The local forest management unit certified forest 
management in the whole area and by doing so facilitated the certification of a 
chain of custody among lessees. Large timber industry complexes, the main buyers 
of pulpwood, started to certify production less as a result of the changes occurring 
within the local context than their affiliation with transnational economic 
space. Regardless of this fact, their participation in the process of certification 
has contributed to an acceleration of changes taking place in the locality. Later 
on, when the Syktyvkar timber mill undertook certification of the leased areas 
of its subsidiaries, it supported Silver Taiga’s innovation of involving other forest 
management units in the certification process. 
In the course of the research it became clear that there are a number of certified 
bankrupt enterprises working in the territory of Priluzie. This contradicts the 
concept of certification as market leverage and can be explained by two reasons. 
The changes in the companies located in Priluzie proceeded not only from the 
natural course of events (the development of the Russian market, renewal of old 
and the existence of new contacts with Western partners etc.), but also from the 
intervention of global actors in their activities. None of the logging companies 
working in Priluzie could act independently without the assistance of NGOs in 
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regard to the organization of forest management certification. The existence of 
certified bankrupt enterprises was also possible through informal arrangements 
between business and the local administration. It was a business strategy for 
survival in new market conditions. 
Although small business did not profit from certification, it stimulated the 
improvement of the environmental and social standards used by the enterprise. 
Certification standards, such as accident prevention, provision of safety 
equipment and uniform clothing, and regular wage payment, have become the 
basis of developing the companies’ social responsibility to their employees. At the 
same time, the lack of strict rules and regulations concerning support from local 
communities has created only a general framework for the companies’ relevant 
socially oriented activity; the application of this framework depends on the 
company.
This case study has demonstrated the possibilities of stimulating local democracy 
“from above”. Public meetings organized by Silver Taiga have become a 
mechanism for the local inhabitants gradually becoming involved in a dialogue 
with business. However, as is evident from the experience of the Priluzie forest 
management unit, the local inhabitants themselves were not ready to maintain 
relevant initiatives; they needed an organizer, in this case, Silver Taiga. Hence, 
there is a danger that by terminating the project and reducing NGO activity the 
local democracy “cultivated from above” will decrease, and the dialogue between 
business and the local community will acquire a formal character. 
Despite a certain artificial character of promoting certification in Priluzie, the new 
model “was inscribed” in this locality and subsequently was developing according 
to market laws. Some of most successful companies entering Western markets 
could use the obtained certificate as an additional advantage. Other companies 
needed certification to sell their products to the Syktyvkar timber mill, which also 
follows international standards in its activity. This assumes that the introduced 
practice will continue to operate even after Silver Taiga withdraws from the region 
and financial support from Western sources terminates.
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